MINUTES OF MEETING
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Sixty-seventh Session
April 29, 1993
The Assembly Committee on Judiciary was called to order by Chairman Robert M. Sader at 8:11 a.m., April 29, 1993, in Room 332 of the Legislative Building, Carson City, Nevada. Exhibit A is the Meeting Agenda, Exhibit B is the Attendance Roster.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
Mr. Robert M. Sader, Chairman
Mr. Gene T. Porter, Vice Chairman
Mr. Bernie Anderson
Mr. John C. Bonaventura
Mr. John C. Carpenter
Mr. Tom Collins, Jr.
Mr. James A. Gibbons
Mr. William D. Gregory
Mr. Ken L. Haller
Mr. William A. Petrak
Mr. John B. Regan
Mr. Scott Scherer
Ms. Stephanie Smith
Mr. Louis A. Toomin
COMMITTEE MEMBERS ABSENT:
Mr. Michael A. Schneider
GUEST LEGISLATORS PRESENT:
None
STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT:
Ms. Denice Miller, Research Analyst
OTHERS PRESENT:
Mr. David Sarnowski, Chief Deputy, Nevada District Attorney's Office
Mr. Noel S. Waters, District Attorney, Carson City District Attorney's Office
Mr. Gary Hatlestad, Chief Deputy, Washoe County District Attorney's Office
Mr. Dan M. Seaton, Chief Deputy, Clark County District Attorney's Office
Mr. Ben Graham, Legislative Liaison, Nevada District Attorney's Association
Mr. Kevin M. Kelly, Attorney, Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice
After roll call, Chairman Sader opened the meeting on committee business. He presented a Bill Draft Request for committee consideration dated April 29, 1993 which was a Clark County bill originating from the Department of Youth and Family Services and Juvenile Services.
ASSEMBLYMAN TOOMIN MOVED FOR COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION OF THE BILL DRAFT REQUEST.
ASSEMBLYMAN COLLINS SECONDED THE MOTION.
THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY.
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 521 Revises provisions governing penalty hearings upon conviction for first-degree murder.
A.B. 521 had been introduced by the Attorney General's Office.
Mr. Kevin M. Kelly represented the Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice. He stated A.B. 521 would remove the three judge panels in circumstances where juries were unable to arrive at unanimous sentencing decisions in first degree murder trials.
Mr. Kelly noted, in cases where juries had been unable to arrive at unanimous verdicts, the district attorneys had the options to drop charges or have the defendants tried again. He alleged, in most instances, cases would be retried and subsequent juries would have the opportunity to arrive at unanimous verdicts.
Mr. Kelly opposed the practice of three judge panels. He suggested provisions to address cases where juries had failed to arrive at unanimous verdicts which should allow the courts to impose the least severe penalties. To further clarify, he stated juries might agree the death penalty was inappropriate but be unable to decide whether the sentence of life with the possibility of parole or life without the possibility of parole was appropriate. This hung jury situation was the type of case which would proceed to a three judge panel. He alleged approximately nine out of ten of these cases resulted in death sentences by the judges, which he adamantly opposed.
Mr. Kelly addressed A.B. 521, Section 1, lines 6 and 7, which did not provide for bench trials or trials by judges in first degree murder cases. He contended this was inappropriate as all first degree murder cases must be tried by juries.
As Mr. Carpenter understood, juries had three penalty options in which to choose from in first degree murder cases: death, life with the possibility of parole or life without the possibility of parole. The three judge panels came into effect when juries could not unanimously agree upon any of the listed three penalties. In these cases, the juries would elect for the least severe penalty which was life with the possibility of parole.
Mr. Kelly stated some jurors would not impose the death penalty because of personal beliefs which resulted in hung juries. In cases where juries unanimously rejected the penalty of life with the possibility of parole and were undecided as to whether to levy death sentences or life without the possibility of parole, the juries would submit their verdicts to judges under special verdicts. In these situations, life without the possibility of parole would be imposed by the judges as it would be the least severe of the remaining death sentence option. Under the present statute, Mr. Kelly alleged the three judge panel could not elect to impose the sentence of life with the possibility of parole. A.B. 521 would create this. Under the present statute, provisions required trial judges convene three judge panels to decide sentences in accordance with the discretion of the three judge panels.
Mr. Porter pointed out juries who had been predisposed to elect the death penalty could be selected. Mr. Kelly added the state had filed notices to seek the death penalty because of the jury qualifications. Often, the most severe and harshest individuals would be selected for death penalty cases as individuals who might oppose the death penalty would have been eliminated. He continued, jurors who had philosophical, religious or moral reasons opposing capital punishment would be removed for cause.
In reply to Mr. Gregory's inquiry, Mr. Kelly stated jurors had the opportunity to hear the evidence, observe witnesses and evaluate the credibility of testimonies during jury trials. Three judge panels would not be afforded this opportunity.
Mr. Kelly referenced A.B. 521, Section 4, lines 36 and 37, the phrase "or the trail is held." He understood this provision would allow murder trials to be held before judges in bench trials. Mr. Sader confirmed Mr. Kelly's summation. He stated all the brackets in the proposed language would be deleted from Section 4, lines 33 to 38. Mr. Kelly added this would be required due to the fact first degree murder cases could not be tried before judges but were mandated to have trials by jury.
Mr. Sader stated the bracketed language which suggested deleting the last sentence in A.B. 521, Section 4, lines 39 through 41 would need to be retained as the option to apply the death sentence had been omitted. He pointed out Section 5 which related to three judge panels versus the district court issue and recommended Section 5 be deleted. Mr. Kelly concurred with the suggested deletions. Mr. Sader queried whether NRS 175.562 should be repealed. Mr. Kelly referenced Section 5, line 18 which addressed the judges. Mr. Sader noted the bill drafter would make the appropriate deletions.
Mr. Ben Graham, legislative liaison for the Nevada District Attorney's Association, referenced Mr. Kelly's preceding testimony with regard to aggravating circumstances. Mr. Graham corrected what he believed was misinformation and stated juries must decide, beyond reasonable doubt, aggravating circumstance would not be outweighed by mitigating circumstances. He did not believe Mr. Kelly intentionally misstated aggravating circumstances had been added to the list each year. He noted it had been many years since any additions to the aggravating circumstances list had been made. The state had one of the shortest lists of aggravating circumstances. Mr. Graham also took exception to the statement Mr. Kelly made every homicide case could become an aggravating factor for the death penalty.
Mr. Graham commended Mr. Carpenter's analysis which he felt was perceptive and factual. He surmised what he felt the intent of the opposition was which would allow one individual's decision to prevail over the decision of the jury in death sentence cases.
Mr. David Sarnowski, Chief Criminal Deputy, Nevada Attorney General's Office, testified in support of the passage of A.B. 521. He presented a general overview of the bill. Once prosecutors made determinations on first degree murder cases, the prosecutors must decide whether or not to seek the death penalty. If prosecutors decided to seek the death penalty, they must file notices notifying the defendants of the aggravating circumstances which the state believed qualified the defendants to be death eligible. If prosecutors decided not to seek the death penalty, no such statements were required to be filed. In either case, cases might be tried to a judge or jury.
Mr. Sarnowski contended defendants might request bench trials before trial judges, however, other provisions would allow the state to insist juries adjudicate the defendants' guilt. A.B. 521, Section 1, NRS 175.552 addressed this particular situation. He maintained, in death penalty cases, the majority of defendants were tried to juries in both guilt and penalty phases. In cases where the findings of guilty by the trier of facts had been made, the state must prove one or more aggravating circumstances existed and the burden of proof was beyond reasonable doubt. It was the same burden of proof carried in the guilt phase which showed the defendants were guilty of first degree murder.
Mr. Sarnowski continued, if the state proved the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances, the juries or the three judge panels must review the evidence, including all aggravating and mitigating evidence in the record, and ascertain whether it was evidence which had been presented at the trial, which might be considered mitigating evidence, or whether it was evidence typically brought in the trial phase. This would show the defendants had some good qualities and should be spared the death penalty and given less onerous sentences. At that point, if the mitigating evidence did not outweigh the aggravating evidence, they might impose the death sentence. He maintained, if mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence, the triers of fact could not impose the death sentence although they had the option to impose lesser sentences.
Mr. Sarnowski informed the committee there was no mandatory death sentence in Nevada. In 1987, the United States Supreme Court vacated the only death sentence imposed under the mandatory death law for inmates serving life terms who murdered while incarcerated. It had been deemed unconstitutional as it did not allow juries to consider individual characteristics.
Mr. Sarnowski was aware of only one case in Nevada where there had been a second hearing upon a reversal made by the Nevada Supreme Court. In this case, the defendant had not been sentenced to death by a trier of fact the second time the penalty phase had been tried. He maintained there may be any number of reasons why death sentences were vacated on appeals such as legal errors which occurred during the penalty phase. In the referenced case, there had been a reversal and the case went back for a new penalty phase. This case had been initially tried to a three judge panel. There was a plea of guilty. In all cases where pleas were entered, three judges made the determination. In this particular case, the defendant was sentenced to death. It was later determined his counsel was ineffective in representing him to the point the verdict was not constitutional. The case went back to a new three judge panel which imposed a sentence less than death. Since the Nevada law had been instituted in 1977, this was the only time where there had been a reversal of death and the defendant did not receive the death sentence.
Mr. Sarnowski pointed out these cases were particularly heinous crimes and the defendants had been death-worthy individuals. He noted the system required unanimity to impose death sentences. If juries were unable to decide the penalties, current law allowed three judges to make the decisions. This law had been held to be valid by the Nevada Supreme Court. There had been no adjudication by a federal court to address this issue. However, they believed the law had been adequately implemented and should stand as it presently existed without amendments.
Mr. Sarnowski recapped, when juries decided life with the possibility of parole was not an appropriate sentence under this proposed scheme, the courts would impose the next most onerous penalty which would be life without the possibility of parole, assuming the jury could not decide upon the penalties of life without the possibility of parole and the death sentence. He contended the system worked and three judge panels were conscientious in determining the fate of the defendants. He believed the proposed amendments were not needed.
In response to Mr. Anderson's concern, Mr. Sarnowski stated when three judge panels made unanimous decisions, the penalty imposed would be the penalty agreed upon by the majority of the judges. There had been instances where judges had been unable to reach death verdicts and returned life with or life without the possibility of parole.
In reply to Mr. Carpenter's concern, Mr. Sarnowski stated, in order to impose a death sentence, the three judge verdicts must be unanimous. Conceivably, there could be cases where each of the three judges believed each of the three penalties was appropriate although this had not happened since 1977.
Mr. Dan M. Seaton, Chief Deputy, Clark County District Attorney's Office, replied to Mr. Scherer's inquiry and stated the number of hung juries in death penalty cases which had occurred in the state had been five.
Mr. Seaton alleged the most important aspect of A.B. 521 was the impact the provisions would have on the criminal justice system. He relayed detailed information of a case which involved an individual in Las Vegas who had been charged with a heinous crime. He alleged, should Mr. Kelly's provisions be adopted, one biased individual could cause a gross injustice in the outcome of specific trials.
Mr. Seaton outlined another case where one juror had been adamantly opposed to law enforcement efforts, the judicial system and the death penalty. He alleged prosecutors supported the death penalty whereas defense attorneys did not. A.B. 521 would favor defense attorneys as it would reduce verdicts. He believed legislation which would mandate the lowest common denominator penalty was wrong in serious cases.
Mr. Seaton informed the committee 19 cases in the state had gone to three judge panels of which 89 percent had resulted in the death penalty and 11 percent had not. He pointed out these were skewed statistics and virtually meaningless as one case had received a non-death penalty. In five of these cases, the defendants had demanded death penalties. There was a total of 14 cases which was too small to derive any meaningful conclusion.
Mr. Seaton stated there had been many cases where defendants pled guilty and received three judge panels. He asked why would defendants would plead guilty to first degree murders knowledgeable of the fact biased panels would fact them and levy the death penalty. He maintained defense attorneys often advised defendants to plead their cases before objective, three judge panels. A.B. 521 had been designed to allow one individual on a jury to bring the verdict down to the lowest common denominator which was life with the possibility of parole. This, he contended, in certain heinous crimes, was not the appropriate penalty.
Mr. Seaton addressed the constitutionality of A.B. 521. He stated three cases in the state had upheld the constitutionality of three judge panels. He cited the U.S. Supreme Court case which pertained to the case Spazziano vs. the State of Florida. In the state of Florida, judges could override the recommendations of the juries. In the Spazziano vs. Florida case, the judge disregarded the jury's recommendation of life without the possibility of parole in favor of the death penalty. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the judge's determination. Mr. Seaton rationalized if it was constitutional for one judge to override the unanimous recommendation of one jury, it would be constitutional for three judge panels to override one juror's decision. He believed the system worked well as it presently stood and recommended the committee indefinitely postpone the bill.
