The Committee on Judiciary was called to order at 8:00 a.m., on Wednesday, February 17, 1999. Chairman Bernie Anderson presided in Room 3138 of the Legislative Building, Carson City, Nevada. Exhibit A is the Agenda. Exhibit B is the Guest List. All Exhibits are available and on file at the Research Library of the Legislative Counsel Bureau.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Bernie Anderson, Chairman

Mr. Mark Manendo, Vice Chairman

Ms. Sharron Angle

Mr. Greg Brower

Ms. Barbara Buckley

Mr. John Carpenter

Mr. Jerry Claborn

Mr. Tom Collins

Mr. Don Gustavson

Mrs. Ellen Koivisto

Ms. Sheila Leslie

Ms. Kathy McClain

Mr. Dennis Nolan

Ms. Genie Ohrenschall

GUEST LEGISLATORS PRESENT:

Assemblyman Roy Neighbors, Assembly District 36

STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT:

OTHERS PRESENT:

Leonard Gang, General Counsel and Executive Director, Commission on Judicial Discipline, State of Nevada opened his testimony by pointing out A.B. 20 was a "cleanup bill." He noted in 1996 there was a State of Nevada constitutional amendment passed that clarified the Commission on Judicial Discipline had jurisdiction over Justices of the Peace and Municipal Court Judges. Prior to that time there were questions as to whether they had jurisdiction over those judicial branches. The amendment did not contain language stating what would occur if a Justice of the Peace or a Municipal Court Judge was removed from office. At the time there were two statutes that referred to Supreme Court Justices and one applying to District Court Justices. Those statutes provided justices removed from office by the Commission on Judicial Discipline were no longer eligible to be a candidate for a judicial office in the State of Nevada.

Mr. Gang explained in 1998 the constitution was amended again which transferred some of the duties of the Supreme Court to the legislature, in regard to the Commission on Judicial Discipline. He referred to A.B. 344 and explained it was approved by the voters in 1998. It provided what the conditions were regarding investigations and confidentiality regarding the commission. Section 1, lines 9 through 11 of A.B. 20 provided a judge who was removed by the commission could no longer be a candidate for judicial office. Also the word judge was defined in A.B. 344 to include Justices of the Peace and Municipal Court Judges. He reiterated A.B. 20 was a cleanup provision. It made it clear once a Justice of the Peace or Municipal Court Judge was removed from office, they could no longer be a candidate, making it consistent with the law as it applied to Supreme Court Justices and Municipal Court Justices.

Mr. Gang noted Nevada was one of two states where a judge was removed from office and then ran for the office again. He explained the commission removed Judge Gary Davis of North Las Vegas in 1995 and in 1996 he ran for the same office from which he was removed, but he was not elected to the office. There was no law at the time to prevent it. Coincidentally, the State of Louisiana had the same situation but, in their case, the judge was reelected to the office from which he was removed. The Supreme Court of Louisiana enjoined him from taking office.

Chairman Anderson told the committee he had asked the Research Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau (LCB) to do a general search of similar statutes throughout the United States and found eight states prohibited judges from seeking reelection after being removed from office. He noted in the State of Alaska, a judge removed by the Supreme Court would be ineligible for a period of 3 years. The other states mentioned in the report were Arizona, California, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington State and those states made a judge ineligible to run for office upon removal from office. Chairman Anderson felt there needed to be clarification on judicial discipline and the committee took the issue very seriously.

Assemblywoman Buckley addressed section 1, lines 9 through 11 to which Mr. Gang had referred in his testimony and asked if he would explain the language contained in those lines regarding the Supreme Court overturning the removal upon appeal. She expressed her concern over the word appeal and did not want the right to appeal removed if the commission made a mistake in removing a judge. She wanted to know why they wanted that language removed.

Mr. Gang responded the Commission on Judicial Discipline removed Judge Fein a family court judge. She was a candidate for reelection at the time she was removed. A writ was sent to the Nevada Supreme Court by her opponent seeking to prevent her from being a candidate for the office and the Supreme Court held as long as the matter was on appeal she was eligible to be a candidate for office. He explained when the commission removed a judge the decision was final unless appealed, and noted any judge removed by the commission had a right to appeal.

Chairman Anderson, referring to the same language contained in lines 9 through 11 of A.B. 20, asked if a candidate was successful on appeal would the judge still not be able to run for office again.

Ms. Gang replied the court had already clarified that issue by making it a law by Supreme Court decision that a judge removed from office could be a candidate until the appeal was final.

Chairman Anderson still wanted clarification regarding the appeal issue. He understood the commission could remove a judge from office and it was a final decision unless appealed. He also understood a judge could continue to run for office until the appeal was final. What he did not understand was, if at the end of the appeal process it was found in favor of the judge who had been removed from office, would the decision revert back to the commission’s final decision that the judge be removed from office.

It was Mr. Gang’s position if the Supreme Court reversed the commission’s removal of a judge they were then eligible to be a candidate and a judge. He noted, if the Commission on Judicial Discipline removed a judge and prior to the next election the Supreme Court reversed the position, they would still be eligible to be a judge. Mr. Gang stressed he did not have a problem keeping the language about appeals in the bill.

Ms. Buckley felt there should be clarification if they were going to remove the language from the bill, because it referred to removal from judicial discipline and did not make reference to the Supreme Court overturning the commission’s decision. She felt it would look as if the Committee on Judiciary added significance to the language of the bill by not clarifying the removal from judicial discipline was due to the court overturning the decision.

Assemblyman Carpenter repeated Mr. Gang’s testimony regarding while an appeal was in the process the judge could seek office and asked if that statement was correct.

Mr. Gang responded the Supreme Court held while an appeal was pending the judge was still allowed to remain on the ballot as a candidate for office and could be elected to the office.

Mr. Carpenter referred to section 1, lines 9 through 11 of A.B. 20 when stating the language contained in those lines said unless the Supreme Court overturned the removal upon appeal thereafter they may seek or hold office, it did not say while appeal was pending. He thought it should be clarified in both areas.

Chairman Anderson said he would wait to hear what the bill drafter suggested for amended language.

Ms. Lang responded the language could be clarified if it was the desire of the committee. They would have to look at each section in order to complete it, but she wanted to point out if the committee looked at section 2 which set forth the eligibility for office, it already said a person was not eligible for office if they had been removed. She agreed removing lines 9 through 11 of section 1 would cleanup the bill because there was inconsistency. She said each section could be examined to add the language.

Assemblyman Collins questioned Mr. Gang if Judge Gary Davis’ case was still in appeal.

Mr. Gang responded Judge Davis’ removal from office by the commission was affirmed on appeal. The case that was still pending was Judge Fein.

Mr. Collins expressed the confusion he had was, if the language was removed from section 1 who would decide if a judge could still be a candidate until the appeal was final. Was it the Supreme Court or the commission or was it the law that said they could be a candidate until the appeal was decided.

Chairman Anderson responded they were waiting for clarification from Ms. Lang with the redraft of an amendment that would state appeals were the property of the Supreme Court. He noted if at the end of the appeal process the appeal was upheld, the judge would be eligible to return to his office.

Mr. Gang cautioned that the law as it stood was the decision of the Commission on Judicial Discipline and was a final decision unless appealed, so there should not be any indication in the amendment the decision of the commission was not final, pending the Supreme Court taking action. He noted in some states, the commission’s decision was not a final decision, only a recommendation to the Supreme Court and the court made the final decision. In Nevada a commission decision was a final decision, just like a decision of any district court, unless appealed.

Assemblywoman McClain queried if the commission’s decision was appealed and went to the Supreme Court and they overturned it, were they never removed. Mr. Gang responded that was correct. Ms. McClain replied her point was, it was addressed in the rest of the language of bill. An example was section 4, lines 26 and 27 where it stated not ever been removed.

Chairman Anderson indicated in one case the Supreme Court reversed a commission decision and the court ordered the commission to strike the order of discipline in that case. The commission entered an order striking the decision and it was if the decision had never been made. He made the statement because he wanted to point out he thought Ms. McClain had misread the language in the bill. As an example he quoted section 4, line 26 (d) that stated "not have ever been removed or retired from any judicial office by the commission on judicial discipline." He noted the reason for that language was it became a extra added requirement to stand for that particular office. He commented that was why language was repeated throughout the statute.

Ms. McClain responded she understood what the Chair was saying, but she still wanted to make the point if it was appealed and the Supreme Court said the decision had been overturned, and it was stricken from the record, they were never removed from office. Chairman Anderson responded only if they struck it.

Mr. Gang agreed that would be his interpretation. He pointed out the one case where it occurred the commission was directed to strike the order and it was done.

Assemblyman Brower referred to section 4, line 4 and pointed out the words "retired" and "removed" and asked Mr. Gang to describe the difference between the two terms.

Mr. Gang informed Mr. Brower and the committee the commission had the authority to remove a judge for misconduct. They could also cause a judge to retire not for misconduct but for disability as an example.

Mr. Brower asked if the statute precluded the appointment by the governor of a judge who had been retired or removed from office, or was it assumed it would be politically unwise to do so or unlikely it would happen and did not need to be addressed.

Mr. Gang responded he could not imagine a governor appointing a judge who had been removed by the commission. Mr. Brower questioned the statute would not preclude the situation, it just had not been recognized as a viable possibility and had not been addressed.

Chairman Anderson asked Ms. Lang to look at an amendment for A.B. 20 at line 3, section 4. Ms. Lang stated the language regarding retired and removed was used in each section and observed it determined a person was not eligible for office if removed or retired, so the qualifications for office had been established in each section so a person could not be appointed either.

Mr. Gang agreed and noted a person was not eligible to be a candidate if removed or retired or be eligible for the office.

Mr. Brower offered a philosophical question about what was wrong with the idea the voters should be able to decide whether or not a removed or retired judge was fit or eligible to be reelected.

Mr. Gang thought the constitution and the statutes provided the Commission on Judicial Discipline with the authority to remove a judge for misconduct. If a judge was removed for misconduct or caused to retire due to senility, and was not qualified to serve in a judicial capacity, it would be inappropriate for the voters to be able to respond.

Chairman Anderson expressed his concern the electorate clearly knew who they wanted in office, but the legislature set the qualifications for certain positions. He asserted there was different criteria to qualify to hold a position in the judiciary, such as a simple age requirement as in some positions. He noted if a judge was expected to sit on the bench and pass judgment on his peers, that person should have a higher level of acceptability.

Ms. Ohrenschall asked for clarification of involuntary retirement. She wondered if retirement occurred at the time the decision was made or did the word retirement imply the judge could finish out a term and then not be allowed to run for office again. Mr. Gang responded it would be when the commission entered an order for retirement.

