MINUTES OF THE meeting

of the

ASSEMBLY Subcommittee on Judiciary

 

Seventy-First Session

April 4, 2001

 

 

The Subcommittee on Judiciarywas called to order at 4:38 p.m., on Wednesday, April 4, 2001.  Chairwoman Kathy McClain presided in Room 3142 of the Legislative Building, Carson City, Nevada.  Exhibit A is the Agenda.  Exhibit B is the Guest List.  All exhibits are available and on file at the Research Library of the Legislative Counsel Bureau.

 

 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

 

Ms.   Kathy McClain, Chairwoman

Mr.   Bernie Anderson

Mr.   John Carpenter

 

STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT:

 

Nicolas Anthony, Committee Policy Analyst

Risa B. Lang, Committee Counsel

Sandra Albrecht-Johnson, Committee Secretary

 

OTHERS PRESENT:

 

Liliana Loftman, Attorney, Children’s Attorney’s Project, Clark County Legal Services

Nancy Angres, Deputy Attorney General, State of Nevada, Human Resources Division

Liz Breshears, Family Programs Officer, State of Nevada Department of Human Resources, Division of Child and Family Services

May Shelton, Consultant, Human Services

Ed Irvin, Deputy Attorney General, State of Nevada, Human Resources Division

Marjorie L. Walker, MSW, LSW, Social Service Specialist, State of Nevada Department of Human Services, Division of Child and Family Services

 

Assembly Bill 248:  Requires adoption of regulations governing provision of certain information to foster or adoptive parents and revises certain provisions governing procedures for protection of children from abuse and neglect. (BDR 38-356)

 

Chairwoman McClain explained the complexities of A.B. 248.  The purpose of the subcommittee meeting was to review the many proposed amendments for A.B. 248.  She called the witnesses forward to explain the proposed amendments.

 

Ms. Liliana Loftman, Attorney, Children’s Attorney’s Project, Clark County Legal Services, described that the children she represented had very little say in matters that greatly impacted their lives.

 

Ms. Liz Breshears, Family Program Officer, Department of Human Resources, Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), explained that the purpose of A.B. 248 was to make technical changes to the law in order to bring Nevada into compliance with the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), since the ASFA regulations were not finalized until after the 70^th Legislative Session.

 

Ms. Nancy Angres, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Human Resources Division, assisted DCFS with their proposed amendments to A.B. 248 (Exhibit C).  She apologized to Ms. Loftman for not having the time to discuss the proposed amendments before the meeting.

 

She called the subcommittee’s attention to page 2, Section 1, subsection 4, lines 4 through 6 of the bill, which regarded the department issuing a “synopsis.”  To alleviate the committee’s concerns that the word “synopsis” would limit the information available to foster care providers and adoptive parents, they replaced it with the phrase, “summary of certain information.”  They also added the sentence, “This does not preclude providing foster parents access to records pursuant to subsections 1 and 2,” to ensure the availability of information, even if a synopsis was provided.  It would not prevent foster care providers or adoptive parents from having access to the child’s records.

 

Ms. Angres referred the subcommittee to page 2, Section 2, lines 20 through 24, of the bill.  The particular exception to the termination of parental rights was specified in federal law.  In an effort to clarify the purpose of the exception, she rephrased the language to prevent impeding the constitutional rights of the parents.  If the agency did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family of the child, and they did not provide the family with services deemed necessary for the safe return of the child to their home, then the agency could not file for the termination of parental rights and would lose Title IV-E funding for the child as well.

 

Mr. Carpenter explained his concern that the provision in the bill could have been to provide an excuse for the agency if they did not fulfill their responsibilities.  Ms. Angres responded that she understood the concern, but the provision was made to protect the parental rights if the agency failed to perform its duties.

 

Mr. Anderson inquired if the language and punctuation was consistent with the Assembly’s bill drafting rules and techniques.  Ms. Risa B. Lang, Committee Counsel, explained that the proposed amendment did not follow along with the original style the bill was drafted in.  Ms. Angres answered that she felt the intent was clear.  Ms. Lang explained that bill drafting could work with the language to make it conform to bill drafting requirements.