Mr. Gary Hatlestad, Chief Deputy, Washoe County District Attorney's Office testified in opposition to A.B. 521. He pointed out, in Washoe County, there had never been a hung jury in regard to the death sentence which had required the appointment of a three judge panel. His office had asked for the death sentence on several occasions and the juries had not imposed the death sentence. He echoed the sentiments of Mr. Seaton and contended the system was correct and juries operated effectively within the bounds of the law. He alleged Mr. Kelly's statistics were skewed. He concurred A.B. 521 should be indefinitely postponed.
There being no further testimony to come before the committee, Chairman Sader closed the hearing on A.B. 521. He opened the hearing on A.B. 434.
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 434 Revises provisions governing judgments of acquittal.
Mr. Kevin Kelly testified on behalf of the Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice who were the requestors of A.B. 434. He stated the bill mirrored the federal statutes in Chapter 29 A which allowed judges to enter judgments of acquittals upon presentation of all evidence. He alleged there was no fiscal note involved.
Mr. Kelly stated the average time utilized on civil trials in the Eighth Judicial District Court was approximately 18 months. Chapter 29A allowed criminal judges to hear the evidence. If the evidence was insufficient for juries to reach unanimous verdicts, judges would be powerless if they must refrain from any action until the juries made their decisions. Judges could not make determinations to cancel cases. A.B. 434 allowed judges to cancel cases which would be cost effective and time saving as it would relieve the dockets.
Mr. Kelly addressed A.B. 434, Section 3, subsection 1, which pertained to criminal cases where it was the burden of the state to prove defendants' guilt. Trial judges could advise juries in judgments of acquittal. The proposed bill would allow the courts or the defendants to enter or move for judgments of acquittal. During the judicial process, if cases involved hung juries or guilty verdicts, judges could order judgments of acquittal if the juries had not followed the instructions of the courts. He alleged there were two benefits to these provisions. Judges withheld rendering decisions until juries reached verdicts and entered judgments of acquittals. At this point, the state could appeal to the Supreme Court as to whether the judgments of acquittal were appropriate. In cases where the decisions of judges were incorrect, the original guilty verdicts were reinstated and the sentences were remanded for sentencing.
Mr. Sader informed the committee, in any trial, whether it was civil or criminal, judges ascertained the law and instructed the juries on that law. It was the responsibility of the juries to decide the facts. In criminal trials, after the prosecutors presented their cases, they must prove beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the defendants. If the judges believed the cases were simply insufficient and the defendants could not be found guilty, there were no mechanisms to dismiss the cases as there were no motions for acquittals.
Mr. Sader stated the processes were different in federal courts where motions could be made to dismiss cases based on insufficient evidence. Federal judges could determine whether cases could or could not be proven. Whereas in state criminal hearings, judges had the opportunity to state the evidence was insufficient and enter judgments of acquittal only after all the presentations had been heard and the juries had made their decisions. State judges could only advise juries. Mr. Sader clarified Mr. Kelly's position this would be a cost saving mechanism.
Mr. Kelly added judges made determinations during grand jury trials or when cases went to preliminary hearings in justice courts after which the cases went to district court. In district court cases, defense lawyers could file pretrial writs of habeas corpus when judges determined grand juries had not heard sufficient evidence of probable cause to bind the defendants over, or if justices of the peace had not heard sufficient probable cause evidence to bind the defendants over from the justice courts to the district courts. This provided district court judges the opportunity to examine the evidence brought before the grand juries or the justice courts. District court judges made determinations as to whether there was sufficient probable cause. If there was not sufficient probable cause, the district court judges could dismiss cases at that point. Once district court trials began, the judges had no authority to intervene and decide there was not enough evidence to meet the standard beyond reasonable doubt and enter judgments of acquittal.
In response to Ms. Smith's concern, Mr. Kelly replied the state had two opportunities to bring cases to district court through preliminary hearings held in justice courts. The justices of the peace would make determinations if there was sufficient evidence to hold defendants for trial. District attorneys might elect to take cases to grand juries which would ascertain whether there was sufficient probable cause to return indictments. District court judges would then make determinations. Good defense lawyers would review both proceedings to decide if there was basis to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and file pretrial writs of habeas corpus. He informed the committee members district courts made the decisions as to whether justices of the peace or grand juries applied the law. All the justices of the peace or the grand juries had to do was find marginal evidence. The judges reviewed to see whether they met the greater burden of beyond a reasonable doubt. If they had not, under the current statutes, judges were powerless. A.B. 434 allowed judges to terminate hearings in cases where the state had not proven the defendants guilt.