Assemblywoman Angle asked if that applied to voluntary retirement of a judge. She noted a judge might want to voluntarily retire and when conditions improved or for other reasons wished to return to the bench, how would that be handled. Mr. Gang replied, absent a commission action, voluntary retirement did not prevent a judge from running for office again. He noted the statutes provided if the commission investigated a case regarding whether a judge should retire, the commission tried to handle it on an informal basis. They met with the judge, discussed the issues, and he or she was given the opportunity to retire voluntarily. He thought in that situation the commission would enter into an agreement with the judge to retire voluntarily and not seek office again.

Ms. Angle asked if the commission entered into an agreement with a judge to retire voluntarily, and later the judge changed his mind and wanted to run for office again, how would the commission handle that.

Answering hypothetically, Mr. Gang responded the commission would request the judge not run for office, and if he refused the commission would try to enforce the agreement.

Chairman Anderson closed the hearing on A.B. 20.

Chairman Anderson opened the hearing on A.B. 81 and indicated the Chair would proceed with Bill Draft Request (BDR) 1-229, which was similar in nature to A.B. 81, therefore he closed the hearing on A.B. 81 and considered all remarks would be applied to that bill also.

Ms. Buckley asked for the amendment to clarify a justice or judge could not be removed while an appeal was pending or if a higher court had overturned the underlying decision.

Mr. Gang commented to Ms. Buckley regarding her statement "not removed." He reiterated that was the point he was addressing when he talked about eligibility for candidacy as opposed to removal. He thought the amendment should not change the fact they were removed, but were eligible to be candidates while the appeal was pending.

Ms. Buckley stated her intent was to make sure if the Supreme Court returned the decision and failed to strike the order, she did not want any ambiguity in the statutes.

Chairman Anderson assigned A.B. 20 to Assemblywoman McClain to present on the floor of the Assembly.

Chairman Anderson entertained a motion to indefinitely postpone A.B. 81.

Chairman Anderson indicated if any member of the committee had any ideas or concepts for a potential BDR they needed to submit them to him. He noted he had received a request from Ms. Buckley asking for revision of Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 125A.350. It governed when parents had joint legal and physical custody of a child it would require permission from the court for one parent to move out of state. One of the factors currently being reviewed was it should consider the best interest of the child.

Chairman Anderson asked for a motion for a potential Bill Draft Request (BDR). He noted the Committee on Judiciary had used 1 of the 6 allocated.

Assemblyman Nolan informed the committee he had received an e mail from a police officer who was concerned about the use of laser beams aimed at the police. He noted a person could purchase a pocket laser beam anywhere. He explained the policeman made a stop and was approaching the window and was targeted by a laser beam.

Chairman Anderson entertained a motion for a possible BDR for the use of laser beam instruments of low magnitude that might be used as a distraction device, as requested by Mr. Nolan. He asked Mr. Nolan to provide sufficient materials to the bill drafters.

Chairman Anderson commenced with the work session scheduled for the committee. He noted they usually did not take testimony during a work session, but sometimes they needed clarification on why a group requested an amendment to a piece of legislation.

Don Williams, Committee Policy Analyst, presented the committee with a work session document (Exhibit C) he and Risa Lang, Committee Legal Counsel, had prepared. The document contained information on five bills previously heard by the committee. They were A.B.16, A.B. 21, A.B. 22, A.B. 38, and A.B. 53. Mr. Williams indicated he would walk the committee through the document and Ms. Lang would assist in commenting on the proposed amendments included in the document.

Mr. Williams stated as an employee of the Legislative Counsel Bureau (LCB) he could neither support nor oppose any legislation on any of the five bills or any of the comments made.

Mr. Williams began his presentation of the document with A.B. 16. The bill was requested by the Legislative Commission’s subcommittee on fees, fines, and forfeitures and administrative assessments imposed and collected by the courts. It was the S.C.R. 10 interim subcommittee, which Chairman Anderson chaired. A.B. 16 was heard by the Committee on Judiciary on February 5, 1999.

Ms. Lang testified the legislation was requested to provide if a person had failed to pay a fee or a fine to a court in the State of Nevada they may not renew their motor vehicle registration or driver’s license until payment was complete. She noted the committee heard from the chief of the Registration Division of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and the department did not have a position on the bill. She indicated the department would need to hire a management assistant to track non-payment notices received from the courts, prepare monthly reports for the courts, and to maintain accounts receivable.

Mr. Williams called attention to tab A of Exhibit C where the fiscal note for A.B. 16 was located.

Mr. Williams continued with A.B. 16 stating a representative of the Las Vegas Municipal Court testified in support of the bill, but asked that failure to appear in court be included as another reason not to renew a person’s motor vehicle registration or driver’s license. At the direction of the Chair, the Las Vegas Municipal Court prepared a proposed amendment to A.B. 16 which was found behind tab B of Exhibit C.

Mr. Williams explained John Morrow of the Washoe County Public Defenders office testified a person should be given an opportunity to show the inability to pay a fine or fee due to financial hardship. Mr. Morrow was asked by the Chair to submit an amendment to address those concerns. Tab C of Exhibit C contained the proposed amendment.

Mr. Williams stated the final issue on A.B. 16 was a proposed amendment submitted by the Sparks Municipal Court. The proposed amendment could be found behind tab D of Exhibit C.