 

Ms. Loftman expressed her concerns with the term “compelling reasons which are documented in the plan for the child.”  She stated that the section should include language that would allow the child to have input into the development of the permanency plan.  If a 14-year-old child did not want to be adopted, and did not want parental rights terminated, they should be allowed some say in the permanency plan.  It would not make sense to terminate parental rights if an independent living plan was desired.  She urged the subcommittee to include language that would allow parties to have the opportunity to partake in the development of the plan, and actively protest and amend the permanency plan.

 

Mr. Anderson stated that the mention of parties would not guarantee the rights of the child.  He explained the foster care providers and adoptive parents would have the right to make decisions on behalf of the child, but that the child under the age of 18 would not have the legal standing to make decisions for themselves unless they were emancipated.  He asked how the inclusion of the statement of the child’s participation would help them if they still would not have the right to make decisions with regard to their care.  Ms. Loftman responded that in cases of abuse and neglect, the child was a legal party in proceedings that concerned them, and would have legal standing in such matters.  Chairwoman McClain clarified that the purpose of the Children’s Attorney’s Project was for the voice of the child to be heard in court.

 

Ms. Angres explained the impact of the section with regard to the termination of parental rights from the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).  If the permanency plan was for independent living, it would not be impacted by Section 2 of the bill and/or the proposed amendment to A.B. 248 (Exhibit C).  The child’s case plan would only be affected if it involved the termination of parental rights.

 

Mr. Anderson clarified that the child would not be represented in and of themselves, as adults would be.  Ms. Angres concurred.  A child would not legally be allowed to make their own decisions until they were age 18.  That was the reason for the existence of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) to intervene on behalf of the best interests of the child.  However, when a social worker created a permanency plan, in good practice, they would have taken the child’s wishes into consideration, but always made a plan that they felt was in the best interests of the child despite what the child wanted.

 

Chairwoman McClain explained that she felt the child had a right for their voice to be heard, since in court the parents and the social workers would each have an attorney.  She remarked the child should have an attorney as well.  Ms. Loftman concurred that a child should have input in decisions that would greatly impact their life.  Typical practice in termination of parental rights hearings included the child as a legal party.  The child should be included in other decisions regarding their life as well, and wanted it so documented in the law.

 

Ms. Breshears described that permanency plans were required for all children.  She explained that not all permanency plans involved the termination of parental rights.  Specific situations would determine whether the permanency plan would involve the termination of parental rights.

 

Ms. Loftman informed the subcommittee that children in Clark County had very little input in decisions that greatly affected their lives.  Her concern with the section of the bill were lines 25 through 27, which stated the “compelling reasons for not filing a termination of parental rights must be documented in the child’s permanency plan for the child.”

 

Ms. Breshears emphasized that the language in those lines were specific ASFA requirements.  The ASFA required a compelling reason for the lengthened time of a case to be documented in the case plan.

 

Chairwoman McClain inquired if the change of language suggested for that section would take Nevada out of compliance with the ASFA.  Ms. Angres explained that if the agency endangered their control of development of the plan, they could lose Title IV-E funding.  She stated she would contact the federal government to ensure Nevada would remain in compliance if the language was indeed changed.

 

Mr. Carpenter remarked it would not be appropriate if ASFA did not allow the committee to include language to protect the children in Nevada.  Ms. Breshears stated a portion of the intent of the ASFA was to inform the various child protection agencies that every child deserved to have a family, and that they needed to provide for that child in a timely manner whether it would be to terminate parental rights or reunify the child with their family.  Some children were in the system for several years.  The purpose for the language was to document the reason the case would take longer than expected, to ensure the children are provided permanency within a timely manner.

 

Mr. Ed Irvin, Deputy Attorney General, Human Resources Division, informed the committee that he gave legal advice and represented the Division of Human Services, Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS), in termination of parental rights cases in the rural counties.  He stated that when NRS 432B was first enacted, it included a provision for the possibility of a guardian ad litem.  He explained most rural counties did not have Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA), but commonly appointed attorneys to represent children throughout the process.  He acknowledged that when NRS 432B was passed last session, it included language to protect children, persons would be available to protect their interests, and specified their qualifications, and what information they should be able to access.