In reply to Mr. Collins' concern, Mr. Kelly stated judges could only dismiss cases based on the lowest standard probable causes.
In responding to Mr. Scherer's question, Mr. Kelly stated the standard at that point would be what was beyond a reasonable doubt. Only as a matter of law would judges be placed in the positions of fact finders. This entailed the same standards as the Supreme Court had.
Mr. Scherer addressed Mr. Kelly's testimony which pertained to the similar provision contained in the civil action rule 41 B. He stated the standard in this type of motion was courts must interpret all the evidence. The most favorable went to the non-moving party or the plaintiff. If there was any evidence presented by which reasonable jurors could find in favor of the plaintiffs, the judges had to allow the cases to move forward. Mr. Kelly understood this to be the correct standard.
Mr. Scherer directed his concern toward Mr. Kelly and asked how this was different from the slighter marginal evidence of probable cause standard. As he understood, Mr. Kelly replied it was the same.
Mr. Anderson alluded to A.B. 434, Section 3 and asked if defense attorneys would request acquittals at the cessation of the prosecutions' presentations. Mr. Kelly noted they did not have these options. Mr. Anderson added if the suggested provisions were passed, would this become the normal action and as soon as the prosecution was completed attorney's could move for acquittal. Mr. Kelly concurred, if A.B. 434 passed, defense attorney's could move for acquittals although the majority of the time acquittals were denied.
Mr. Anderson contended the provisions contained in A.B. 434 would not accelerate the system. Mr. Kelly responded the proposed provisions would speed up the system due to the cases where juries determined defendants were not guilty. He surmised 85 percent of the Clark County cases were judged not guilty. As a matter of contention, judges would be able to stop 15 percent of the hearings from proceeding.
Mr. Petrak firmly believed it would save the state substantial amounts of money if judges were allowed to make the decisions initially. He felt justice would not be served if defendants were not permitted to go to trial.
Mr. Noel Waters, Carson City District Attorney, supported the process of the jury system. He contended A.B. 434 would allow judges to reside as thirteenth jurors and render their opinion. He did not feel the citizens of Nevada wanted this. He felt there was a trend for federal courts to become involved in state activities. He seriously doubted if the statute would be utilized. He was cognizant of one instance where a judge used an advisory verdict which was already an advisory opinion to the jury and had already been approved.
Mr. Waters believed judges would not utilize the provisions contained in A.B. 434 as they respected the jury system. The provisions would be utilized to provide three opportunities for the defense attorneys move for acquittals which would be at the conclusion of the state's cases, at the conclusion of the attorneys' cases and at the conclusion of the presentations of the evidence. The provisions gave three additional opportunities to argue or suggest the evidence was so paltry it did not allow juries to consider it. He argued this was the intent of the bill. He urged rejection of A.B. 434, concurring with the same reasons testified before.
Mr. Sader noted Mr. Waters defended the jury system whereas Mr. Seaton's testimony denied the jury system. The arguments changed depending upon the positions espoused. Mr. Waters alleged Mr. Seaton testified as to the aberrations contained in cases. Mr. Sader interjected and stated he used this as a rationalization for an institutional change. Mr. Waters believed the proposed provisions were in opposition to an institutional change.
In reply to Ms. Smith's concern, Mr. Waters alleged the national prosecution standards stated prosecutors should not charge cases unless the evidence could justify verdicts of guilt. In some more egregious cases, e.g. child molestation and sexual assault charges where the evidence was weak but the nature of the crime was violent, the standard was if any reasonable juror could take the evidence and return a verdict. Mr. Waters viewed this as an ethical standard prosecutors had. He believed this was in the Supreme Court provisions which stated no prosecutor should bring a case unless he believed it was brought before juries upon probable cause.
In reply to Ms. Smith's additional concern, Mr. Waters stated, in extremely rare cases where judges concurred and entered judgments of acquittal, the state had the authority to appeal. The trials stopped there, the state appealed and the cases proceeded on to the Supreme Court. In these cases where the juries had been correct in their verdict and the judges had been erroneous in applying the legal standard, another trial would be conducted. Mr. Waters did not understand where the proposed provisions would save time. Statutes were already in place to expedite time. He noted advisory opinions were rare in Nevada.
Mr. Toomin asked if the provisions contained in Chapter 29A of the federal statutes were being utilized in other states. Ms. Patricia Justice responded from the floor and stated the commonwealth of Virginia utilized the provisions contained in Chapter 29A.
There being no further testimony to come before the committee, Chairman Sader closed the hearing on A.B. 434. He opened consideration for other bills.
ASSEMBLY BILL NO 521 Revises provisions governing penalty hearings upon conviction for first-degree murder.
ASSEMBLYMAN TOOMIN MOVED TO INDEFINITELY POSTPONE.
ASSEMBLYMAN GIBBONS SECONDED THE MOTION.
THE MOTION PASSED. (ASSEMBLYMEN ANDERSON, PORTER AND BONAVENTURA VOTED IN OPPOSITION.)
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 434 Revises provisions governing judgments of acquittal.
ASSEMBLYMAN PORTER MOVED DO PASS.
ASSEMBLYMAN BONAVENTURA SECONDED THE MOTION.
Mr. Anderson believed the suggested provisions contained in A.B. 434 eroded the power of the juries and would not speed up the judicial process. As he had confidence in the jury system, he stated he would vote in opposition to the bill.
Mr. Porter would vote in favor of A.B. 434. In defense of his position, he stated the practice alluded to had operated in the federal system for a number years and was not a situation which would create substantial abuse. He contended judges were not circumventing juries. The provisions were not rules which courts would be quick to exercise. In those few circumstances where prosecutions had not proven their cases, there should be a mechanism whereby courts could state the defendants could not be found guilty. The bill would enable the courts to dismiss charges although attorneys for the state might have presented the case and did not prove all the elements which had been required by the statutes. Mr. Porter did not believe the bill tampered with the jury system nor did he see the potential for abuse.
Mr. Sader concurred with Mr. Porter's testimony in that the system worked well in civil cases as well as with federal criminal cases. He believed there were rare instances where hearings should be terminated when prosecutions could not prove guilt.
Mr. Collins voiced opposition to A.B. 434 and noted the federal judicial system was different than the local judicial system. He steadfastly believed in the retention of the jury system.
Mr. Carpenter concurred with Mr. Anderson's testimony. He felt the real concern lay with the fact it gave the defense one more reason to delay. He believed the provisions would not save time and money.
Ms. Smith stated she agreed with Mr. Porter on the philosophy behind A.B. 434 but she concurred with Mr. Carpenter on the practicality of the provisions. She said she would vote against passage of the bill.
Mr. Porter explained the procedural aspects of A.B. 434. He stated there was an equivalent rule, Rule 41B, which pertained to the civil rules of the civil courts. Defense attorneys could move for involuntary dismissals under Rule 41B in cases where they had not proved the elements. If evidence was presented in which juries could rule in the plaintiffs' favor, courts must deny the Rule 41B motion. The courts had to accept all facts and inferences most favorable for the plaintiffs.
Mr. Scherer testified, in his civil court experience, 41B motions took many hours. As he understood the 41B process to work, all facts and evidence would be interpreted most favorably for the prosecution. The judges would be required to determine there was no way reasonable juries could convict the defendants. Mr. Porter concurred with Mr. Scherer's analogy. Mr. Scherer stated he would be inclined to support passage of A.B. 434.
Mr. Anderson contended the determinations should be left with the juries and not the judges.
THE MOTION TO DO PASS ON A.B. 434 CARRIED. (ASSEMBLYMEN ANDERSON, CARPENTER, COLLINS, GREGORY, SMITH AND TOOMIN VOTED AGAINST.)
Mr. Porter was assigned to handle A.B. 434 on the Assembly Floor.
Chairman Sader opened the meeting on committee business. He noted there were a number of bills in subcommittees which had been testified upon but not acted upon. A.B. 77, S.B. 293, A.B. 462, A.B. 463, A.B. 469, A.B. 499, A.B. 494, S.B. 234, A.B. 115 would be heard and decided upon during the work session scheduled for Tuesday, May 4, 1993. Action would be taken on A.B. 73, A.B. 196, A.B. 387 and A.B. 455 on Friday, May 7, 1993.
There being no further business to come before the committee, Chairman Sader closed the meeting at 10:10 a.m.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY
Jessie A. Caple
Committee Secretary
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Assembly Committee on Judiciary
April 29, 1993
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