Ms. Lang proceeded to explain it was her job to point out legal matters and other sections that might be affected by the proposed amendments found in Exhibit C. In regard to the proposed amendment from the City of Sparks (tab D, Exhibit C), she felt it was procedural in nature. They wanted to ensure the payment for rehabilitation was included and it was her opinion it was already included since the language said "or other charges imposed by the court." She thought it would include any charges the court required. Their second concern was reprogramming case management systems and other technical concerns. She stated she did not know how the committee would like to address the issue, but she noted the bill just gave the courts authority to use the technology as a collection device. The courts would have to set up the manner that was suitable for each court, which could be different from court to court depending on their needs. The third concern of the City of Sparks was how to determine whether a person was the registered owner of a vehicle if the person driving the vehicle received a citation and was not the registered owner. Ms. Lang mentioned again she was not sure how the committee would like to address the issue, but maybe the committee could work with local authorities who were currently using the notice of non-payment. An alternative was the committee could limit it to obtaining the owner information if it was known. If that was the case it would not always affect driver’s registration, it would only affect it in those cases where the person was in his own vehicle with his registration.

Ms. Lang called attention to the amendment proposed by John Morrow, Washoe County Public Defender (tab C, Exhibit C). She noted Mr. Morrow’s concerns were to make sure a defendant had notification before the notice of non-payment. She stated the language he proposed appeared to require the advanced notification for any action taken pursuant to NRS 176.064. She was not sure if it was his intention to affect all those procedures included in the current language concerning collection agencies. She thought his main intent was to allow the defendant time to respond before the notice of non-payment was mailed to the Department of Motor Vehicles.

According to Ms. Lang, the third amendment came from Michael Haveman from the Las Vegas Municipal Court. He wanted to expand the notice of non-payment so it could be used when a person failed to appear on a traffic citation. She noted it was just a failure to appear and not necessarily a non-payment. She pointed out to the committee there was already a section of NRS currently allowing courts to suspend the driver’s license of a person, after mailing notice to him, if he failed to appear on a traffic citation.

Chairman Anderson, in seeking clarification regarding the Las Vegas Municipal Court’s proposed amendment, asked Dan Musgrove a lobbyist for the City of Las Vegas to come forward. Mr. Musgrove explained they were looking for those individuals who "had not shown fail to appear" having the same weight as the original intent of the bill. Mr. Anderson referred to Ms. Lang’s observation where it appeared the current statutes gave the city the opportunity to do that under NRS 483.465. He asked Mr. Musgrove if the City of Las Vegas was looking to expand the requirement to give notification which would increase the paperwork. Mr. Musgrove did not feel that was their intent.

Chairman Anderson addressed Ms. Lang and asked her if she thought it would require the city to go through greater notification for somebody who failed to appear.

Ms. Lang explained the difference between the statute currently in place and the one that was proposed was the proposed one would allow a court to file on notice of non-payment. It would prevent a person from renewing a license or registration. She pointed out the one currently in place had various notice procedures and then actually suspended the license. It would occur sooner than the notice of non-payment proposed in the bill draft.

Mr. Musgrove indicated the court was looking for one more mechanism to collect outstanding fees. By requiring that once they received the failure to appear they could suspend the license so when the person attempted to get a license they had the ability to collect the fine at that time.

Chairman Anderson referred to Mr. Morrow’s proposed amendment regarding prior notification for the defendant. He asked if it would expand not just to motor vehicles but increase the notification question for all types of collection processes. After somebody was turned over for collection and was notified, would they have 75 days before action was taken.

Ms. Lang noted Mr. Morrow’s amendment suggested a person would have 15 working days to respond before the notice of non-payment was mailed. The notice was sent to DMV when the renewal on the vehicle came due the office would send a notice giving a person 60 days to clear it. It was her opinion it could be as long as 75 days.

Mr. Carpenter thought the proposed amendment Mr. Morrow had requested would require the court to advise everyone an action would be taken and had 15 days to respond. He did not think the legislation should involve the situation where the court had to file a notice on everybody. He felt the proposed amendment was causing more work for the courts.

Chairman Anderson thought Mr. Morrow’s proposed amendment addressed another problem and was broader in scope in terms of notification. He felt the committee was trying to provide a mechanism for the cities and counties to collect fines. He noted proper notification was essential and should not be abandoned, but thought the amendment reached too far.

Ms. Buckley noted currently if a person was fined and could not afford the payment but went to court in a timely manner and requested an alternative option like payment plans and community service, the court extended those options. She stressed the committee should be cognizant that fines added up. One simple ticket with additional fines for being late, plus losing their license or their registration could cost a person as much as $400 just for loss of registration, but with the alternative payment options it alleviated her concerns.

Mr. Brower questioned if it was the collective opinion of the committee Mr. Morrow’s proposed amendment was not well received and was seen as not necessary.

Chairman Anderson agreed with Mr. Brower and said the committee would exclude Mr. Morrow’s proposed amendment from the discussion.

Mr. Nolan commented he had raised an issue during the original discussion of A.B. 16. When DMV had their genesis system up and running in the year 2000 all issues such as fines paid, forms signed admitting guilt, receiving license and registration, or any other issue involved in car registration or payment of fines, could be handled at the counter. He wanted the committee to have the forethought when addressing the current piece of legislation.

Tom Grady, Executive Director, Nevada League of Cities, informed the committee in the 1995 session the league had sponsored a bill to assist in collecting parking tickets. He thought the current bill was dovetailing with that bill. During the earlier session the league worked with DMV and there were considerable problems because the original bill stated DMV would collect the fine before reissuing the license. They realized it would not work because if a citation was issued in Elko County, Washoe County, or Clark County and paid with a bad check, how would DMV receive their money back from local governments. He stated the league worked during the interim to try and clear it up and in the 1997 session came back with a program that worked very well. He reiterated the program was working very well and they supported the legislation.

Chairman Anderson asked if there should be clarification regarding proper notification because that was the concern of the interim subcommittee to which Mr. Grady had referred.

Mr. Grady did not believe any court filed the day of the citation, there was plenty of notification before the method would be used.

Assemblywoman Leslie commented during the original hearing Mrs. Lucille Lusk, representing Nevada Concerned Citizens, testified about a family who lost their vehicle because the registration was removed and it concerned her. She asked if the spouse who did not lose the registration be allowed to address the judge as to why the family could not afford to pay the fine.

Chairman Anderson pointed out it was addressed in tab D of Exhibit C from the City of Sparks.

Chairman Anderson asked the opinion of the committee in regard to rejecting the proposed amendment from John Morrow behind tab C of Exhibit C. He also asked if it was necessary to examine the recommendations behind tab B from Las Vegas Municipal Court because Ms. Lang had noted they were already covered in the bill.

Mr. Carpenter indicated the bill was far reaching and would come back to the next session for clarification and unfinished business. He felt it should be put into a working model and avoid too many additions.

Chairman Anderson indicated he did not want to address the recommendations from the City of Las Vegas (tab B, Exhibit C) but bring it back at a later time and add the broader scope if it was needed.

Chairman Anderson called attention to tab D of Exhibit C which was a proposed amendment from the City of Sparks that dealt with the defendant not being the registered owner of a vehicle when a citation was issued. His concern was if the registered owner had to pay the citations for the people who had borrowed the vehicle.

Ms. Buckley referred to section 2, line 6 of A.B. 16 when she noted it was only when the defendant was the registered owner, so she thought if the person driving the vehicle was not the registered owner, the owner would not be responsible for the citation. She pointed out it did not solve Ms. Leslie’s issue if a husband and wife were co-owners of the vehicle or only one spouse was listed on the registration. If one of them received a citation should the other spouse be punished for the sins of the one driving the vehicle. She referred to Ms. Leslie’s question about the one spouse having the ability to address the judge and Ms. Buckley thought the answer would be no. The defendant who was driving had the opportunity to go before the judge to work out a payment plan, but the registered owner would not have the opportunity. She related the present discussion to one held in the 1995 session regarding a vehicle being taken away from a drunk driver. She thought the bill died because of the same reason regarding the rights of the spouse.

Assemblywoman Ohrenschall called attention to the fact the way the language was written it was possible for non-renewal to occur because of a series of parking tickets. She thought it was a little extreme for the other members of the family because parking tickets went with the car and did not indicate who parked the car.

Chairman Anderson mentioned there could be far reaching effects, but was not sure if they could clean it up. He asked Ms. Lang if there was a mechanism in terms of language, where they would be able to provide for a co-owner of a vehicle either listed or not listed on the registration.

Ms. Lang informed the committee parking violations were already covered in NRS and would already withhold the registration of a vehicle if there was a notice of nonpayment for parking violations and nonmoving violations. She stated she would work on language to limit it to the person who did not follow the court order and not affect the co-owner.

Mr. Brower questioned if the committee was maybe diluting a good bill by doing too much in the way of amendment and it could defeat the whole purpose of the bill. The potential for the family car to be taken away was good incentive to keep people from not paying their fines or committing other offenses.

Assemblyman Gustavson indicated he still had the same concern as Ms. Ohrenschall and Ms. Leslie regarding the restriction of family members driving the family vehicle. He noted some people lent their car to friends also.

Chairman Anderson stated Mr. Brower made it very clear the bill had potential hazards. The water had been tested in regard to parking citations as Ms. Lang had pointed out in NRS 484.444, which already provided notification for parking citations. The committee should be mindful if they moved forward with the legislation, they were potentially harming other family members who may not have been a party to the citation.

Ms. Ohrenschall asked if the bill would affect rental car agencies. Ms. Lang responded there was already a provision in the bill that removed them.

Ms. Buckley asked for clarification whether it would only apply when the defendant received the fine or fee and was the registered owner of the vehicle. She also wanted clarification if the bill allowed the revocation of the registration on any matter within the court’s jurisdiction. It could be a driving offense, a DUI, a barking dog, or any misdemeanor case and that would change it from the parking citation provision in the bill.

Ms. Lang agreed if a person owed the court money for any reason and had not paid it, the court could use it as a mechanism for collection. If a person was the registered owner of a vehicle and received a notice of non-payment that person could not renew their registration or driver’s license. It was not an immediate revocation, it was upon renewal.

Mr. Carpenter questioned Ms. Lang if he received a citation and the family car was taken away, could a member of the family go before the judge and have the ticket removed under general powers of some kind.

Ms. Lang was not aware of how a person outside the jurisdiction of a particular case could come in unless they came forward with the defendant and asked to address the court.

