#### SENATE BILL NO. 400-COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

#### MARCH 12, 1999

### Referred to Committee on Judiciary

SUMMARY—Revises jury instruction that defines reasonable doubt in criminal actions. (BDR 14-1533)

FISCAL NOTE: Effect on Local Government: No. Effect on the State or on Industrial Insurance: No.

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EXPLANATION - Matter in bolded italics is new; matter between brackets [omitted material] is material to be omitted.

AN ACT relating to criminal actions; revising the jury instruction that defines reasonable doubt in criminal actions; and providing other matters properly relating thereto.

- WHEREAS, NRS 175.211 currently provides for an instruction to the jury
- that defines and explains reasonable doubt in criminal actions; and
- WHEREAS, The supreme court of Nevada has repeatedly held that the
- 4 instruction contained in NRS 175.211 is constitutional in its current form;
- 5 and
- 6 WHEREAS, The Nevada legislature continues to believe that the
- instruction contained in NRS 175.211 is constitutional in its current form
- 8 and that the instruction does not need to be revised based upon any
- 9 principles of constitutional law; and
- WHEREAS, The Nevada legislature declares that the provisions of this
- bill must not be construed to support a finding that the instruction contained
- in NRS 175.211 is unconstitutional in its current form; and
- WHEREAS, The Nevada legislature continues to believe that the
- instruction contained in NRS 175.211 adequately defines and explains
- 15 reasonable doubt in criminal actions; and
- 6 WHEREAS, The Nevada legislature recognizes, however, that the
- instruction contained in NRS 175.211 is based upon statutory language that
- was drafted in 1889; and
- WHEREAS, Members of the judiciary and the State Bar of Nevada have
- 20 encouraged the use of more contemporary language in the instruction
- 21 contained in NRS 175.211; and

WHEREAS, The supreme court of Nevada, in Bollinger v. State, 111 Nev. 1110, 1115 n.2 (1995), encouraged the Nevada legislature to adopt the definition and explanation of reasonable doubt endorsed by the Federal Judicial Center; and

WHEREAS, In a concurring opinion in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 27 (1994), Justice Ginsburg of the United States Supreme Court opined that the instruction endorsed by the Federal Judicial Center stated "the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly"; and

WHEREAS, The Nevada legislature believes that the use of more contemporary language in the instruction contained in NRS 175.211 would further enhance the administration of justice in this state; now, therefore,

# THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY. DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

## **Section 1.** NRS 175.211 is hereby amended to read as follows:

175.211 1. [A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt, but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

- 2. No other definition of reasonable doubt may be given by the court to juries in criminal actions in this state.] In any criminal action that is tried before a jury to determine the guilt of the defendant:
- (a) The court is not required to give any instruction that defines or explains reasonable doubt, unless such an instruction is requested by the jury or a party.
- (b) If the court gives an instruction that defines or explains reasonable doubt, the following instruction must be given to the jury, and the court shall not give any other instruction that defines or explains reasonable doubt:

The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the prosecution's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this

world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find the defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that the defendant is not guilty, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find the defendant not guilty.

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- In any penalty hearing conducted before a jury in which the prosecution is required by the constitution or laws of this state or the Constitution of the United States to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating circumstance, allegation or other matter:
- (a) The court is not required to give any instruction that defines or explains reasonable doubt, unless such an instruction is requested by the 15 jury or a party.
  - (b) If the court gives an instruction that defines or explains reasonable doubt, the instruction that is given to the jury must be, to the extent practicable, substantially similar in form and content to the instruction set forth in paragraph (b) of subsection 1, and the court shall not give any other instruction that defines or explains reasonable doubt.
  - The provisions of this section apply to all proceedings related to a criminal action or penalty hearing in which one or more prospective jurors, regular jurors or alternate jurors are examined, selected or present.
  - Sec. 2. The amendatory provisions of this act apply to all criminal actions and penalty hearings in which the initial examination of prospective jurors for the criminal action or penalty hearing commences on or after July 1, 1999, regardless of when the offense was committed.
    - **Sec. 3.** This act becomes effective on July 1, 1999.