 

Mr. Irvin explained each time a case was reviewed or changed, the permanency plan was typically amended.  The permanency plan could change and include input from the child in its development.  When a petition was drafted to terminate parental rights, it was reviewed by an attorney and signed under Administrative Rule No. 11, before it was filed.  The attorney reviewed it before taking legal action.  He explained that termination of parental rights was a civil action covered by Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) Chapter 128.

 

He described that there was confusion in various jurisdictions in rural counties about the participation of the child.  Representation was assigned to the child whenever it was requested.  He reiterated the termination of parental rights was a civil action, and was a closed action with only parties that were involved in it.  He had no experience where a representative of the child was excluded, but although the action related to the child, he did not believe the child was a legal party to the action.  He explained there could be cases where an action to terminate parental rights would be taken against the wishes of the child, because it was determined that that action would be in the best interest of the child to enable the child to move on with their life.  He explained the numerous protections and great care exercised by the division before an action to terminate parental rights was taken.  In rural areas, judges typically listened to children involved in cases regarding termination of parental rights, however, it was made clear to them the situation was not their fault or in their control, so that they would not feel responsible for their parents’ rights being taken away.  There was a general understanding that a child would not need to bear that scar for the rest of their life.

 

Chairwoman McClain stated that children should still be allowed to have representation throughout the entire process.  Ms. Angres responded the children were already represented by CASA's, Children’s Law Projects, attorneys that may be appointed by the court, and by guardians ad litem.  She explained that the children were assured representation by NRS 432B.  She opined that Ms. Loftman wanted child participation in the development of the permanency plan to be mandated by A.B. 248.  Ms. Loftman agreed that the child should have the right to participate if they wished to do so.  She clarified that she did not state the child should be the person to develop the permanency plan, just to be allowed to participate in its development if the child so wished.  She stated that the child should have the right to participate in decisions that would affect them for the rest of their life.

 

Ms. Angres offered placement of the language, “Adopt a plan for the permanent placement of the child, which shall include input from the child,” in Section 1A of A.B. 248.  Ms. Loftman agreed the proposal would be sufficient to allow the child to have input.

 

Mr. Anderson stated if such language was put in statutory language, it should not make a child a legal party to such cases.  He explained the child would either be a ward of the state, ward of a foster parent, or a ward of the court; those would be the only choices of how the child could be a legal party.  He expressed his concern of forcing an amendment to the bill to create the child as their own legal entity, especially if it would endanger funding.

 

Chairwoman McClain requested Ms. Loftman to explain the necessity of such rights to be given to the child.  Ms. Loftman described that in normal practice in Nevada, children were full parties to termination and abuse and neglect proceedings.  Thirty states had statutory language that made children parties to all abuse and neglect proceedings that involved them.  Those states did not endanger their Title IV-E funding by doing so.  She explained that the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) did not specifically address whether a child was a party to proceedings, and therefore including language in A.B. 248 to allow the child to participate in proceedings that involved them would not endanger federal funding.

 

Ms. Loftman described several cases that she was involved in where the child was not informed of their fate when they were brought into the system.  She found that when children were informed and given a little control in decisions regarding their future, they tended to be more well-behaved, performed better in school, were more responsible about their health and well-being, were more effective in pursuit of goals to reunite with their families, and ran away less often than children who were not allowed involvement in the process.  She noted that when children were not given the opportunity to participate in the development of their case plan, they often became delinquents, truants, and runaways, because they were not happy with their placements and/or decisions that were made on their behalf without their input.  When children were allowed some control in the process, they tended to succeed more than children who weren’t allowed any control.

 

She offered a specific example of a brother and sister that she represented.  The brother, who was a teenager, made only one request, which was to remain at the same school until the end of the school year, if possible.  The caseworker was going to place them in a home across town and away from their family and friends, and would put them into a different school district.  The brother had behavioral and academic problems after discovering where he was going to be placed.  The court instructed the caseworker to look again to locate a home that would allow the children to remain in the same area as their family and friends, and where they could stay in the same schools.  A home was found, and the children were very happy to remain in the same school throughout the year and be close to their family, and they had better grades.

 

She explained that social workers were typically overworked and as a result, case plans were developed frequently without the input of the children.  Mr. Anderson stated children should have the opportunity to participate.  He explained a clear blanket statement for the child to have input at all steps of the proceedings could be placed in one place in the bill to affect the rest of it.  He explained it would be necessary to do so to prevent unintentional problems with other statutes.  Chairwoman McClain concurred with Mr. Anderson.

 

Ms. Breshears inquired if Ms. Loftman could work with the DCFS and Attorney General’s Office to form an amendment that would be agreeable to all parties.  Ms. Loftman agreed and stated that general language such as “Children are full parties to all abuse and neglect proceedings, and have input at all stages of the proceedings,” would be sufficient.

 

Mr. Irvin stated that throughout NRS 432B, the rights and interests of the child were described.  The process to inform the child about the proceedings was dictated by NRS 432B.500.  He explained all of the protections of the child were already in place in NRS 432B.

 

Chairwoman McClain instructed all parties to work together and make sure that in any amendments, the child would have representation and input.  Mr. Anderson explained that perhaps the instruction of incorporating representation and input of the child would be better addressed through the Nevada Administrative Code.  He expressed his concern that if the statement would be inserted statutorily, it could greatly impact the normal practices of the agency.  He asked if Ms. Loftman’s concerns were about procedures contained in the Nevada Administrative Code rather than statutes.

 

Ms. Loftman responded that from a lawyer’s standpoint, statutory language would carry more weight in court than the agency’s administrative code.  She wanted the language included in the statutory law so the courts could enforce it when it was necessary.

 

Chairwoman McClain inquired if the blanket statement would address all of Ms. Loftman’s concerns as she held up Ms. Loftman’s proposed amendments (Exhibit D).  Ms. Loftman stated it would address most of her concerns, but there were still some concerns she had with certain sections of the bill.

 

Ms. Angres explained the changes to Section 4, page 3, lines 23 to 24, of A.B. 248.  It clarified language to initiate an immediate investigation upon a child’s death, or if a child showed signs of abuse or serious injury, or if there were other children in the household.  Section 15 mirrored the changes in Section 2 of the bill, to give a summary to adoptive parents and not to preclude access to other records that pertained to the child.  Chairwoman McClain clarified that they would be given a summary, but could still get further information if they wished.  Ms. Angres concurred.  The definition of “reasonable efforts,” and what it meant would be established through the new section to be added to the bill.  She explained that NRS 432B did not include the language of the federal law that “reasonable efforts must include as the paramount concern the health and safety of the child.”  The definition was included in the proposed amendment to A.B. 248, on page 3 (Exhibit C).  The term “agency with legal custody of the child” was used in the proposed amendment because the DCFS would not always have the legal custody of the child, it could be the county, et cetera.  She continued to read from the proposed amendment, and paused to explain the references to other statutes.  Those statutes, NRS 127.152, NRS 127.410, NRS 424.038, pertained to providing information to foster parents and adoptive parents.  Mr. Anderson clarified the addition of reference to NRS 127.410 was to take care of special needs children.  Ms. Angres then continued to read from the proposed amendment.  Chairwoman McClain suggested the section might be the best place to insert the blanket statement for the child to have input at all steps of the proceedings.  She informed Ms. Loftman that a copy of the proposed amendments would be faxed to her for review.

 

Ms. Angres explained the “Text of Repealed Sections” was language in the NRS that was to be deleted.  She clarified that it was not deleting the “spanking bill.”  Chairwoman McClain requested clarification of the use of italics in the language of that section.  Ms. Lang informed the subcommittee the “Text of Repealed Sections,” was not a concern, that it was just a matter of bill drafting style.

 

Ms. Angres referred the subcommittee to Section 7, page 8, lines 15 through 18, of the bill.  She explained the amount of the $500 fine, as a sanction to members of the citizens’ review panel that breached the confidentiality of information discussed in hearings, was set as a suggestion, but was not dictated as to the amount by federal law.

 

Chairwoman McClain called for questions regarding the proposed amendments from the Attorney General’s Office.  There were none.  She then called upon Ms. Loftman to introduce her proposed amendments.  Ms. Loftman called the subcommittee’s attention to Section 3, lines 46 and 47, page 2 of A.B. 248, which was also referred to on page 2, Section 6, of her proposed amendments (Exhibit D).  It would be important to also address the abuse of children in foster homes.  She had seen several cases of abuse and neglect of children in foster homes that were not addressed by statutes; it only addressed abuse and neglect in institutions.

 

Ms. Angres explained that NRS Chapter 424 governed foster homes and the authority of the agency’s adopted regulations also pertained to foster homes.  She stated regulations of foster homes should be addressed in those portions of the law, not in NRS Chapter 432B.  Chairwoman McClain inquired if a foster home would be considered a “residential institution.”  Ms. Angres clarified that it was a family home and would not be considered an institution.  She also clarified that the proposed amendment would not be necessary.  The issue would be covered by NRS Chapter 424, which also gave the agency the authority to adopt regulations.  A request could be made to the agency to adopt regulations with regard to the concerns that were expressed about abuse in foster homes.

 

Mr. Anderson asked Ms. Lang if it was possible to use A.B. 248 to address the concerns in foster homes to mirror NRS 424.020.  Ms. Lang responded that anything that was going to address foster homes would be more appropriately placed into NRS Chapter 424, which governed foster homes.  She thought the chapter already gave the agency the ability to adopt new regulations.  She explained NRS 424.020 and NRS 432B.190 specified the nature of regulations the division was entitled to adopt.  If that statute did not contain the requirements requested, those requirements could be included in NRS Chapter 424.  Ms. Angres read NRS 424.020 to the subcommittee.  She stated the statute was quite broad.  Chairwoman McClain concurred, and inquired if it could be amended to incorporate residential institutions and foster homes.  Ms. Lang explained it was already regulated by something else and therefore could not be addressed in A.B. 248.

 

Ms. Loftman expressed her concerns about Section 9, line 3, of A.B. 248, which regarded temporary placement of children.  She stated the placement should be required to fall under full compliance with the Interstate Compact of Placement of Children (ICPC), which established the entity in control of the child when the child crossed state lines.  When a child would be placed in a home in another state, a caseworker from that state would be sent to evaluate and determine that the placement would be safe and appropriate for the child.  Regulation 7 of the ICPC stated when a child would be placed with a relative with whom they had a relationship, the approval should occur within 30 days.  She noted the practice was quite different, and the approval took an average of 60 to 90 days due to the high volume of requests for evaluations in the system.  As a result, children were held in emergency safety havens or shuffled between foster homes for four to five months at a time before they could be sent to the relative waiting for them in another state.

 

Chairwoman McClain inquired how A.B. 248 could address the problem, and if the relative had to be a licensed foster care provider.  Ms. Loftman explained that according to the ASFA, if placement was to be long-term, the relative would be required to be a licensed foster care provider.  However, they did not need to be licensed for a temporary placement.  Ms. Angres noted the bill referred to the ICPC in Section 4.  The difficulties with including Regulation 7 of the ICPC, in A.B. 248, were as follows:

q       Other states could not be bound to Nevada law, therefore voiding the effectiveness of any law with regard to Regulation 7;

q       The ICPC was not a regulative authority and was not a legal citation, but rather a goal to be achieved;

q       The ICPC was a very controversial topic;

q       Adoption of Regulation 7 of the ICPC would place a large fiscal impact on the state;

q       Any amendment to A.B. 248 to adopt Regulation 7 would place a fiscal note on the bill for increased staffing and other related expenses, and could potentially kill it.

Therefore, the DCFS would adamantly oppose the adoption of Regulation 7 of the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) into Nevada Revised Statutes.  Chairwoman McClain clarified the statement from the bill, “child is placed with any person who resides outside the state, placement must be in accordance with NRS 127,” referred to the ICPC.  Ms. Angres answered that NRS 127 was the ICPC.  She also explained the necessity of the relative to be licensed was to qualify for Title IV-E adoption subsidies, in the case that they could eventually become adoptive parents.

 

Chairwoman McClain expressed her concerns of children of abuse and neglect cases who were placed with relatives that were issued guardianship, that the abuse and neglect cases would be closed by the DCFS at some point throughout the process.  She was distressed that the relative could then relinquish the guardianship back to the abusive and/or neglectful parent without the knowledge of the DCFS.  Ms. Loftman explained cases she had seen that were closed as abuse and neglect cases but remained open as guardianship cases.  The case would be issued to the guardianship commissioner, who would rely upon the lawyers in the Children’s Attorney Project to act as an independent evaluator and social worker for the child involved.  She described the difficulty with that unofficial role was they were lawyers and biased for what their client wanted.  She referred the subcommittee to number 11 of her proposed amendments (Exhibit D), which proposed language that would legislate the case of abuse and neglect where the goal was reunification, to remain an open abuse and neglect case despite any issuance of guardianship, which would allow the family to receive continued services needed.  She expressed some concern that A.B. 248 may not be the appropriate place to insert the proposed amendment, but felt it needed to be included somewhere in the statutes.

 

Ms. Angres called the subcommittee’s attention to page 10, lines 36 through 40 of A.B. 248, which allowed the juvenile court to retain authority over abuse and neglect cases even if guardianship was issued.  The case was not required to be transferred to another court if the juvenile court decided to retain it.  She explained the provision was already in the statutes, but was rarely utilized.  If the statute could be strengthened, she expressed support to do so.  Chairwoman McClain instructed the incorporation of such support to be included in any proposed amendments to A.B. 248.

 

Ms. Loftman requested the subcommittee to consider her proposed amendment (Exhibit D), number 3.  She explained the necessity to legislate the authority of the court to order the Department of Human Services, Division of Child and Family Services, to locate alternative placement of children.  It had been unclear if the court had the authority to do so, and argued that ASFA governed the placement of children, which assigned the agency to be the sole authority on the placement of children, otherwise the agency could lose federal funds.  However, she explained, the authority for the court originated when the court heard testimony from all parties involved, that it could then make the decision to order alternative placement of children to be located without the agency’s loss of federal funds.

 

Ms. Breshears expressed her concern of the possible misinterpretation of any language in the bill to address the issue, because she felt the misinterpretation could endanger the federal funds.  Ms. Loftman explained it would not endanger the federal funds because it addressed the judicial authority to disagree with a social worker’s placement of children.

 

Ms. Angres explained the Federal Register regulated that if the state assumed the responsibility of placement of children, Title IV-E funding would no longer be available.  Such an assumption of responsibility would occur if the court ordered alternative placement of children by the agency.  She stated there would be a significant fiscal impact on the state if that happened.  If a court-ordered placement was significantly more expensive, the DCFS would lose control over their monies, which would create further problems for the agency.  It would also create a breach of separation of powers.  The judicial branch would then be in control of an agency of the executive branch, which would be unconstitutional.

 

Chairwoman McClain requested clarification if the court was making decisions about placement of children.  Ms. Angres clarified that the responsibility of development of case plans and placement of children belonged to the DCFS.  The court did not make those decisions, but had the authority to review them to determine if they were reasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.  They also had the authority to oversee the cases, but not the authority to dictate the agency’s actions.  The court could find that the agency abused their discretion in the development of the plan or placement of the child and order the agency to reconsider.  However, they did not have the authority to instruct what the agency should do, only to suggest and provide the direction the agency should follow.

 

Ms. Loftman stated the explanations provided by Ms. Angres were not sufficient.  She rebutted that the court was not an economic entity.  It had the responsibility to determine what was in the best interests of the child.  If the best interests of the child required a more expensive placement, the court should be allowed to order such placement.

 

Mr. Carpenter noted that what Ms. Loftman wanted codified was already in practice, as exemplified by her earlier example of the judge ordering the social worker to look again to find a more appropriate placement for the children.

 

Ms. Angres informed the committee the court already had the authority to place a child anywhere it deemed appropriate.  However, it did not have the authority to instruct the agency where to place the child.  If the court ordered the placement, it became a county expense; it would no longer be a state expense at that point.

 

Chairwoman McClain expressed her discontent that the issue seemed to revolve around budget concerns.  The children’s fate and best interests should be served despite budgetary problems.  She also informed the audience there was another bill in the committee that would probably address similar issues.  She held the subcommittee open to meet again within the next week.  She also instructed the persons from the DCFS and the Attorney General’s Office to cooperate with the Children’s Law Project to form an amendment that would suit both parties.

 

Mr. Anderson indicated that A.B. 577 may address issues similar to those addressed in A.B. 248.

 

Chairwoman McClain adjourned the meeting at 6:04 p.m.

 

 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

 

 

 

Sandra Albrecht-Johnson

Committee Secretary

 

 

APPROVED BY:

 

 

 

                       

Assemblywoman Kathy McClain, Chairwoman

 

 

DATE: