MINUTES OF THE
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Sixty-seventh Session
February 2, 1993
The Assembly Committee on Judiciary was called to order by Chairman Robert M. Sader, at 8:00 a.m., on Tuesday, February 2, 1993, in Room 332 of the Legislative Building, Carson City, Nevada. Exhibit A is the Meeting Agenda. Exhibit B is the Attendance Roster.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
Mr. Robert M. Sader, Chairman
Mr. Gene T. Porter, Vice Chairman Absent/Excused
Mr. Bernie Anderson
Mr. John Bonaventura
Mr. John C. Carpenter
Mr. Tom Collins, Jr.
Mr. James A. Gibbons
Mr. William D. Gregory
Mr. William A. Petrak
Mr. John B. Regan
Mr. Scott Scherer
Ms. Stephanie Smith
Mr. Michael Schneider
Mr. Louis A. Toomin
OTHERS PRESENT:
Paula Treat, Nevda Judges' Association
Judge Valorie Vega, Las Vegas Municipal Court
Judge Robey Willis, Carson City Municipal Court
Robert Hadfield, Executive Director of the Nevada
Association of Counties
Guy Hobbs, Director of Budget and Financial Planning,
Clark County Department of Finance
Mary Henderson, Washoe County Department of Finance
Kurt Fritsch, City of Henderson Department of Finance
Paul McGrath, Carson City Sheriff
Kevin Higgins, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney
General's Office
Ben Graham, Clark County District Attorney's Office
Following roll call, Chairman Sader reviewed the schedule for the two weeks in Las Vegas. He welcomed Michael Schneider to the committee as a temporary substitute for Mr. Haller.
Chairman Sader then opened the hearing on AB 55.
ASSEMBLY BILL 55 - Makes various changes to provisions governing disbursement of administrative assessment for violation of misdemeanor.
Paula Treat, representing the Nevada Judges' Association, came forward and introduced Judge Valorie Vega from the Las Vegas Municipal Court.
Judge Vega explained AB 55 had been requested by Association members at the Nevada Judges' Association annual conference. During these meetings, it was revealed several jurisdictions were having a problem gaining access to the administrative assessment fees they had been collecting. The intent of AB 55 was to address those problems, hoping thereby to eliminate the need for Association members to address them through litigation. In 1990, although Nevada Supreme Court had held the statutory scheme and surcharge might cause some problems in budgeting and administering the fund, they had thought such problems could be solved by "good faith cooperation" between the branches of government. Current budget problems had severely tested the "good faith cooperation."
Clarifying the term administrative assessments, Chairman Sader explained in the early 1980's the Legislature had enacted the administrative assessment law as shown in the bill. This provided that for criminal offenses with fines based on a sliding scale there would be assessments associated with the fines, i.e., additional money paid by the criminal defendant in the process of sentencing and fining. The law also provided a series of distributions, proportionate shares of the administrative assessment going to various services generally judicial related. Chairman Sader pointed out this circumvented the traditional budget process in local government, which was the crux of the problem.
Continuing, Chairman Sader told committee members AB 55 was written to deal with the disbursements of these funds, interest accruing on those funds, etc. One key area to remember was when specific assessments were created and sent to an earmarked destination, conflicts and potential problems were also created in the allocation of the funds.
Finally, Chairman Sader explained administrative assessments were collected through the court and distributed to the county or municipal treasurer. They were then placed in designated accounts for use by the court system or other earmarked places.
Judge Vega then explained the assessments had originally been devised to supplement the basic budget of the courts to allow them to purchase those things they needed to effectively function in a modern arena. These funds collected by the court were separated from the fine bail with all receipts, monies and records maintained separately. Also, all court dockets, documents and minute orders tracked the funds. Judge Vega told committee members in certain circumstances it could be as long as two years and as early as two months before the particular case was adjudicated and if the person was found not guilty, the fees might be refunded. The monies stayed in an account which was held by either the city or the county until such time as the case was resolved and ended.
During the holding period these monies were invested in market accounts and a variety of different investments. Thus, the amendments in sections 5 and 6 stating that interest accrued on administrative assessment fees, which was not money belonging to the cities and counties, should be distributed in the same fashion as the actual assessments themselves. Essentially, Judge Vega continued, the city or county was holding the administrative assessment bails or final adjudication monies in a special account and were operating as the banker of those monies. It was Judge Vega's experience these monies were being invested by the city or county managers and the accrued interest was becoming a windfall for those entities. Judge Vega opined it was only fair the interest accrued on the monies should be returned to the depositors and not held by what she perceived were the "bankers."
Explaining the amendments, Judge Vega pointed out section 5(b), page 2, lines 33-37, and 6(b), page 2, lines 2-6, addressed monies which were collected but not spent at the end of the fiscal year, and provided for them to be carried over to the following year. This would allow money to accrue for the courts enabling them to purchase the large-ticket items such as security systems, video capability systems and computer systems.
Continuing with an explanation of proposed new language, Judge Vega commented page 4, section 10 and 11, lines 4-24, addressed the question of how to deal the funds at the end of the fiscal year. Page 3, section 7, lines 12-19, clarified permitted uses of administrative assessment fees.
Page 3, section 8, lines 20-25 specified that the administrative assessment fees were collected only to supplement the regular budget "unless reasonable grounds exist to deny such an expenditure or request." Unfortunately, there had been a variety of problems in this area, she stated.
In the original language requested for the bill, Judge Vega said they had not asked for this to be handled in a special account but rather by a trust account in order to place the city and county in a fiduciary duty with regard to the spending of those monies. There had occurred instances in which the city or county had used administrative assessment fees without the knowledge of the judges of the court system.
Chairman Sader asked Judge Vega if she was suggesting an amendment relating to the creation of trust accounts. Judge Vega agreed rather than placing it in a special account it should be placed in a trust account.
Judge Vega agreed the present system circumvented the budget process, although the court was required to submit budgets dealing with anticipated expenditures of administrative assessment fees. She thought there should be more stringent regulation, however.
Mr. Carpenter was confused about where the interest would eventually be placed. Judge Vega answered it would divide along the same breakdown as the fee itself. In other words, if there was a $100 administrative assessment fee collected which remained in the account for a period of perhaps two years, the interest accruing on the $100 would be split proportionately and at the same rate of division of the fee. Mr. Carpenter opined the interest accrued would go to the state. When this legislation had been considered initially, Judge Vega stated, there had been some consideration given to a percentage rate, but there was a question if this would produce some constitutional consequences. The problem had been eliminated by placing a cap which would require no matter what fine was imposed, the most the court would ever receive would be $2.50. Nonetheless, Judge Vega maintained if $2.50 was designated to go to a justice court, the interest on $2.50 should also go to the justice court.
Chairman Sader opined the confusion in the language could be a question for the bill drafters. The intent was understood, but if the language did not fit, the bill drafters should look at it.
When asked approximately how much money was being considered, Judge Vega stated her municipal court had contributed over $2 million the last fiscal year. The amount returned to her court (the Las Vegas Municipal Court) was approximately $160,000.
Judge Robey Willis from the Carson City Municipal Court and head of the Government Affairs section of the Nevada Judges' Association, told the committee he had been surprised to learn the Las Vegas Municipal Court monies had been deposited in the city or county general fund. For a number of years, he said his court had been placing leftover monies in a separate fund in Carson City; and this was the original intent of the legislation. Clarifying legislation was just needed to regulate these monies.
Mr. Anderson questioned section 7, which expanded the area of the justice court. He asked if they currently were spending the funds for capital improvements or whether personnel was included. Judge Vega replied she knew no one who was using it for personnel purposes. Judge Willis agreed the perception was such monies should not be used for personnel.
Mr. Anderson questioned language on line 17, section 7 stating, "professional services which are not otherwise provided by employees of the court." Judge Vega gave an example of an $80,000 contract with the National Center for State Courts for a comprehensive study and assessment of overall operations, efficiency of the case management flow, facilities and structure, security system, collections division, and suggestions for implementing the American Disabilities Act (ADA).
Mr. Scherer was somewhat concerned with language in section 8 in regard to due process. Judge Vega replied she did not believe this was a problem. Basic services, Judge Vega contended, should come through the general budget, while the refinements could justifiably come from the administrative assessment fund. Mr. Scherer questioned whether there was a constitutional problem with providing the court too much authority over what happened with the money.
Judge Vega remarked Mr. Scherer's initial concerns regarding due process arguments had been addressed by Justice Gunderson in early stages of the legislation.
Chairman Sader questioned Judge Vega's early statement regarding litigation issues arising from the current statute. He wondered what these issues were. Responding, Judge Vega indicated the type of scenario in which a replacement piece of equipment was needed by clerical personnel. The authority holding these funds could deny this request, reasoning the monies were more properly needed for another project. If this occurred, the judge would have to file a writ of mandate with the district court to force the city manager to process the purchase request for the replacement equipment.
Clarifying, Chairman Sader stated, "The legal issue would be forcing the county or city -- as the case may be -- to use the funds for their intended purpose, . . . by using a subterfuge of the reversion process. The intent was to fix this by the language on carryovers of reversions." Judge Vega agreed. Judge Willis believed Chairman Sader's statement had clarified the issue adequately.
Chairman Sader then asked if there was any allegation by the judges that interest had to be allocated to these accounts by current law. Judge Vega said this was not an issue that had been addressed until it had been discussed at the Nevada Judges' Association meeting.
Thus, Chairman Sader summarized, the legal issue was the one relating to refusal to utilize funds for their intended purpose; instead favoring a reversion of those funds.
Mr. Carpenter asked if present legislation required the city manager to approve the expenditures from the administrative assessment fee budget. Judge Vega said this was not specifically stated, but in common budget practice across the state the courts did not hold their own accounts, but rather the accounts were held in the finance department of either the city or county. Judge Willis reiterated most courts experienced no difficulty in obtaining agreements from the cities and counties in the manner in which to spend these monies. It appeared to only be occurring in small pockets in the state.
Mr. Collins wondered why this was an issue just in Clark County. Judge Vega answered this was not an issue just in Clark County; there were pockets throughout the state and much depended on who the city or county officials were.
Chairman Sader asked for opposing testimony. Coming forward as a spokesman, Robert Hadfield, Executive Director of the Nevada Association of Counties (an association representing all 17 Nevada counties), introduced Guy Hobbs from Clark County, and Mary Henderson from Washoe County.
Mr. Hadfield explained generally as a matter of principle, the members of his association opposed dedicated revenues because they often created a separate class of operations within county governments. Mr. Hadfield opined there would be an expansion of the current use of the dedicated revenues beyond the original intent, which was specifically dealt with in section 7.
Mr. Hadfield maintained the current statutory authority worked and operated in good faith; and elected county and city officials could work together with the court to resolve the problems.
Mr. Hobbs indicated the administrative assessment fee was already contrary to the basic principles of budgeting and accounting for expenditures of governmental functions in what was called the "general fund." He emphasized this general fund system had worked very well in Clark County, and if revenues were routinely earmarked certain critical functions would eventually have no support. He cited as an example a jail which generated very little revenue, but cost over $30 million/year to operate. Alternatively, the business license department might only cost $2 to $3 million/year, but it generated well in excess of $30 to $40 million/year in revenue.
Mr. Hobbs told the committee the recent Price Waterhouse Study dealing with Nevada's revenue and tax structure had strongly discouraged the use of earmarked revenue; and invariably, earmarked revenues led to inequities in funding among governmental services. The provisions of AB 55 would clearly liberalize the application of current administrative assessment fees by making them not only subject to more liberal expenditure requirements but also allowing the funds to roll forward from year to year and create interest.
The existence of administrative assessment fees, Mr. Hobbs continued, had already created some resentment and jealousy on the part of other members of the criminal justice system and elected officials who did not have the benefit of dedicated revenues. Mr. Hobbs did not believe there was a particular problem in Clark County. They had worked quite well with the justice court administration, he opined, and they had, in fact, been in a position in the last few years to return revenue to the general fund after all their capital expenditures were fully satisfied.
Also in opposition to AB 55, Mary Henderson agreed with Mr. Hadfield and Mr. Hobb's testimony. Washoe County considered the manner in which they presently administered the assessment presented a desirable check and balance system which might possibly be eliminated if AB 55 was enacted. Ms. Henderson also called attention to section 8, wherein there was the proposal to supplement and not displace other funding available. Budget preparation would prove difficult in determining the proper interpretation of allocation. The county government was not in the role of banker. Presently, interest monies were captured into a fund, not a special account.
Kurt Fritsch, representing the City of Henderson, agreed with the testimony from Washoe and Clark County. He added the municipal court in his jurisdiction did not pay its own way, but was supplemented by the general fund. From that perspective he felt there was a difference of opinion regarding the separation. While there was a separation of government between the administration of the city and the court, the municipal court administered its own budget and the budget process fell under the guidance of the city manager. The court had to compete, as did all departments, for any expenditures in a coming year.
Chairman Sader indicated the practice of denying requests for use of funds so such funds would revert to the general fund and be used for other purposes was troubling. He asked where this had occurred. Mr. Fritsch did not believe this had occurred in Henderson. Ms. Henderson said they had always tried to work with the court system on a carry-over basis. Some projects not completed in one year would carry over to the next year. She was not aware of any real problems. Mr. Hobbs said to his knowledge this had not occurred between Clark County Administration and the Clark County Justice Courts.
Chairman Sader asked Mr. Hadfield if he saw this as a problem in other jurisdictions throughout the state. Mr. Hadfield replied he had no personal knowledge of the problems the proponents of AB 55 had alluded to.
Turning to the proponents, Chairman Sader asked if they could tell him where else the reversion issue was a problem besides in the Las Vegas Municipal Court example. Judge Vega replied this had been reported by different members in the Association as happening in some of the smaller outlying areas such as Ely or Elko. It had also occurred in certain areas of the juvenile court and Judge Vega believed it had occurred in Carson City.
Mr. Scherer asked Mr. Hadfield if it was common for revenue-generating departments to make a "pitch" for increased budgets based on the amount of revenue they had generated. Mr. Hadfield said, "Yes." Regarding the current law stating these funds could be used to improve the operation of the court, Mr. Scherer questioned if this was not already broad language. Mr. Hadfield agreed it was broad, but noted when the law was originally enacted it was fairly clear the focus was on capital and equipment needs which could not otherwise be met.
Questioning Mr. Hobbs concerns regarding earmarking funds, Mr. Scherer noted Clark County had recently created its own DUI school in order to earmark certain funds to support specific programs thereby putting a number of small business people out of business. How was this different from what the judges were seeking to do in AB 55?
Mr. Hobbs replied in the specific program mentioned by Mr. Scherer they could see no other way to accomplish the funding of the program at that time. If other funds had been available, they would not have taken the route they did.
When questioned by Mr. Scherer, Mr. Hobbs agreed the administrative assessment funds were already earmarked. Thus, AB 55 would not expand the earmarking of the funds. If the practice was to proliferate, however, it would render the general fund difficult to manage.
Mr. Regan questioned "earmarked fees" as opposed to "taxes." In the budgeting process how were the administrative fees budgeted. Since the fees were based on fines would it be difficult to predict any given amount to be received? Mr. Hobbs replied he could only answer for Clark County, but Clark County together with the court would make an estimate of what they believed the application of the administrative assessment fees would generate. They would then match the revenue estimate on the expenditure side with an appropriation for a similar amount of money in a separate general fund expenditure account, separate from the regular justice court account. The remainder of the justice court budget was handled as all other county budgets were handled during the budget process, and appropriations placed in the justice court budgets for the general operation of the court. In a separate line item on the expenditure side of the "other general expense" category there was a similar amount to the estimated revenue from the administrative assessment fees. The actual revenue might vary, he added, but there were mechanisms which dealt with the fluctuation.
Mr. Regan asked if this would cover the allocation of the interest monies. Mr. Hobbs told him the interest was allocated to the general fund. If AB 55 was enacted, they would need to segregate the administrative assessment fees into a special fund in order to allocate pooled interest to it. The accounting procedures for allocating to a subaccount of the general fund would be very complex.
Mr. Anderson asked how many of these justice and juvenile courts were fiscally self-sufficient without monies from the general fund for overall operation. Ms. Henderson replied there were none.
Judge Willis remarked during his tenure as a judge in Carson City far more revenue in fines had been brought into the city than the city had returned for the operation of the court.
Addressing a question to Mr. Hadfield, Mr. Anderson drew attention to language on page 3, section 7, line 9. Why was the justice court not treated in the same way the juvenile courts and municipal courts were treated? Mr. Hadfield could not say why the original legislation had been written as it was. His objection was to the scope of spelling out the activities, not with regard to the justice court. "Then you would support expansion in line 9 to include the new language, 'justice court?'" Mr. Anderson asked. Mr. Hadfield said in his experience in Douglas County the justice court had not been treated differently. He was not quite clear what the language meant.
Mr. Petrak questioned whether language on page 3, section 7, lines 13, 14, and 19 opened up unlimited opportunity to spend the money. He did not believe it was appropriate language.
As just a statement, Sheriff Paul McGrath, Carson City Sheriff and representing the Nevada Sheriffs and Chiefs, stated they had proposed legislation which would change the manner in which the money was distributed to the various entities throughout the state after it was collected.
Finally, Judge Vega addressed Mr. Petrak's question regarding the language on page 3, line 19, "(d) Other acquisitions deemed necessary by the court." She pointed out this was not in the original language, but was submitted by the Nevada Judges' Association. The language submitted was, "The improvement of the operation of the court shall include, but is not limited to, such things as training, education, capital purchases outside professional services and contract acquisitions which would not normally be funded by the executive branch of government." However, this particular subsection would be governed under section 8, requiring that it be a "reasonable" expenditure. She did not think any justice would abuse this provision.
Mr. Bonaventura suggested this bill should be heard in Las Vegas since that appeared to be where the problem was occurring. Chairman Sader said they would hear the following bill and when finished would return to discuss whether there was an appetite to continue discussing AB 55.
ASSEMBLY BILL 76 - Creates administrative assessment to be used to help defray costs of extradition.
Deputy Attorney General, Kevin Higgins drew committee members' attention to Exhibit C showing extradition costs for fiscal year 1992. Mr. Higgins explained the Attorney General's Office currently approved all extraditions from out of state which were referred to them from county and city agencies, as well as most state agencies. An extradition took place when a felon fleeing Nevada was apprehended elsewhere. If it was learned through the computer network the individual was wanted in another state, a decision would then be made whether to extradite. Extradition costs related solely to costs incurred in retrieving a fugitive.
In the past, Mr. Higgins said attempts had been made to retrieve the costs from the extradited person, and this had provided approximately $50,000 in payments by probationers. There had been an attempt to assess these costs to people who were sent to prison, but a recent Nevada Supreme Court decision had limited their ability in that regard.
Explaining the intent, Mr. Higgins told committee members AB 76 would create a new administrative assessment. For every $1,000 bail posted, the arrested individual would have to pay $2.00 in an administrative assessment. This money would first go into a county fund which would in turn be paid into a state fund each quarter. This would supplement the current monies now allocated in a separate extradition fund. Currently when those monies were exhausted, the Attorney General's Office turned to a contingency fund. Mr. Higgins explained it was their goal to allow the county to keep the interest while they held the money. Once the quarterly payment had been made to the state coffers, any interest accruing from that point would go into the state extradition fund. Basically, he remarked, this was an attempt to fund the extradition process by passing the costs on to the people generating the expenditures.
Mr. Scherer asked if this administrative assessment would be returned to those people found not guilty. Mr. Higgins said this would not be the intent, the funds would simply go into the fund.
Mr. Toomin asked if there were any estimates, based on last year's records, how much money would be generated by this assessment. Mr. Higgins replied they had tried to estimate this, but he had been unable to determine what the figures were for bail bonds posted last year. They were able to determine from some counties the amount of cash bonds posted, but justice courts did not keep track of bonds posted as it was not their responsibility if the bond was eventually forfeited.
Mr. Gibbons asked if, in fact, an administrative assessment was constitutional as it related to the direct application of justice to the person being attached. Was it not truly a "tax" as opposed to an "administrative fee?" Mr. Higgins opined it was an assessment rather than a tax principally because it affected a very narrow class of persons (who were posting bond). However, he said he would have to do some research before answering this definitely. Mr. Gibbons asked him to do that.
Mr. Regan pointed out a "fee" was based on anticipated behavior. Did the Attorney General's Office anticipate everyone would attempt to flee the state? Mr. Higgins said he could not answer this, although it was not uncommon for an individual to leave the state.
Discussion followed.
Ben Graham, with the Clark County District Attorney's Office, related an occurrence after the 1991 Legislative Session. He said he was placed in the unit which oversaw extraditions. He said they invariably found that those charged with the most serious offenses left for Canada, Hong Kong or Bangkok. He said it was the policy in his office not to extradite anyone from anywhere unless they could get a felony conviction in the long run. Ninety-five percent of all cases were negotiated or plea bargained. It took two police officers to go after someone, and in some instances commercial airlines would not allow a prisoner in handcuffs on an airplane. Finally, Mr. Graham said the extradition process was long, tedious and expensive. Mr. Graham opined this was a "user fee" not a tax.
If this was in fact a user fee, would it not be more appropriate to charge a higher amount on those who were actually extradited and convicted? Mr. Scherer asked. Mr. Graham assured him they did make an effort to seek costs of extradition on all convictions; however, this was not often successful.
Was there a process to collect costs? Mr. Scherer continued. Frequently, Mr. Graham replied, in a negotiated plea part of the negotiation was to make restitution, pay the victims and pay back costs of extradition. Generally, this was at the discretion of the Parole and Probation Department, and although there was, indeed, a method, it was not very effective.
Mr. Toomin asked again to see an estimate of proceeds if the bill was enacted. Mr. Graham agreed with Mr. Higgins there was no centralized method of determining this. If optimistically this generated more than was used, the remaining monies would simply go into the general fund. However, Mr. Graham added this was an unlikely scenario; and more likely there would not be an amount in excess of the expenditure. Mr. Graham agreed to try to determine an approximate forecast of what would be generated.
Mr. Collins asked if either Judge Vega or Judge Willis could roughly estimate what they assessed in bails on a daily or weekly basis. Judge Vega replied she had tried to get some figures together on this subject, but had been unable to do this. Judge Willis estimated in Carson City approximately 1,500 to 2,000 cases per year fell into the category of bail they were questioning. There had previously been $40 added to every bond, $20 of that going to victims of violence. Mr. Sader clarified this was a government fee on the bond itself.
Bails would probably average $5,000 and $10,000 each in the district court, Judge Willis said. Judge Vega thought this was hard to estimate but guessed it would more likely be $400 to $500 in the municipal court.
Before closing the hearing on AB 76, Chairman Sader opined the constitutional question of whether it was a "fee" or a "tax" was important enough to settle before they proceeded with the bill. He asked Mr. Higgins to provide research on this by Thursday, February 11, 1993, so it could be discussed in work session on Friday, February 12, 1993. Specifically, he asked for a brief opinion from the Attorney General's Office whether the proposed fee would run into any problems, constitutional or otherwise, or would violate concepts of taxation. Mr. Higgins stated he would do that.
Also, Chairman Sader asked for some kind of estimate as to the funds this administrative assessment would generate, and how the figures were tabulated.
Chairman Sader again turned attention to AB 55, recalling the earlier discussion. He asked if there was sufficient interest to continue with the bill. Would an amendment make it more favorable? He suggested a motion to indefinitely postpone, based on the premise if the motion passed there would be no need for further testimony. Alternatively, if the motion failed, the committee members could continue.
ASSEMBLYMAN CARPENTER MOVED TO INDEFINITELY POSTPONE ASSEMBLY BILL 55.
ASSEMBLYMAN GIBBONS SECONDED THE MOTION.
Mr. Carpenter felt the special assessments created animosity between elected officials and the judiciary. In the past it had not been needed. Recently in Elko, Mr. Carpenter indicated the district judge had taken the commissioners to court over some aspect of spending for the court. The Nevada Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the judge. Subsequently, the question, "Should the county commissioners have the authority to set the budget of the district court and the other judges within the context of how budgets are set for the other county offices?" had been placed on the ballot. The vote had been overwhelmingly against the judicial system. Mr. Carpenter opined the people felt the county commissioners and city council had been elected to allocate funds to the various aspects of the judicial system in the same manner as they did any other department. Mr. Carpenter thought the bill was too broad.
Though he understood the needs of the judicial department, Mr. Gibbons thought the initial threshold in this case was one in which a class distinction was being created between departments. The judicial system would end up having access to revenues which other departments did not have. Allowing this would simply open the door to other departments. Also, by enacting this bill, Mr. Gibbons concluded they would allow a method to circumvent the administration of all forms of government.
Agreeing with both Mr. Carpenter and Mr. Gibbons, Mr. Anderson nonetheless thought the bill could be saved, and thus, the motion should fail. He suggested clarifying and broadening the scope to include the justice court in the bill, and retain sections 7 and 8.
Various committee members made statements regarding either their opposition or support of the bill.
Chairman Sader asked for a roll call vote.
THE MOTION FAILED. (ASSEMBLYMEN CARPENTER, GIBBONS, SCHNEIDER AND PETRAK VOTED YES, ASSEMBLYMAN PORTER WAS ABSENT FOR THE VOTE, ALL OTHERS VOTED NO.)
Following discussion it was decided to appoint a subcommittee to work out language. Mr. Anderson was appointed chairman, joined by Mr. Toomin and Ms. Smith. Chairman Sader asked them to bring back amending language by Friday, February 12, 1993.
Chairman Sader asked whether Mr. Gibbons would be ready to report to the committee on his subcommittee by Friday, February 12, 1993. Mr. Gibbons said this would probably not be ready until after the committee had returned from Las Vegas.
There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 10:30 a.m.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
Iris Bellinger
Committee Secretary
??
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
Date: February 2, 1993
Page: 1