Chairman Anderson stated originally the municipal or justice court would have cited somebody under an ordinance and if that person failed to appear or pay the fine, the court would inform DMV there was an outstanding, non-paid instrument against the individual. The court would have a search done through DMV to see if the individual owned a vehicle and have a notification posted when the vehicle came up for renewal there were outstanding citations.

Ms. Lang added it was a mechanism for the court to use, it was not a requirement. The courts would address all options for the defendant and the provision would be a mechanism to use as a threat.

Mr. Brower informed the committee there were certain penalties or repercussions without an apparent nexus. As an example if a person did not pay child support pursuant to a court order, a person’s law license or any professional license could be revoked. He stated a hammer was needed to enforce those types of orders for the benefit of society at large.

Ms. Buckley suggested a change in the language that stated a defendant was the sole owner. She stated it would not eliminate the problem where the spouse was not on the registration and the issue of community property.

Chairman Anderson suggested a sunset clause be inserted in A.B. 16 that guaranteed a revisit to the bill. He said it would create an opportunity for the courts to come back to the legislature. He pointed out the bill would have gone into effect in October 1999, and suggested the sunset clause should be either 2001 or 2003. He thought 2001 might be too early to revisit the question and felt 2003 would be a manageable amount of time for the courts to determine if the clause worked for them.

Mr. Carpenter referred to page 2, line 1 of A.B. 16 which stated the court on its own motion could enter an order of nonpayment. He suggested adding language to that line or in section 3 where it talked about a person who, after receiving a notice of nonpayment went to court, paid the fine, and received a receipt showing payment. He suggested adding the judge could review any situation and note if circumstances had changed, he could modify his previous order to show it was impossible for the person to pay his original fine.

Ms. Leslie indicated she was looking for the same thing Mr. Carpenter had discussed. She felt there was not a natural mechanism where the family was able to address the judge.

Chairman Anderson responded during the initial hearing on A.B. 16 and the subcommittee hearing on fees, fines, and forfeitures they heard about the difficulty the courts had in collecting fines. He noted some counties had 70 to 80 percent of uncollected funds. The motor vehicle represented the most important real property that would guarantee the payment of small fines and it would be a good tool for the courts to collect fines, if they had a statute similar to the one for parking citations. He pointed out the audit that was done for the previous hearings showed a huge dollar amount in fines that were uncollected. He noted credit cards had been tried, but now they would have an additional hammer in collecting those fines.

Mr. Collins expressed he was still concerned about adding additional problems for people by trying to solve the problem. He noted warrants could be issued, arrests made for multiple offenders, or boots put on cars to handle fine collections.

Chairman Anderson explained the legislation was trying to move the burden of responsibility to the state to help the cities in their collections.

Chairman Anderson directed the research staff to work on potential amendments for A.B. 16. One provision was the sunset clause, another was single ownership of a motor vehicle, and the third was the opportunity for judicial review. He noted the committee agreed on the year 2003 for the sunset provision.

Assemblyman Nolan called attention to a previous statement which made sure DMV had the capability of collecting fees, fines, and forfeitures at the window when technology allowed it, DMV would not be precluded from entering into an arrangement with the courts to do so.

Chairman Anderson noted it should be handled through the courts. He felt if the legislature was going to hold the courts responsible for their actions, they needed their paperwork clean.

Chairman Anderson called attention to Assemblyman Neighbors bill, A.B. 38, which was located behind tabs H, I, and J, in Exhibit C.

Don Williams explained A.B. 38 was introduced by Assemblyman Neighbors and heard on February 10, 1999. It was requested by Judge John Davis, District Judge, Fifth Judicial District, which consisted of Esmeralda, Mineral, and Nye Counties, to provide a second district judge for the judicial district. He stated an additional judge was needed to deal with a significant increase in caseloads in the Pahrump area of Nye County. The law clerk for Judge Davis presented the committee with statistics which indicated the district had experienced a significant increase in case filings since 1990.

Responding to questions from Assemblywoman Buckley, Chairman Anderson had requested the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) provide the committee with statistics on the number of judges, case filings, and population of each of Nevada’s judicial districts. Those statistics were included behind tab H of Exhibit C. The table included the information Ms. Buckley had requested comparing the district courts and the size of their caseloads and the population per judge. Mr. Williams also pointed out Mr. Neighbors had presented the committee with a proposed amendment to implement by statute the provisions of Assembly Joint Resolution (A.J.R.) 17 of the 68^th session which amended section 7, Article 6 of the Nevada Constitution. When the voters approved ballot question number 3 of the 1990 general election, the amendment provided the terms of the district court should be held at the county seats of the respective counties unless legislature otherwise provided by law. Under the new provision the legislature designated areas in the county other than the county seat for holding district court.

Mr. Williams addressed questions asked by the committee in the original hearing regarding the language of Mr. Neighbors amendment that would allow the board of county commissioners to establish one or more additional locations within the county for the district to hold court. He also noted Chairman Anderson requested the research division review the legislative history of A.J.R. 17 and identify any discussion of the issue. Tab I of Exhibit C contained the proposed amendment of Mr. Neighbors and behind the amendment was the information provided by the research division.

Mr. Williams informed the committee Chairman Anderson had requested the legal counsel to draft a proposed amendment to change the provisions for appointing and electing the additional district judge in section 2 of A.B. 38. That language could be found behind tab J of Exhibit C.

Chairman Anderson opened the hearing on A.B. 38 so Mr. Neighbors could present a letter to the committee.

Assemblyman Roy Neighbors, Assembly District 36, indicated the committee had requested him to provide some type of communication from the county commissioners regarding concern of the fiscal impact.

Chairman Anderson called attention to the statistical information provided by the AOC (tab H, Exhibit C) pointing out of the nine judicial districts in the state only the Fifth Judicial District had a single member district judge. He also noted the population of Esmeralda, Mineral, and Nye Counties was 37,770. The combined counties were one of the largest geographical judicial districts in the United States. He mentioned the caseload was very high and even with two court judges, it would still have a high caseload approaching that of the Sixth Judicial District. He continued to refer to the chart behind tab H and went over the population statistics contained in the chart.

Chairman Anderson indicated he was disappointed the electorate would not have "first shot" rather than an appointment of a new judge. He referred to the proposed amendment behind tab J of Exhibit C regarding the date the judge would take office.

Ms. Angle referred to the chart and called attention to the Seventh Judicial District where it seemed to be lagging behind in population with an area similar geographically to the Fifth Judicial District. She asked if the new proposal would allow the jurisdiction to be taken across county lines. She noted Clark County’s caseload kept climbing and they seemed to be having problems in that jurisdiction also, so maybe the additional judge could help other counties. Chairman Anderson mentioned that issue was discussed in the original bill. Mr. Neighbors also responded according to the constitution the district court must meet in the county seat. The amendment stated the court would still meet in the county seat but could add additional areas according to how the law was passed.

Chairman Anderson contended Ms. Angle was reaching beyond the scope of the legislation to solve a different kind of problem. He felt she was looking at how judges were assigned and utilized within jurisdictions, but that was not the issue of the particular legislation being discussed. He said the legislation was trying to facilitate the placement of an additional court.

Chairman Anderson questioned the proposed language of A.B. 38 regarding the responsibility of the board of county commissioners establishing one or more additional locations within the counties for the district to hold court. Yet when he read the secretary of state’s memo it allowed the legislature to designate locations in the county other than the county seat. He wondered if the legislature was abandoning its responsibility.

Mr. Neighbors replied regarding the issue of the board establishing one or more locations and pointed out the "or more" was the concern. The example he originally gave was Laughlin did not have a district court and there was huge growth in that area.

Chairman Anderson referred to the line about the board of county commissioners establishing one or more additional locations and asked if the language was necessary. Mr. Neighbors replied yes, they would want the language in the bill.

Mr. Carpenter believed the language went along with the language in the constitutional amendment where it said "the terms of district court shall be held at the county seat of the respective counties unless the legislature otherwise provides by law." He noted the legislature would be providing by law the county commissioners could establish one or more additional locations.

Chairman Anderson reiterated the question would be, if the committee took up the proposed language, shall the legislature designate specific locations or shall it not by empowering the county commissioners to do so.

Ms. Buckley asked if the Chair would entertain a motion to approve the additional judge and add an additional location for holding court. She believed the suggestion would be Pahrump. That way the committee met the needs of Mr. Neighbor’s district and kept the jurisdiction with the legislature.

Chairman Anderson asked if it was the intention of the presenter of the bill to include the provision of election of first placement rather than appointment.

Ms. Buckley replied if the court felt they could wait until that time she would agree to include the election.

Mr. Carpenter questioned if any county wanted to hold court outside of the county seat they would introduce a bill in the legislature and the legislature would hopefully designate the area. He asked if that was what had been decided. Chairman Anderson responded according to the argument for passage the proposed amendments would allow the legislature to designate the locations for holding courts that were more convenient. The counties stated by authorizing other locations within the county for holding courts the proposal may also reduce certain associated costs. He said it appeared in the argument for passage that was the question. It was Chairman Anderson’s opinion the limiting effect of the constitutional amendment was predicated on the action of the legislature and was not a relinquishment of the legislative authority.

Mr. Carpenter stressed he did not disagree with the Chair, he just wanted a process in place so the counties understood what their responsibility was.

Ms. Lang informed the committee it could be done. They would not use Pahrump specifically but would tie it to population.

Chairman Anderson observed what the committee decided would dictate how other counties proceeded. On one hand they wanted to give the counties the ability to move their courts around without having to come back to the legislature to redesignate physical location. He questioned how much power they were willing to give to the county commission as compared to what the legislature would hold. He felt that was the question in front of the committee.

Mr. Brower commented if the committee decided they could go either way, he did not see a down side in allowing the county to decide where it could best utilize a second or multiple locations for the district court.

Mr. Neighbors responded the language for the amendment came from LCB. They interpreted question 3 on the ballot (tab I, Exhibit C) and if other counties wanted to do the same thing and the legislature was specific in one county and did not let the county commissioners decide, it meant they would have to come back in 2 years and go through the same thing again. He reiterated the language came from LCB, which gave the board of county commissioners the authority to establish one or more additional locations.

Mr. Buckley declared the committee needed additional clarification from the Legal Division. She felt if they were writing on a clean slate it would make sense for the county to designate the location where the population increased, but the ballot question was should the constitution be amended to allow the legislature to designate locations. She did not think the committee could say the legislature would designate any location the county wanted.

Chairman Anderson asked Ms. Lang to obtain clarification from the drafter of the amendment as to the intent of the change of NRS 3.100 in the second sentence and the rationale found on the same page (tab I Exhibit C).

Chairman Anderson informed Mr. Neighbors no action would be taken on A.B. 38 and it would be brought up again in another committee meeting.

Don Williams explained A.B. 22 was requested by Assemblywoman Cegavske. It was heard in committee on February 9, 1999 and Ms. Cegavske testified the bill was requested to correct an existing situation; when an inmate received a monetary judgment in an civil action the inmate did not have to use any portion of the money to pay his outstanding debts.

Mr. Williams indicated A.B. 22 authorized a court to require the payment of money owed to the inmate from such judgments to pay for victim restitution, administrative assessments, fines owed, and pay any public costs of the inmate’s defense. He noted Keith Munro, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Nevada Attorney General’s Office testified the office supported the bill. He pointed out inmates who were not indigent should pay for the cost of transportation to small claims court hearings. During his testimony, certain members of the committee requested information from prior years on the number of cases and amount of monetary awards that would have been covered by the provisions of the bill. Chairman Anderson requested the Attorney General’s office provide the information. Members of the Nevada District Attorney’s Association and the Washoe County Sheriff’s Department also testified in support of A.B. 38. Chairman Anderson asked both entities if they considered it necessary to amend the bill to include offenders in county jail.

Mr. Williams called attention to tab G, Exhibit C, a proposed amendment from the Attorney General’s Office and the requested information on the statistics the Chair had requested.

Ms. Lang indicated the proposed amendment had two purposes. One would make it applicable to persons confined in county jails and the other would exclude actions such as wrongful death.

Chairman Anderson referred to the proposed amendment behind tab G, Exhibit C regarding if an inmate died in confinement in the county jail would the bill preclude the family from a wrongful death suit.

Tom Patton, Assistant Attorney General, Nevada Attorney General’s Office responded it would not preclude a lawsuit. He explained the proposed language was a civil rights action arising from the conditions of confinement. The previous language stated only an action which would encompass any type of legal action including a wrongful death action. He explained a wrongful death action was an action brought by relatives asserting the rights of the decedent. He said a wrongful death was the decedent’s action brought by somebody on their behalf. A civil rights action arising from a condition of confinement was a personal action that must be brought by the plaintiff asserting their personal civil rights had been violated.

Mr. Williams pointed out in addition to the information behind tab G, the Attorney General’s Office also provided a chart showing examples of civil rights cases that had been filed and claims paid to inmates.

Ms. Buckley informed the committee, during the two sessions she had served, there had been many measures involving cutting down on frivolous lawsuits by inmates. She noted the attorneys general both nationally and locally had attempted to cut down on lawsuits. She also referred to testimony by Robert Bayer, Director of Prisons, Nevada Department of Prisons (NDOP), who talked about his philosophy that sometimes the prison was doing something wrong, and all an inmate wanted was validation; that was why there were small payments made to some inmates.

Ms. Buckley felt there was potential in A.B. 38 to further assist victims. She pointed to the section regarding the prisoner had to pay victim’s restitution. She was concerned about the rest to the bill regarding paying the cost of defense, administrative assessments, and fines. Ms. Buckley inquired if a correctional officer caused a wrongful death, but first the state received their share of the money to pay a public defender from 10 years prior, it would encourage civil rights violations. Referring to the chart in Exhibit C she indicated some of the actions were minor against the inmates, but some were very serious. She noted some actions were the prison’s fault and it was the attorney general’s position they paid when the state was wrong and did not pay when the lawsuit was frivolous. She reiterated her position she liked the victims to receive restitution, but was concerned over the policy of the state receiving money when they did something wrong.

Mr. Patton stated he agreed with Ms. Buckley regarding their position on civil rights cases. The Attorney General’s Office did not take the position that all civil rights cases needed to be pushed to the side. Those cases that were meritorious were settled. He stressed meritorious cases involved significant damages. He did not think the bill would be a deterrent to bringing meritorious claims where significant damages were the issue. The Attorney General’s Office was going after the frivolous claims and trying to provide a disincentive for filing those cases.

Chairman Anderson indicated he wanted the amendment proposed by the Attorney General’s office put into draft language by LCB and address any other questions so the amendment could be cleaner and the committee had a comfort level about A.B. 22.

Mr. Brower expressed as he read the bill again he focused on the word judgment and his concern was with the settlement. If the inmate decided to settle with the state prior to trial, it was his opinion the settlement should go to the victim and to pay the rest of the fees the bill contemplated. He wondered if that was addressed in the bill.

Mr. Patton responded settlements were reduced to judgments in order to become a legally effective document. The court approved the settlement and entered judgment accordingly. He did foresee some pre-filed settlements arranged so he felt the amendment should include a monetary judgment or settlement award.

Chairman Anderson asked Mr. Patton to include that point when drafting any proposal for the amendment.

Mr. Brower indicated he wanted to make sure any funds received by an inmate from the state, whether or not it was reduced to judgment, should fall within the requirements of the bill. He noted it was very common in civil practice for cases to be settled. If no judgment was entered other than stipulated dismissal he wanted to make sure if the case was settled, and it was not reduced to a judgment, the inmate would have to make reimbursements provided by the bill.

Chairman Anderson concluded the committee would not process the bill and took it back to bill drafting for proper language and would include it on another regular committee agenda and not a work session.

The meeting adjourned at 10:50 a.m.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

Chris Casey,

Committee Secretary

APPROVED BY:

Assemblyman Bernie Anderson, Chairman

DATE: