MINUTES OF THE
ASSEMBLY Committee on Judiciary
Seventieth Session
May 6, 1999
The Committee on Judiciary was called to order at 8:15 a.m., on Thursday, May 6, 1999. Chairman Bernie Anderson presided in Room 3138 of the Legislative Building, Carson City, Nevada. Exhibit A is the Agenda. Exhibit B is the Guest List. All Exhibits are available and on file at the Research Library of the Legislative Counsel Bureau.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
Mr. Bernie Anderson, Chairman
Mr. Mark Manendo, Vice Chairman
Ms. Sharron Angle
Mr. Greg Brower
Ms. Barbara Buckley
Mr. John Carpenter
Mr. Jerry Claborn
Mr. Tom Collins
Mr. Don Gustavson
Mrs. Ellen Koivisto
Ms. Sheila Leslie
Ms. Kathy McClain
Mr. Dennis Nolan
Ms. Genie Ohrenschall
STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT:
Donald O. Williams, Committee Policy Analyst
Risa B. Lang, Committee Counsel
Jennifer Carnahan, Committee Secretary
OTHERS PRESENT:
Bob Crowell, Representative, Nevada Judge’s Association
Robey Willis, Justice of the Peace, President, Nevada Judges Association
Alan Glover, Clerk-Recorder, Carson City
Barbara Reed, Clerk-Treasurer, Douglas County
Dave Wasik, Administrative Counsel, Nevada Supreme Court
Matt Sharp, representative, Nevada Trial Lawyer's Association
John Morrow, Representative, Washoe County Public Defender’s Office
Dick Gammick, District Attorney, Washoe County District Attorney’s Office
Gemma Greene, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County District
Attorney’s Office, Representative, Nevada District Attorney’s Association,
Captain Don Means, Director, Crime Lab, Washoe County
Anne Cathcart, Special Assistant Attorney General, Nevada Attorney General’s Office
Janalee Murray, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney General's Office
David Thompson, Representative, Attorney General's Office
Following roll call, Chairman Anderson opened the hearing on S.B. 512.
Senate Bill 512: Revises provisions relating to marriage ceremonies, marriage licenses and certificates of marriage. (BDR 11-630)
Bob Crowell, representative, Nevada Judge’s Association, testified in support of S.B. 512. He told the committee the bill was originally a Nevada Judges Association bill which was amended in the Senate. Section 4 of S.B. 512 was the only part of the bill with which the judges were concerned. Section 4 would allow justices of the peace in the townships of Henderson, North Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Sparks, and Reno to accept non-monetary gifts of a nominal value for performing marriage ceremonies. Judges in those areas were limited to performing 20 marriage ceremonies each year. The townships did not presently allow justices of the peace to accept gifts. If a judge accepted a gift at present, such actions constituted an ethics violation.
Justice of the Peace Robey Willis, president, Nevada Judges Association, added S.B. 512 did not affect him or his colleagues in Carson City, but was meant for association members in other townships who sometimes traveled great distances on weekends to perform marriages. Since judges could not accept a gift such as flowers or even cookies for their time and inconvenience, it became difficult for people who wanted to be married by a judge to find one who could do so. The sole purpose of S.B. 512 was to allow those judges to accept a non-monetary gift for their services.
John Tatro, justice of the peace, Carson City, agreed with previous testimony and added the judges had been told by the Judicial Discipline Commission they would be in violation of the ethics code if they accepted flowers for performing a wedding ceremony. If they performed a ceremony over the weekend, and someone sent them flowers on Monday to express thanks, the judges had to send the flowers back. That was almost insulting to people who just wanted to say thank you. The judges were not searching for gifts through S.B. 512; they just wanted to keep the flowers or cookies.
Chairman Anderson asked if S.B. 512 would still limit the number of ceremonies each judge could perform in a year, and Judge Willis explained such was the case.
Alan Glover, clerk-recorder, Carson City, testified in support of S.B. 512. He presented an amendment to the bill (Exhibit C) which would insert the word "or recorder" after the words "county clerk" in order to clarify who made corrections to forms for marriage certificates (Exhibit D).
Chairman Anderson asked if the amendment would expand the role of the recorder, since the purpose of the bill was to expand the role of the clerk. Mr. Glover replied the recorder was in most cases the one who made the corrections to the marriage license forms. Before someone was married, the clerk made any necessary corrections to the forms. After the marriage, the recorder made any necessary corrections to the actual finished document.
Risa B. Lang, committee counsel, Legislative Counsel Bureau, said Nevada Revised Statute 247.305 authorized county recorders to collect a fee if there was no fee specified elsewhere in statute. That did not apply to justices of the peace or county clerks. Chairman Anderson wondered if there should not be a certain fee specified.
Mr. Glover replied there was a specified fee in statute for filing of the marriage certificate. An amended or corrected certificate was not a marriage certificate. Those documents were treated as any other document. For example, in the case of a deed the specified fee was $7 for the first page, and $1 for each additional page. There could be numerous pages in a corrected document, such as statements from ministers or birth certificates to explain why there were changes. Chairman Anderson commented it did not seem appropriate to charge the bride and groom as much as four times the original fee to correct a mistake perhaps made by someone else.
Assemblyman Carpenter asked why it would be necessary to charge for more than the corrected certificate. Mr. Glover replied there would be at least one document to explain why the correction was necessary. A name change would require a birth certificate, perhaps a driving record, prior court records, and such documents as those. S.B. 512, as amended, would limit the fees for those changes to no more than $25 under the assumption the recorder would receive $10 of that amount and $15 would go to the clerk. Most of the time, the fee was $7 or $8 at most.
Chairman Anderson said a suggested change to page 3, subsection 2 of S.B. 512, which cited Nevada Revised Statute 247.305 excluded clerks from the collection process. Mr. Glover said the Clark County Clerk agreed to the wording. Chairman Anderson asked if Nevada Revised Statute 247.305 would have to be changed to include the clerk. Ms. Lang replied it might just be necessary to enter language to authorize county clerks to make use of the statute rather than change the statute itself.
Assemblyman Manendo asked if the amendments in question had been discussed with the Senate. Mr. Glover replied that was not possible since the recorders were not aware of S.B. 512 until the Clark County Clerk brought it up for amendment.
Chairman Anderson wanted to clarify changes to wording represented in the amendment (Exhibit C). He asked why section 2, subsection 3 did not have those funds go through the recorder.
Barbara Reed, clerk-treasurer, Douglas County, responded the amendment to S.B. 512 originally addressed the functions of the Clark County Clerk. There were two separate duties involved. In such a case, not all of the money collected would go to the recorder. There were cases where the money would go to the clerk, such as if nothing was to be recorded but was simply a matter of changes to the license.
Chairman Anderson referred to section 2, line 7, of S.B. 512. He asked if it should include county clerk or recorder. Mr. Glover did not want a change on page 1, line 4, of S.B. 512, but he asked for the change to be included elsewhere. Ms. Lang suggested the proper change in section 2 would be to line 7. The first line in the amendment would not apply at all, and would be stricken.
Chairman Anderson asked for a motion on S.B. 512.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN BUCKLEY MOVED TO AMEND AND DO PASS S.B. 512, AMENDMENTS BEING TO SECTION 3, PAGE 2, SUBSECTIONS 1, 2, AND 3 TO ADD THE WORDS "OR RECORDER", AND AT PAGE 2, SECTION 3 TO ADD THE REFERENCE TO NEVADA REVISED STATUTE 247.305 INSTEAD OF A STATED FEE.
ASSEMBLYMAN CARPENTER SECONDED THE MOTION.
THE MOTION PASSED.
ASSEMBLYMAN GUSTAVSON VOTED NO.
Chairman Anderson closed the hearing on S.B. 512 and opened the hearing on S.B. 492.
Senate Bill 492:—Revises provisions governing offer of judgment in civil action. (BDR 2-851)
Dave Wasik, administrative counsel, Nevada Supreme Court, testified in support of S.B. 492. He explained the bill amended Nevada Revised Statute 17.115 to make it consistent with Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 68. Both statutes regarded offers of judgement and encouraged settlement prior to trial. The policy was to encourage early settlement of cases and not make traps for the unwary. The only difference between the two statutes was that Nevada Revised Statute 17.115 had a provision for expert witness fees. Mr. Wasik said he anticipated the court would amend Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 68 to reflect that provision.
Chairman Anderson said he was concerned that the timeframe for offers of judgement would be changed from at least 10 days prior to trial to within 10 days. Mr. Wasik said the amended statute provided for offers to be made anytime prior to 10 days before trial. That provision did not change.
Assemblyman Brower asked if that meant a full 10 days even if the trial date fell within the 10 days.
Matt Sharp, representative, Nevada Trial Lawyer's Association, responded that was not the case. Section 1 of S.B. 492 stated the offer had to be made more than 10 days before the trial began.
Assemblyman Brower then asked if the only difference was the provision for expert witness fees. Mr. Sharp responded the language was not exactly the same. The bill submitted the language of Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 68 with the addition of expert witness fees being inserted by the Legislative Counsel Bureau. The concern was for the loss of expert witness fees if both statutes were not cited. Mr. Wasik said it appeared that prudent attorneys would reference both Nevada Revised Statute 17.115 and Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 68.
Assemblywoman Buckley asked if the language in page 3, section 2, of S.B. 492 regarding apportioned offers of judgement was different language from Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 68. Mr. Wasik replied the rule meant the same but the language was not exactly the same. Mr. Sharp said substantively the rule was the same. Assemblywoman Buckley replied the language appeared to change the rule. She pointed out language referring to multiple offers of judgement. Chairman Anderson reminded the committee the Legislative Counsel Bureau had reinterpreted the language, and asked for a response.
Mr. Wasik said the draft language presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee was Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 68, plus one sentence that addressed expert witness fees. The existing language in S.B. 492 was not identical to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 68, but it was substantively the same.
Ms. Lang responded she had not been involved with drafting the language, but she knew Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 68 was used to draft S.B. 492. There had been no intent to change the rules at all. She would be happy to look the language over to ensure the intent was carried out. Assemblywoman Buckley requested more time to review S.B. 492.
Chairman Anderson asked Mr. Wasik who would be placed at risk by changes to Nevada Revised Statute 17.115. Mr. Wasik responded he had discussed the issue with many practicing attorneys in civil trial matters, and it was determined by all concerned either the Nevada Revised Statute and the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure should be identical, or the statute itself should be eliminated. The reason for that decision was the area of law involved was so intermingled and overlapping.
Assemblyman Brower commented that Mr. Wasik, Mr. Sharp, and himself all came from different areas of opinion regarding the law, and because all three of them reached agreement in the issues of S.B. 492, perhaps that would raise the comfort level of the committee.
Mr. Sharp clarified both the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and the Nevada Revised Statute performed the same function. S.B. 492 simply made the language uniform and everyone was in agreement.
Chairman Anderson called for any other testimony on S.B. 492 and seeing none, he closed the hearing on S.B. 492 and opened the hearing on S.B. 482.
Senate Bill 482: Revises various provisions relating to criminal procedure. (BDR 14-1639)
John Morrow, representative, Washoe County Public Defender’s Office, testified in support of S.B. 482. Mr. Morrow told the committee to his knowledge S.B. 482 was the first bill ever introduced on behalf of the Washoe County Public Defender’s Office. He said S.B. 482 was prompted by discrepancies in procedures under discovery statutes between people considered for indictment by the grand jury and others charged with a criminal offense by a district attorney’s office by way of criminal complaint.
Mr. Morrow explained S.B. 482 had two separate parts. The first portion dealt with notice to the target of a grand jury investigation, and the second part dealt with how evidence was treated once it was seized by warrant.
Several sessions ago, continued Mr. Morrow, the legislature, pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court, determined it was appropriate that a person who was the target of a grand jury investigation be so notified. Usually a person who was notified by letter he or she was the target of a grand jury investigation would take the letter to an attorney. The notice was probably as much to help an attorney do a competent job as it was to notify the person of the action. S.B. 482 required notification to a person being investigated include the offense being charged, the period in which the offense occurred, and which police agency was involved in bringing the charge. Mr. Morrow explained that procedure did not affect in total the secrecy of the grand jury, if a targeted person was considered a flight risk, or there was perceived danger to potential witnesses. Notification was given only to such people who were considered reliable enough to stay in the jurisdiction and to not harm witnesses.
Mr. Morrow said the second portion of S.B. 482 dealt with property seized by warrant. When business records were seized in evidence, they were no longer available to the business, which made it virtually impossible for the business to operate. The individual would be under investigation only, and not yet charged with a crime, but could not make a living. It was believed safeguards provided in section 2 of S.B. 482 would enable the businessperson to copy portions of their business records which were necessary to continue their personal or business operations.
Mr. Morrow told the committee he had a problem with section 2, paragraph 5 (c), of S.B. 482. He explained under the present language a person could inspect records which were material to any pending grand jury proceeding or criminal action. Mr. Morrow said while some business records might not be material to the investigation, they might still be vital for the business to operate. He felt perhaps that provision should be worded differently to clarify the intent.
Assemblyman Brower wondered if any other jurisdiction in the country proposed the same requirement as that addressed in S.B. 482. Mr. Morrow replied he knew of none. The procedure outlined in S.B. 482 was essentially that followed by the office of the prosecutor in Clark County.
Assemblyman Brower commented grand jury rules were challenged all over the country, and had withstood those challenges, and Mr. Morrow reminded him that Nevada indeed had a different kind of philosophy in many matters.
Chairman Anderson asked if S.B. 482 rearranged the steps taken in an investigation. Mr. Morrow replied the legislature had previously added to the discovery statute a provision that discovery to be used in a preliminary examination be made available to a defendant prior to that examination. S.B. 482 would move the pre-preliminary motion forward in time.
Chairman Anderson asked how S.B. 482 would affect the problem of a business picking up copies of records from the way it was done in the past. Mr. Morrow replied S.B. 482 attempted to eliminate the prejudice to a business regarding record seizure.
Assemblyman Brower asked if any other jurisdiction imposed the notice requirement addressed in S.B. 482. Mr. Morrow replied Nevada already required such notice, but he was not sure if other jurisdictions did so.
Dick Gammick, district attorney, Washoe County District Attorney’s Office, spoke in opposition to S.B. 482. Mr. Gammick took grave exception to the testimony of Mr. Morrow. He said when Mr. Morrow had set the stage for S.B. 482, he had said the bill concerned grand juries only. He had neglected to stress the language in section 5 which read ". . .to any pending grand jury proceeding or criminal action." Those words brought the entire search warrant issue into every criminal case. Mr. Gammick said S.B. 482 actually involved not only discovery, but also every aspect of the criminal justice system.
Gemma Greene, deputy district attorney, Washoe County District Attorney’s Office, representative, Nevada District Attorney’s Association, testified in opposition to S.B. 482. She said when the bill was first drafted it related only to grand jury proceedings. Most of what was proposed in section 1 of S.B. 482 was the practice of the district attorney’s office in Washoe County, in that notice was given to the target of a grand jury investigation which included the date, time, location, and information as to a person’s right to have exculpatory evidence provided to the grand jury.
Ms. Greene stressed to the committee the grand jury hearing was an investigatory procedure. The grand jury decided whether a case it heard went forward. Nowhere in the nation or in the federal system did the target of an investigation have any more information than they had in Nevada. Nowhere in the nation were they afforded any kind of discovery.
Ms. Greene said when S.B. 482 was presented in the Senate, Mr. Morrow gave the example of a person who could not present exculpatory evidence because he or she did not have the necessary records to do so. That was true, because the case would still be in the investigatory stage. Should an indictment be issued, eventually every discovery mechanism would be available to a subject of the grand jury.
Ms. Greene explained there had not been a great deal of opposition to S.B. 482 in the Senate because some of the wording relevant to section 2 of the bill had not been there at the time. Section 2 of S.B. 482 addressed issues which were traditionally the purview of the district attorney. Once a case was in place, the district attorney controlled the evidence, decided when evidence would be presented in court, who would bring the evidence, and how it was disposed of after a case was concluded.
Assemblyman Carpenter asked if Ms. Greene had any problems with section 1 of S.B. 482. Ms. Greene replied there were problems, particularly because not everyone did things the same way throughout Nevada. Mr. Morrow had indicated section 1 of the bill was a mirror of how things were done in Clark County, which Ms. Greene felt was a misstatement.
Mr. Gammick added section 1, paragraph b, of S.B. 482 would give the person under grand jury investigation and the attorney who represented that person not less than 5 judicial days notice. Under current law the target was required to have 5 days notice of a grand jury investigation. Under section 1 of S.B. 482, the target could hire an attorney 2 days prior to the grand jury hearing, and the attorney could have an additional 5 days’ notice. The grand jury would have to be rescheduled, witnesses called off, and the whole process would repeat itself. If the language was amended it should read the target or their attorney would be given 5 days’ notice.
Mr. Gammick continued another problem with section 1 of S.B. 482 was added language at subsection 2(d), which included the term "a brief allegation". He said the target was already informed of proposed charges, and Mr. Gammick was not sure what "a brief allegation" was. He foresaw a lot of litigation forthcoming as to whether the target was given enough notice or enough information in the notice. The target was already told what the charges were, what state law was involved, when the alleged event occurred, and what his or her rights were. The target had a right to send a letter to the grand jury the district attorney was required to deliver, regardless of the contents of that letter.
Another requirement of that section was to provide reference numbers from investigative agencies concerning the offense. Mr. Gammick said he was not sure why that requirement was included, other than as a way to skirt discovery.
Assemblyman Carpenter asked if there was a statute to insure all those requirements were met. Mr. Gammick cited Sheriff v. Marcum, 105 Nev., 1989, (Exhibit E) which was the basis for the requirement. The legislature had passed a law in 1997 which required notice be given to a target or the reason the district attorney wished not to give notice must be disclosed to the court. Between Marcum, state statutes, and the Supreme Court, the recipe for noticing had evolved.
Chairman Anderson said the question of the continued existence of a grand jury and its importance was at stake. Not every state allowed a grand jury process. He asked how frequently the grand jury process was used in Washoe County. Mr. Gammick replied the Washoe County grand jury sat every other Wednesday for scheduled cases, and had been cancelled only twice in the past year. Clark County had two full-time sitting grand juries. If there were special investigations they would sit even more often. Special grand juries were relatively rare.
Mr. Gammick continued the criminal justice system in the United States had evolved over many years from common law, statutory law, and experiences from all over the world. He wanted to again stress how very far-reaching S.B. 482 was. When a crime occurred, it was reported and an investigation ensued. During that investigation the district attorney often requested search warrants to assist the police agencies. The United States Supreme Court had said a search without a warrant was unreasonable. Over the years, the Supreme Court had carved out specific exceptions to that rule which were very narrowly drawn. The general rule was a warrant was required. In the vast majority of criminal investigations, a warrant was obtained. A preliminary hearing was to prove to a court the district attorney had enough evidence to go forward with a trial. The defense had rights during that hearing. Case law stated if the evidence was in conflict and could be interpreted in favor of the state, such would be done. A preliminary hearing was not a mini-trial. The state did not look for guilt or innocence at that stage.
Chairman Anderson asked for an example of how S.B. 482 would affect the day-to-day application of the chain-of-evidence portion of the law. Mr. Gammick responded S.B. 482 would allow counsel, the target, or an agent of either to demand evidence. In other words, anybody could have it.
Captain Don Means, director, Crime Lab, Washoe County, explained his agency dealt with approximately 60 different agencies. He said the more people who handled evidence, the more chances there were of contamination of that evidence. Trace evidence was especially vulnerable.
Chairman Anderson asked if S.B. 482 passed was it possible to maintain the integrity of evidence. Captain Means replied it would require more staff to eliminate more contamination problems and to watch evidence viewing.
Chairman Anderson said there was a fiscal note attached, and asked if Captain Means if he had an idea of any additional cost to the counties. Captain Means estimated he would need three additional criminalists at $65,000 a year, not counting retirement and insurance. Mr. Gammick interjected there would also be additional staff required from the district attorney’s office to insure the integrity of the evidence. Chairman Anderson asked why those people would be involved after evidence was turned over to the crime lab. Mr. Gammick replied all other evidence than that in the crime lab was put into evidence lockers. As a matter of routine, there were at least four people from the district attorney and defense who viewed evidence just prior to trial. With passage of S.B. 482, that assemblage would be needed every time there was a demand to view the evidence. Therefore, there would be a substantial fiscal impact.
Assemblyman Nolan asked what the process was to grant access to computers taken in evidence. Mr. Gammick replied one problem would be the ability to wipe evidence from a computer through a previously set program or keystroke, which would of course destroy any evidence in the computer. S.B. 482 would allow access to such computers even before forensic investigators had a chance to preserve and save the information contained therein. Once the evidence had been copied and preserved, it had been the practice of the district attorney to return the computers to the businesspeople.
Ms. Greene interjected another part of S.B. 482 directed demands to view evidence be sent to the prosecuting attorney or the officer who got the warrant to seize the evidence. So many agencies dealt with the crime lab and the evidence locker that the officer who seized the evidence originally might be from one of many agencies. The prosecutor might not know that had taken place, the agency’s attorney might only be concerned with a lawsuit if they refused, and therefore might not inform the prosecutor’s office. In that manner, control of the evidence could be totally lost.
Chairman Anderson asked if opportunities were currently provided to arresting officers and otherwise involved agencies to view evidence without first obtaining permission from the district attorney. Mr. Means replied the evidence became the property of the district or federal attorney, and permission was sought from those bodies before evidence was released or even viewed by anyone.
Anne Cathcart, special assistant attorney general, Nevada Attorney General’s Office, testified in opposition to S.B. 482. Ms. Cathcart said the Attorney General's Office was responsible for many different types of investigations and prosecutions. The Attorney General's Office investigated and prosecuted such crimes as those committed by state employees or on state property, crimes committed by inmates in the department of prisons, and various "white collar" crimes. Consequently the attorney general was involved in many hundreds of investigations every year. Many of those investigations resulted in prosecution.
Chairman Anderson submitted a copy of a letter from David Sarnowski, chief deputy attorney general, criminal division, Carson City (Exhibit F) in opposition to S.B. 482, as well as a fiscal note presented by the attorney general (Exhibit G.)
Janalee Murray, deputy attorney general, Attorney General's Office, explained she prosecuted insurance fraud for the State of Nevada. She spoke in opposition to S.B. 482. Ms. Murray provided a written copy of her testimony (Exhibit H) wherein she pointed out objections to the bill.
Ms. Murray addressed concern that S.B. 482 actually created new rights for the population which were not recognized by any other state or the Federal Government. Some of those included the right to inspect criminal evidence prior to an investigation being completed, the right to an attorney during the initial investigative stages of a potential criminal prosecution, and the right of both the target and a potential attorney to be notified of a pending grand jury investigation.
Chairman Anderson was under the impression an attorney could be hired at any given time. He asked if that was not the case. Ms. Murray responded if S.B. 482 was read and construed as providing the right to an attorney at the grand jury stage, that would create a substantial fiscal impact to the public defender’s office as well as the attorney general. The right to have counsel at the investigative stage was already present. The right to have the state pay for that counsel at that stage was held not to be available.
Assemblyman Carpenter said he understood if a person was called before a grand jury the case had already passed the investigatory stage. Ms. Murray explained that was incorrect. There would not have been a complaint or indictment filed prior to the grand jury stage. A target had a right to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury, but he or she would have to waive their Fifth Amendment rights, so questions posed and answers given before the grand jury could be used against them. An attorney was not a participant in the grand jury at that stage. Assemblyman Carpenter was concerned about discrimination if one person could afford a lawyer and another could not. Ms. Murray explained a target was not subpoenaed before the grand jury, that was a choice they made. A witness was not provided with an attorney when giving testimony. Therefore, it was not a question of not having an attorney provided for the indigent.
Assemblyman Brower explained anyone could retain counsel at any time for any reason. The law did not require that prosecuting authorities include target or defense counsel at the investigatory stage. While the grand jury system seemed unfair on the face of it because the rules of evidence did not apply, that process had withstood constitutional challenge from time immemorial. It was well understood even by criminal defense that law enforcement could not function unless the grand jury system was different than the trial system.
David Thompson, representative, Attorney General's Office, testified against S.B. 482. Mr. Thompson said traditionally, rights of a criminal defendant started when the person was accused of a crime. Under S.B. 482, special privileges attached at the onset of an investigation before anyone was accused of anything. Neither the Federal Government nor any other state recognized such privileges. As written, S.B. 482 created a radical change to the criminal justice system. There were no provisions in the bill for judicial review. There were no provisions for lawful possession of evidence. Failure of such language raised the prospect for many additional problems.
Mr. Thompson said earlier testimony indicated when business records were seized there was no way to get them back. Normally the prosecutor would be asked for their return, and if the records were not returned, a judicial review took place and a district court judge would settle the issue.
Richard Wright, representative, Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice, testified in support of S.B. 482. Mr. Wright said S.B. 482 only proposed that if a person was searched and personal or business records were seized that person had a right to get a copy of those records. He argued that S.B. 482 did not grant special privileges. The Fourth Amendment allowed access to those records. S.B. 482 simply codified that right. The full cost would be borne by the person who was searched and whose records were seized.
Chairman Anderson said the seizing by warrant of important records had been around a long time. He asked why S.B. 482 was necessary now and not then. Mr. Wright said the reason was that business records did not used to be so easily obtained. S.B. 482 was precipitated by prosecutors who would not allow access to records. The Nevada Supreme Court ruled there was no right to discovery in grand jury proceedings. S.B. 482 was designed only to insure a person access to their own records.
Assemblywoman Ohrenschall wished to know if Mr. Wright was willing to strike page 3, line 14, language which said ". . . or criminal action." Mr. Wright said he would not agree to that provision.
Chairman Anderson asked for any further testimony and seeing none adjourned the meeting at 11:05 a.m.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
__
Lois McDonald,
Transcription Secretary
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
Jennifer Carnahan,
Committee Secretary
APPROVED BY:
Assemblyman Bernie Anderson, Chairman
DATE: