MINUTES OF THE
SENATE Committee on Judiciary
Seventy-First Session
March 30, 2001
The Senate Committee on Judiciarywas called to order by Chairman Mark A. James, at 8:46 a.m., on Friday, March 30, 2001, in Room 2149 of the Legislative Building, Carson City, Nevada. Exhibit A is the Agenda. Exhibit B is the Attendance Roster. All exhibits are available and on file at the Research Library of the Legislative Counsel Bureau.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
Senator Mark A. James, Chairman
Senator Jon C. Porter, Vice Chairman
Senator Mike McGinness
Senator Maurice Washington
Senator Dina Titus
Senator Valerie Wiener
Senator Terry Care
GUEST LEGISLATORS PRESENT:
Senator Raymond D. Rawson, Clark County Senatorial District No. 6
STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT:
Bradley A. Wilkinson, Committee Counsel
Allison Combs, Committee Policy Analyst
Barbara Moss, Committee Secretary
OTHERS PRESENT:
Nancy M. Saitta, District Judge, Department 18, Eighth Judicial District
Brad Escobar, Family Supporting Adoption
Richard Perry, Southern Nevada Adoption Coalition
Janell Evans, Southern Nevada Adoption Coalition
Douglas Evans, Southern Nevada Adoption Coalition
Elizabeth Breshears, Family Program Officer, Division of Child and Family Services, Department of Human Resources
Donald W. Winne, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Child and Family Services, Human Resources Division, Office of the Attorney General
Todd L. Torvinen, Lobbyist, Attorney, Nevada Trial Lawyers Association
W. Kathleen Baker, Attorney
R. Alexis Miller, Lobbyist, Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada
Philene O’Keefe, Lobbyist
Brian V. Chally, Chief Deputy, Douglas County District Attorney’s Office
John P. Sande III, Lobbyist, Nevada Bankers Association
Senator James opened the hearing on Senate Bill (S.B.) 295.
SENATE BILL 295: Provides for establishment of registry of putative fathers for purposes of adoption of children. (BDR 11-50)
Senator Raymond D. Rawson, Clark County Senatorial District No. 6, indicated S.B. 295 deals with putative fathers. He noted the dictionary definition of “putative” is “commonly accepted, or supposed, or, assumed to exist or to have existed.” The definition in section 10, subsection 5, of S.B. 295 is: “Putative father” means a person who: (a) Is alleged or reputed to be the natural father of an illegitimate child; and (b) Before the date on which a petition for adoption of the child is filed, has not acknowledged paternity of the child pursuant to NRS [Nevada Revised Statutes] 126.053 and has not been determined to have a parent and child relationship with the child . . .” Senator Rawson said the effect of the bill is found in section 8 of S.B. 295, “The putative father of a child who is born as the result of an act of sexual intercourse in this state shall be deemed to have notice that” the child may be adopted without consent if he fails to register or to respond after giving notice to register.
Senator Rawson noted there are approximately 700 adoptions in Nevada annually, of which half are complicated because the father is not known and/or does not come forward. Consequently, termination of parental rights is delayed, which slows the adoption, causes a lack of bonding, and disrupts the adoptive petitioner’s home. He explained that S.B. 295 would set up a registry in the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), Department of Human Resources. No fees would be charged to either register or obtain information from the registry. Basically, the division would need partial use of a computer and staff time to respond to requested searches; therefore, a fiscal note would be associated with the legislation.
Senator Rawson further explained a putative father could register any time before the birth of a baby, or within 30 days. A petitioner for adoption would request the DCFS to search the registry for the putative father. Should the DCFS fail to find the putative father, a notice would be posted or mailed, and should the putative father not respond within 10 days of receiving the notice, he would be deemed to have given consent for the adoption.
Senator Rawson completed his testimony by reading a letter (Exhibit C) from Todd L. Moody, Ellsworth, Moody and Bennion, to Senator Rawson, dated March 29, 2001, in support of S.B. 295. Although he did not have the definitive legal answers regarding notice time or location, the senator professed faith in the committee’s ability to determine the issues and create legislation that would ease adoption process confusion.
Senator Wiener broached the scenario of a putative father who may not know a baby was created, but would desire parental rights. In response, Senator Rawson said, unfortunately, a putative father may never know about a pregnancy and there is nothing that can be done about the situation. Should a putative father become aware of the pregnancy, he would have the right to register, receive notice, communicate his interest, accept responsibility, or relinquish the baby. The registry would attempt to contact the putative father and he would have 30 days after the birth to come forward. Should he not receive notice or be informed of the birth, Senator Rawson stated, that is the consequence of having sex without commitment. He emphasized although it is not possible to solve all problems, an attempt can be made to create an orderly process to protect the rights of the putative father.
Senator Wiener further questioned how S.B. 295 would affect a case in which a baby, born in Nevada, was conceived outside the state. Senator Rawson indicated S.B. 295 states, “an act of sexual intercourse in the state,” and said the location of birth established residency.
Senator Washington commented S.B. 295 was an innovative concept which would allow a putative father the opportunity to “step up to the plate” and accept responsibility rather than being penalized. When working with putative fathers, the senator said he had observed fear and a lack of understanding of the implications of their actions. He indicated upon maturity they may desire to take an active role in the child’s life only to discover their rights had been negated and they had been obfuscated by the mother.
Responding, Senator Rawson indicated S.B. 295 would accomplish two things: protect the rights of a putative father who desires involvement, and provide a stable environment for the child. He expressed the opinion every child should be raised by two parents; however, that does not always happen. The senator said the first 2 or 3 years are the most formative and if a child does not experience bonding through the adoptive process, or a father is unwilling to take responsibility, a prediction could be made the child would be “thrown away.”
Further, Senator Washington observed that most putative fathers come from single-parent households without a paternal role model. He noted his church had created an innovative program entitled, “Father-to-Father,” to educate putative fathers on parenting, as well as the legal aspects of raising a child.
Senator Care asked whether time was of the essence in the “universe of adoption.” Senator Rawson answered many states have adopted a 72-hour time frame because it is important to proceed with an adoption as soon as possible. He said the mother is permitted 72 hours to change her mind, and some states allow the putative father to make his decision within that time frame as well. The senator emphasized the importance of establishing a stable situation as soon as possible. He said, although S.B. 295 permits a longer time frame, it was arguable whether or not it was too lengthy, and he deferred to the committee to determine the time frame.
Nancy M. Saitta, District Judge, Department 18, Eighth Judicial District, testifying as a former and current children’s advocate, and as an adoptee, indicated many people had put a great deal of effort into S.B. 295 for all the right reasons. She said the ultimate goal of the bill was to effectuate more rapid, permanent, and safe homes. The laws in the state of Nevada require some attempt to notice or give fathers an opportunity to participate in the parenting process; however, its present form was inefficient, at best. Judge Saitta said she firmly believed a putative father registry, in which failure to register could effectively eliminate the opportunity to parent a child, was a good thing. If a putative father fails to act, he should not be entitled to parental rights. Having said that, the judge noted there were a number of situations in which a father, who may choose to parent, is not given the opportunity to set forth his desire to do so. Judge Saitta affirmed that the registry would provide an opportunity for the putative father to make his decision.
Should the mother not wish to inform the father of the child, Judge Saitta noted the putative father could send a postcard to the registry pointing out, should anything come of the liaison, he would wish to be notified. Whether or not the putative father was aware of the child, the registry would allow him to state his position for the record. The judge pointed out there would be opposition to the bill due to heightened concern regarding an attempt by the mother to keep the information from the father. Judge Saitta voiced her intent to create a registry and stressed there must be some form of due diligence to inform the putative father, but only to a certain point. She explained the point of S.B. 295 was to bring finalization and permanency to adoptive placements.
Continuing, Judge Saitta said there had been litigation in regard to registries throughout the country where due process and liberty-interest challenges were upheld. She declared S.B. 295 was well-written legislation and the individuals who worked on it should be commended for their efforts. A registry should operate as a matter of law and should a putative father fail to act, he would lose his rights to the child. She added a registry would serve the putative father, and the ultimate child of a liaison, by creating a public service within the state to educate young men by explaining the mechanism whereby they may claim parenthood should they desire. The legislation would teach a young man to take affirmative steps to protect his parental rights, Judge Saitta remarked.
In conclusion, Judge Saitta said the focus of S.B. 295 was not only on the rights of birth or adoptive parents, but also on the child who has no say in the process and deserves a permanent home. She stated the most important component of the bill is to formally and safely place children in homes that will provide them an opportunity to be raised by parents who want them and who will maintain appropriate standards, as well as provide all the good things parents can give a child. Judge Saitta emphasized she wanted S.B. 295 to pass; she wanted fathers to have the opportunity to parent, but above all else, she wanted children to grow up safely in permanent, loving homes.
When asked about A.B. 298, Judge Saitta indicated it was identical to S.B. 295 and stated she had written a letter in support of it. She suggested the two bills be joined to effectuate the registry becoming part of Nevada law.
ASSEMBLY BILL 298: Provides for establishment of registry of putative fathers for purposes of adoption of children. (BDR 11-490)
Asked whether S.B. 295 was patterned after any other state, Judge Saitta indicated the bill was a hybrid of a number of statutes. She called attention to a document entitled, “Statutes at a Glance,” explaining it is a compilation of all the statutes throughout the country that contain putative father registries, and offered to provide it to the committee. The judge proclaimed S.B. 295 well-written (with, perhaps, fluctuations for time frames) and considered it the best of all statutes presently in existence. Senator James indicated the committee would find the document, or a citation to it, beneficial.
Senator Porter requested Judge Saitta point out possible objections to S.B. 295. Judge Saitta indicated, should the registry be enacted in its present form, it would essentially operate as termination of a father’s rights should he fail to register. She said, in certain circumstances, there was a practice for adoption agencies to perform a due-diligence search. For example: If a mother knew the name and address of the young man with whom she had relations and imparted that knowledge to her social worker, the agency would be required to use due diligence in locating the putative father at the last known address and inform him that, should he not act, his parental rights could be terminated and his child placed for adoption. Judge Saitta stated that the registry, in its present form, essentially removes the due-diligence component, making the putative father more responsible. She confirmed the practice was good as long as all interested parties were given notice, particularly the putative father.
Judge Saitta emphasized the registry would provide the opportunity to begin educating young men, in a public service fashion, the way to avoid forfeiting their most important right. In terms of opposition, the judge said the notice components could be easily resolved.
Senator James commented the issue “boiled down” to the procedures undertaken by the court to terminate parental rights of a putative father who may, or may not, have notice of the proceedings. He said it was a question of whether or not the procedures in place (which seem to be bare minimum of due process) would better protect rights than a registry where the failure to act would result in termination of parental rights. The senator pointed out under NRS 127.090, as amended, if an individual had not registered, the order to terminate parental rights would occur under that statute because an affirmative action was not taken to register. Senator James pondered aloud whether any case law dealt with the issue.
In response, Judge Saitta indicated there had been several cases in other jurisdictions that focused upon fathers’ rights. She said in Nevada a system is in place in which a putative father may continue to challenge even after an adoption takes place. The judge answered, “No,” to Senator James’ question regarding whether or not the present statutory scheme was effective, or would be more effective than a registry. She said although lip service is given due diligence to notify fathers, in most instances it is unrealistic. When handling adoptions, Judge Saitta affirmed, there were far too many times when she terminated parental rights of John “last name unknown,” who may have been at the Happy Time Bar on September 9, 1998. The judge confirmed that such information could not provide accurate and meaningful notice.
Senator James inquired whether due diligence was set up under case law or statute. Judge Saitta answered due diligence was essentially by practice at the present time. Senator James said the issue went from ad hoc practice, which would change under different circumstances or be up to the agency or court involved, versus a statutory registry with a procedure. He said, at first blush, in regard to procedural due process, S.B. 295 would provide a much better procedural due process because there would be a way to protect a person’s rights. Judge Saitta said the majority of cases that deal with these types of registries are fraud cases. She expressed the opinion that no registry or statutory scheme, nor edict of the high court, would be able to protect against purposeful fraud. The basis upon which the majority of putative father cases arise is a situation where there is an attempt to purposely keep secret the pregnancy and the child from the father, Judge Saitta remarked.
Senator James said, in that event, whether or not the law is constitutional or a good law, it would not be based on the fact it could be defeated by fraud. It would be whether or not it set up reasonable procedures to notice the person of his rights. Judge Saitta agreed, and said legitimate state interest in the case had to do with facilitating the formalized process of adoption and permanently placing children, as against the father’s right to know. She said there was a balance to be struck, but the majority of cases thus far had not dealt realistically with matters other than fraud. Senator James noted they were both compelling interests.
Referencing section 4, subsection 2, of S.B. 295, “A registrant who withdraws his registration pursuant to this section may not submit another registration form for the same child for which he previously registered,” and section 12, subsection 2, paragraph (a), of S.B. 295, “Consent of a putative father to an adoption is not necessary if: The putative father has failed to register with the registry pursuant to section 3 of this act or has withdrawn his registration pursuant to section 4 of this act,” Senator Care asked whether or not it would constitute disavowal of parental rights should a putative father register and then withdraw his registration. Under the present proposed statute, Judge Saitta indicated that was an accurate assessment. It would certainly indicate his lack of desire to become part of the parenting process.
Senator Washington asked the effect of S.B. 295 on The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. Judge Saitta indicated the bill would have no affect on the federal act because it was adopted in the state of Nevada. She said the mandate within the Safe Family Adoption Act was primarily more rapid placement.
Continuing, Senator Washington requested a further explanation of section 7 of S.B. 295 regarding confidentiality. Judge Saitta indicated section 7 was not meant to necessarily be a matter of public access, but to limit, in terms of interested parties, who had to have notice of the proceedings. As rewritten, the situation was created to provide the information to every agency, court, and/or individual with a legitimate interest, and cover all areas of appropriate, legal, and moral notice. She said people who would be involved within the adoption triad could have appropriate access pursuant to the mandate set forth in S.B. 295. Judge Saitta indicated the legislation omitted no one, was not overly broad, or did not allow access for people to obtain the information who did not have a need for it.
Senator Washington conjectured opponents might say the registry could be used against a putative father in order to collect child-support payments. Judge Saitta indicated, the way the bill was drafted, that concern was neither legitimate nor realistic. The judge opined that registering and being sought out to shoulder financial responsibility was unrelated. Senator Washington pointed out that a putative father might not register for fear that courts or agencies would come after him for child-support payments. Judge Saitta said the situation was neither enhanced nor negated by the responsibility of registering.
Questioned what agencies would have access to the registry, Judge Saitta answered, the Division of Child and Family Services, and/or any licensed-adoption agencies. Senator Washington queried which agency would keep the registry. The judge indicated the Division of Child and Family Services would maintain the registry. She said there had been discussion that perhaps the registry might be better placed within vital statistics. Senator Washington pointed out, should it be handled at the county level there would be a fiscal note. In that event, Judge Saitta deferred to those with knowledge regarding placement of the registry to determine the least fiscal effect.
Richard Perry, Southern Nevada Adoption Coalition (SNAC), indicated SNAC comprised all the private-adoption agencies in southern Nevada, including Latter Day Saints Family Services, Jewish Family Services, Catholic Charities, and New Hope. Mr. Perry stated that SNAC enthusiastically supported S.B. 295 and believed a putative-father registry was positive adoptive legislation and would improve adoption practice in Nevada. He said, not only did SNAC support the bill, but every judge, attorney, adoptive and birth parent had also offered support.
Mr. Perry said the members of SNAC found that in one-half of adoptions arranged in Nevada there was no signed relinquishment obtained from the birth father, which placed the adoptive and birth parents in a risky position. Consequently, he said it was necessary to terminate the father’s rights in court, a procedure that takes several months. Until that task is accomplished, Mr. Perry pointed out, the unidentified father could disrupt the adoption.
Further, Mr. Perry proposed to provide an overview of how the legislation would affect people involved in the adoption process. First, the birth mother: When adoption is considered, an expectant mother is typically in a precarious situation. Her relationship with the birth father is either strained, abusive, or nonexistent, and the full responsibility for taking care of the pregnancy and planning for the baby is placed squarely on her shoulders. Financial consideration, prenatal care, and emotional turmoil are hers to bear.
Second, the adoption agency: When a birth mother contacts an agency it becomes the agency’s responsibility to convince her to identify the potential father. The agency must conduct a diligent search and document that everything possible was done to contact the putative father. Mr. Perry disclosed he had been practicing in the field of adoption for 27 years, and noted it was in the best interest of adoption agencies to contact the birth father. He said there is a professional and ethical responsibility maintained by social workers. Additionally, Mr. Perry pointed out, the statutes mandate that the birth father be provided an opportunity to sign a consent to the adoption prior to the child’s birth. This is an important advantage for an adoption agency to pursue. Therefore, the registry would not discourage adoption agencies from continuing to provide good social work to both birth parents. Mr. Perry indicated, frequently the birth mother believes not contacting the father is in the best interest of both her child and herself. She would not wish someone, who essentially abandoned her, to have the power to veto a plan she worked so hard to achieve when there was so much at stake.
Third, the adoptive parents: One-half of adoptions never obtain the father’s signature and adoptive parents must sign an at-risk statement acknowledging their willingness to accept a child who is not yet legally free for adoption under the current system. The adoptive parents must accept the risk that the birth father could appear and claim his parental rights. In that event, Mr. Perry said, the joy of adoptive parents in receiving a long-awaited child is diminished and they must anxiously wait several months before knowing the adoption is secure.
Fourth, the attorneys and family court: After the child is placed, a lengthy, time consuming, and expensive process begins. The process involves filing a petition, publishing the mother’s name and circumstances for 30 days in a newspaper, and allowing 3 weeks following publication for the father to respond. He said the family-court judge must then evaluate all pertinent information to ensure the father’s rights have been properly addressed. Only then can the putative father’s parental rights be terminated, ensuring the safety of the adoptive placement.
Fifth, and last, the birth father: In the case of a truly interested birth father, Mr. Perry maintained the putative-father registry would provide a clear, heretofore unavailable, avenue to pursue his interest. He emphasized the putative father registry would require the father to accept responsibility for the consequences of his actions.
Mr. Perry affirmed that the putative father registry is not anti-father, as some might suggest. He was a father and understood the privileges, joys, and responsibilities that accompany fatherhood. Senate Bill 295 was intended to address men who were not willing to assume their responsibilities. The Nevada Legislature had been favorable to adoption issues in the past. Convinced of the benefit of S.B. 295, Mr. Perry anticipated committee support for its passage.
Brad Escobar, Family Supporting Adoption, pointed out he and his wife were adoptive parents of two children. He indicated he testified in the Assembly on A.B. 298, and affirmed the reasons for S.B. 295 and A.B. 298 were the desire to narrow the time of uncertainty for adoptive couples who have received a baby, provide certainty for a birth mother who has carefully considered a loving plan for her child, and protect the biological putative father with an avenue to manifest a paternal commitment to the child.
During his testimony in the Assembly, Mr. Escobar said he heard constructive comments and criticism from representatives of the Attorney General’s Office and DCFS. He explained there is a two-tiered system of adoption and termination of parental rights in Nevada. At the present time, parental rights are terminated in Chapter 128 of NRS, parentage is determined in Chapter 126 of NRS, and adoption in Chapter 127 of NRS. As presently written, S.B. 295 is a hybrid and puts the putative father registry in Chapter 127 of NRS, which is in the adoption area of the Attorney General’s Office and DCFS. He suggested the putative father registry aspect be put in Chapter 126 of NRS under the parentage provisions of the present statutes. Then Chapter 128 of NRS would cover termination of parental rights and the result of failing to register. Mr. Escobar noted it was an appropriate way to address the concerns.
As presently written, Mr. Escobar said S.B. 295 only allows the petitioner for adoption to use the registry. He suggested the legislation be made broader to allow licensed agencies, attorneys, and/or other interested people with court orders to request information.
Senator James suggested the bill include a requirement the registry be publicized in some way. He pointed out Mr. Escobar’s statement referenced fathers who do not care, but said the law must be fair to those who do. He said there could be cases in which a putative father would not be aware of the pregnancy, and yet care about the child and wish to exercise his parental rights. Comparing the issue to the criminal justice system, the senator said great pains are taken to ensure everybody is provided the same criminal due process even though, in some cases, a person is obviously guilty based upon overwhelming evidence.
Responding, Mr. Escobar noted all who practice adoption in the state would clearly be in favor of publicizing the registry. Mr. Perry interjected the Supreme Court had reached a decision in Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, that was close “on point” with the facts given. In that case, the mother gave birth and the father was with her. She subsequently terminated contact with him and he attempted to find her for a year. She married and he found her 2 years later. He declared interest in the child, had sporadic contact for a time and filed a paternity case. The birth mother and her husband filed for adoption and the birth father did not receive notice of it. The adoption was finalized and the putative father reached as high as the Supreme Court arguing that due process and equal protection was not provided due to his failure to give notice. Mr. Perry said, essentially, the Supreme Court held that the putative father registry was an appropriate device and the father needed to register to assert his parental rights.
Senator James indicated he was not referring to the constitutional question, rather his concern was that the registry should be publicized, whether or not publication is required by the strict interpretation of procedural due process. He emphasized it was the right thing to do.
Mr. Escobar agreed, and said the real issue was due diligence. He pondered whether responsibility should be placed on the putative father and expressed concern for a father who was unaware of the child. Mr. Escobar noted, with the adoption of his first daughter, the paternal identity of the putative father was “John Doe in a bar,” who may have moved to California. He said publication was ordered by the court in Nevada; therefore, it was impossible for the putative father to know about the child. Mr. Escobar affirmed there was no way to provide notice to a person in such a situation.
Senator James commented it was not Senator Rawson’s or Judge Saitta’s intention to do away with due diligence, and clarified that existing due diligence would continue. Mr. Escobar said the bill, as written, would not necessarily require due diligence should it not be desired. He noted, although it was good practice, due diligence was not statutorily mandated. Referring to Mr. Perry’s remarks, Mr. Escobar indicated agencies would contact known putative fathers and attempt to obtain relinquishment to prevent fraud.
Senator Titus indicated her preference to include due diligence in the statute. She expressed caution regarding opening the registry to more people whose purposes might be dishonorable. Mr. Escobar agreed, and said licensed agencies needed access, as well as attorneys doing private placement, which was the reason a court order would be required. Senator Titus recalled Mr. Escobar had testified he wished to broaden the parameters beyond what was written in the bill. Mr. Escobar explained S.B. 295, as written, said only the petitioner (which was the potential adoptive couple) would have access to the registry. He said agencies that obtain relinquishment of a child from the birth mother, or an adoptive couple through their attorney in a private placement, would require a court order to consult the registry in order to finalize the termination of parental rights.
Senator James noted a number of states adopting this law required the registry to be publicized in some way. He expressed discomfort with enacting the legislation without that requirement. The senator agreed with Senator Titus’ concern regarding codifying a minimum level of due diligence. He remarked if it was, indeed, accepted practice, there should be no objection to making it a clear and consistent practice in the statute. Senator James said it would not defeat the intent of the bill.
Janell Evans, Southern Nevada Adoption Coalition, stated she relinquished her baby 7 months ago. She explained, over the objections of the father of her baby, she informed her parents when she was 2 months pregnant. Consequently, the father departed. Ms. Evans indicated she then contacted the adoption agency and an attempt was made to inform the putative father. The putative father contacted her before the birth indicating he would take care of her and the baby; however, he failed to accept his responsibility and once again departed. Subsequently, he contacted the adoption agency claiming he was not the father of the baby. Thereafter, when asked to relinquish his parental rights he refused. Ms. Evans said she gave birth to the baby and placed it with adoptive parents she had chosen. The day after the birth the putative father filed for custody of the baby; a court date was set, and the day before going to court the putative father relinquished his parental rights. Ms. Evans pointed out S.B. 295 would ease this type of situation.
Douglas Evans, Southern Nevada Adoption Coalition, Ms. Evans’ father, said he has three daughters and expressed a belief that the family unit consists of mother, father, and children together. He said when the family learned of Ms. Evans’ pregnancy, she made the decisions. The financial realities were explained to her and the father. Mr. Evans pointed out that the father was a 16-year-old boy, without a job, and unable to help financially. He noted the boy’s parents were contacted and a discussion ensued regarding their mutual obligation. It was agreed the focus must be on the expected baby and adoption would be in everyone’s best interest. He said during the adoption process the father changed his mind, which resulted in a court battle. Thereafter, the father wanted nothing to do with the Evans family, or Janell, and he became involved with another girl. Mr. Evans indicated the young man tied up the legal system with no intention of providing financial support or meeting his obligations. He just wanted vengeance against the Evans family for trying to do the right thing. Mr. Evans stated that S.B. 295 would simplify the process for putative fathers who do not want to accept responsibility. Even though they may not understand the process, Mr. Evans said ignorance was no excuse and it was their responsibility to learn the laws and obey them. He agreed with rewriting the bill to include contacting the putative father. Comparing the problem of putative fathers with those who will not pay child support, Mr. Evans said, if a putative father will not take responsibility for his child, he definitely will not contribute monetarily.
Senator James asked who paid the legal fees on the father’s side. Mr. Evans said legal services helped the boy, but he did not know who paid.
Senator James praised Ms. Evans for her courage in testifying before the committee. He said the committee was impressed and her effort was greatly appreciated.
Elizabeth Breshears, Family Program Officer, Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), Department of Human Resources, said the DCFS was interested in legislation that would facilitate adoption, particularly adoption of special-needs children, which appeared to be the intent of the bill. She indicated two questions arose when she reviewed the bill with the Attorney General: (1) Does the putative father have due process under what is proposed; and (2) Would the legislation, as proposed, weaken the strength of the adoption process in Nevada?
Ms. Breshears noted S.B. 295 was modeled after states that have a single process, which includes both adoption and termination of parental rights. She said Nevada handles the issue under two different processes in two different chapters of the NRS. She explained, termination of parental rights is under Chapter 128 of NRS and must be completed before the adoption process, which is under Chapter 127 of NRS. Ms. Breshears pointed out the adoption process should be as stable and permanent as possible for the child. She declared, should the hybrid be created and termination of parental rights “attacked,” it appears adoption would also be attacked because it is a single process. Ms. Breshears said, at the present time, should it be questioned, termination of parental rights would be attacked but the separate adoption process would be preserved unless, and until, the termination of parental rights process could be successfully challenged.
Senator Care inquired whether or not any of the other 21 jurisdictions had been perused to ascertain what language was contained in their statutes, and if so, did they vary or were they fairly consistent. It was Ms. Breshears’ understanding that Texas and Utah have a single process, as opposed to the separate process in Nevada.
Donald W. Winne, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Human Resources Division, Office of the Attorney General, representing the DCFS, indicated that the statutes of Texas, Utah, and New York vary in regard to how much time is required for notice, what sort of presumptions are imputed upon the putative father as to whether or not he was aware of the child, whether he was aware the child was up for adoption, and/or whether he was aware a child had been conceived as a result of sexual intercourse. He said, “There is a variation of the thread as to how much you are willing to impute as knowledge onto the putative father, but they all attempt to impute some knowledge about something to do with the child in order to take the next step.” Mr. Winne referred to section 8 of S.B. 295, “The putative father of a child who is born as the result of an act of sexual intercourse in this state shall be deemed to have notice that, pursuant to NRS 127.090, the child may be adopted without his consent,” and said it might be a bit of a stretch that just because a man had sexual intercourse with a woman he now knew a child born of that act would be adopted. He suggested it might be more appropriate and reasonable to believe that a child was conceived and use that as a presumption of some sort of notice in the putative father registry. Mr. Winne indicated he was not concerned with the concept of a putative father registry; however, once the route was taken there must be assurance it would be as effective as other attempts at publication.
In regard to publication, Mr. Winne recalled two occasions when he published notice and the father had come forward. On both occasions the men subsequently relinquished their parental rights which, Mr. Winne opined, was the best action to take. Senator James requested Mr. Winne submit some written language to the committee, Judge Saitta, and Senator Rawson. Mr. Winne agreed to do so.
Todd L. Torvinen, Lobbyist, Attorney, Nevada Trial Lawyers Association, indicated he was a family-law lawyer and deferred to Kathleen Baker.
W. Kathleen Baker, Attorney, pointed out she practiced solely in the area of family law in Reno and Washoe County. In that capacity, she said she handled many special-needs adoptions and some private adoptions as well. Ms. Baker noted the Nevada Trial Lawyers Association (NTLA) supports the effort to find good adoptive parents and expedite the process of placing children in safe and permanent homes. She said their concerns had been addressed, including codifying the due-diligence requirements, and expressed the opinion that it was the only way to proceed on the issue.
Recalling the Janell Evans case, Ms. Baker said the father of the child had received notice but did not step forward. She suggested one way to approach the issue would be to presume termination of parental rights, but require due diligence be done to afford an interested parent the opportunity to step forward.
Continuing, Ms. Baker indicated she once handled a private adoption and handled the termination of parental rights through an agency. She said the mother alleged she did not know the identity of the father. After reviewing the documents filled out by the mother, Ms. Baker determined that the mother clearly knew the identity of the father. She noted her distress in discovering that a putative father, who appeared to be an upstanding individual capable of parenting a child, would not be given an opportunity to come forward. She said when a man is informed he fathered a child, coming forward to register in the putative father registry would provide him the option to either relinquish or assume his parental rights. Ms. Baker expressed support for some sort of public-service information. As a private attorney, Ms. Baker said she would appreciate having access to a putative father registry.
Senator James asked whether or not Ms. Baker would still object to S.B. 295 should the practice of exercising due diligence to get notice to the putative father, aside from the registry itself, be codified. Ms. Baker assured the senator that NTLA would support such a bill.
Mr. Torvinen said, “Basically the bottom line with S.B. 295 was after 30 days you imply notice and imply consent to termination notice of the adoption and consent to termination.” He suggested the due diligence requirement be kept in the bill because, in its current form, it did not appear to contain it. He said under NRS 128.012.2 there was a due diligence requirement with regard to terminating parental rights at the present time. Mr. Torvinen suggested due diligence requirements be included in S.B. 295 because, in the current form, the bill appeared to override them.
Senator James requested Mr. Winne work with Mr. Torvinen and Ms. Baker to propose language in regard to due diligence notice requirements for section 8 of S.B. 295 and submit it to Senator Rawson and Judge Saitta. The senator said he would become involved should there be a problem creating the language.
R. Alexis Miller, Lobbyist, Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada, remarked that hearings in the Assembly and Senate in regard to S.B. 295 and A.B. 298 encompassed statements that women have children because they [the children] are endearing. She proclaimed, “Not all of us do. We want to raise a family just like men do. Our intent is not to just have a cute, cuddly baby. Possibly in some instances that is true, but a blanket statement like that can tend to make us look bad.”
Ms. Miller indicated that Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada supports the concept of making the adoption process more expedient and final. She expressed concern about the feasibility of the registry, questioning how a man would know to register if there was a chance he was a father. She pondered how a man would find out where, how, what was entailed, and the time limits. Ms. Miller pointed out oftentimes a pregnancy occurs from a casual encounter and the man does not know the woman’s name or any aliases she might use. Should he have an interest and attempt to register, the woman could be a “Jane Doe,” just as easily as it could be a “John Doe” on the other side of the issue, she remarked.
Further, Ms. Miller conjectured, a man who was trying desperately to have a child could register untruthfully. In such an event, she asked who would pay for the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test when paternity is contested. In addition, she queried, should a man register, would he be fiscally responsible for the mother’s prenatal care and his share of the birth and adoption process.
Continuing, Ms. Miller expressed concern that a man’s silence could terminate his parental rights. She said it was a precarious situation that 30 days after the birth his parental rights would be terminated. Ms. Miller suggested if a man does not know about the pregnancy he cannot register and his rights will be terminated.
In conclusion, Ms. Miller stressed, band-aids are being placed on the larger problem. She said Nevada needs comprehensive, age-appropriate sex education, as well as state-funded family planning, to teach children and provide services that could greatly reduce the number of unintended pregnancies and children born out of wedlock.
Senator James said he considered Ms. Miller’s point well taken and agreed the problem needs to be addressed. The senator asked Ms. Miller to see him after the meeting to discuss an issue that he deemed important enough to be added to the language of the bill.
Senator James closed the hearing on S.B. 295 and opened the hearing on S.B. 285.
SENATE BILL 285: Requires district attorney to provide certain information regarding performance of his duties pertaining to child support. (BDR 11‑1344)
Philene O’Keefe, Lobbyist, disclosed that although she was an employee of Wadhams and Akridge, her testimony was personal and did not reflect the opinions of either the company or its clients. She pointed out S.B. 285 had been brought forth at her request, but speculated the district attorney (DA) would testify the amendment was unnecessary. She said, “When we apply for enforcement we are told they [the DA] do not represent us and we sign a notice to that effect.” Ms. O’Keefe explained the issue was not about being represented by the DA in her child-support case, rather it was not being provided sufficient notice about a recommendation presented to the court on a child-support modification. She said subsequently the DA represented him (her ex-husband) in the appeal, which was another issue.
Ms. O’Keefe explained she was proceeding with an action to terminate her ex-husband’s parental rights because he had not been present, or a factor, in her daughter’s life and it was time to accept the fact that she would be solely responsible. Ms. O’Keefe indicated she would not be personally affected by any changes, but expressed concern regarding due process in her child-support modifications.
Continuing, Ms. O’Keefe indicated a state profile filed by the Nevada State Welfare Division with the Federal Office Child Support Enforcement asked the state to describe the state’s modification procedure. She said the profile stipulated that when a “worker” determined a modification was necessary, within 180 calendar days a review should be conducted. Ms. O’Keefe indicated the profile stated the worker would notify the parties of the review, obtain financial information, conduct the review before a hearing master, notify the parties of an proposed adjustment or a determination that there should be no adjustment, and inform the individual of their right to request a hearing in order to challenge the decision. She asserted that the procedure did not provide proper notification of the definition of the recommendations, and asked how a decision could be challenged. Ms. O’Keefe said when a person challenges a decision, it constitutes an appeal, and she questioned how a person could appeal something on which they had not been given prior notice. Therefore, she said, rather than the bill stating a person must be notified they are not being represented, she preferred to see language stating a person must be notified of a proposed recommendation and the reason it is being proposed.
Ms. O’Keefe indicated the notice she received regarding her hearing, dated December 3, 1999, simply stated, “Please be advised that this case is being sent by mail for service upon the defendant. A hearing has been set for 8:30 A.M. on Friday, January 14, 2000, pending service upon defendant.” She pointed out she did not receive a notice of what the recommendation was going to be. On the other hand, she said her ex-husband received a notice encouraging him to contact the DA’s office prior to the hearing to request a conference. The notice stated: “The issues and allegations raised in this notice may possibly be resolved at this conference and avoid the need of a hearing. You are encouraged to provide information concerning your income, other children you currently support, child support payments, etc.” Ms. O’Keefe affirmed her ex-husband was given an opportunity that she, as the custodial parent, was not provided. She proposed an amendment and requested direction on how to proceed.
In conclusion, Ms. O’Keefe mentioned, California has a family-code section that prohibits the DA from entering into any type of agreement that lowers child support beyond the statutory formula without the consent of the custodial parent. In the case of a custodial parent who receives no public assistance but has a stipulated agreement, Ms. O’Keefe suggested California code be studied to ascertain whether it could be applied in this issue. She confessed, she was married 16 months and spent $5000 on the divorce which took a year; her ex-husband challenged the paternity of her daughter, and the situation was ugly. She said the DA would not know or be a party to those facts. Ms. O’Keefe indicated child support, by its very nature, is an emotional issue. She expounded she gave up approximately $15,000 to $20,000 of community property, and received 18 percent child support, for sole custody of her daughter, and less than a year later the terms were modified based upon a recommendation by the DA. She said although the DA did not necessarily do anything wrong, she was not given proper notice of the recommendation. Even if she had hired a private attorney, she could not have been adequately represented because she was not notified in advance, Ms. O’Keefe remarked.
Senator James asked the reason the DA recommended modifying the agreement. Ms. O’Keefe answered the reason was because her ex-husband subsequently married and had another child. Senator James recalled, when the bill was requested, the concern of the committee was that Ms. O’Keefe was represented by the DA in terms of obtaining child support. He clarified when the modification came she was notified of a hearing; however, at that point she was no longer represented by the DA, but her ex-husband was. The senator explained the committee had been told Ms. O’Keefe was represented by the DA and had received a “bare bones” notice to attend a hearing regarding the case. He indicated, at the hearing, Ms. O’Keefe found the DA’s office representing her ex-husband in an attempt to reduce the child support. The senator stated he wished to hear from the DA on the issue.
Brian V. Chally, Chief Deputy, Douglas County District Attorney’s Office, submitted an “Application for Child Support Services” (Exhibit D) for the committee’s edification. He stated, Ms. O’Keefe’s explanation was incorrect and he would clarify the status of the case. Mr. Chally explained Ms. O’Keefe applied for child support and provided financial information in her initial application. The deputy handling the case sent a notice to the father informing him that since financial information had been provided by the mother, he would be allowed to supply financial information if he so desired. Mr. Chally said the case went to a hearing master because the divorce decree specified a percentage amount, which had to be calculated into a specific amount, and the hearing master was charged with the task. He indicated Ms. O’Keefe was provided 41 days prior to the hearing to ask any questions.
Continuing, Mr. Chally pointed out a meeting was held between the mother, father, and the deputy DA handling the case, at which time Ms. O’Keefe was informed there was a good chance the hearing master would consider the circumstances of the case and possibly reduce the child support, which at 18 percent, was calculated at $220 per month. He said both Ms. O’Keefe and her ex-husband testified at the hearing stating their positions. Mr. Chally indicated the hearing master reduced the child support to $190, and Ms. O’Keefe appealed the decision to the district court, which was reviewed and rejected by District Judge David R. Gamble, Ninth Judicial District. He said Ms. O’Keefe then appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court and an order was issued which dismissed the appeal and deemed the hearing master’s deviation appropriate. Mr. Chally indicated the order stated that Ms. O’Keefe’s request to test the paternity of her ex-husband’s new child, in order to raise her child support from $190 to $220, was not appropriate policy under the statute. He said Ms. O’Keefe then appealed to the ninth circuit court to no avail.
Further, Mr. Chally reported, “Ms. O’Keefe recently filed a case in federal district court which was opposed to dismiss on subject-matter grounds because the district court was not in a position to review a state-court action which she requested be vacated.” He said as soon as the motion to dismiss was filed, Ms. O’Keefe withdrew the case.
Senator James inquired whether or not the Douglas County District Attorney’s Office represented Ms. O’Keefe at the hearing to determine child support. Mr. Chally pointed out a state statute mandating the DA’s office may not represent either parent. He explained when two parents are involved in a case and one is represented by the DA, whatever recommendation is made will not satisfy one of them. He said Ms. O’Keefe retained her own attorney on the appeal and the DA defended the hearing master’s decision. Mr. Chally indicated the DA’s office did not consider the hearing master’s decision beyond the statutory pale in granting the deviation, and the district court and Supreme Court agreed.
Senator James inquired about the notice informing Ms. O’Keefe of the hearing, and the notice requesting her ex-husband to provide financial information and other obligations. Mr. Chally indicated Ms. O’Keefe was informed the purpose of the hearing was to calculate the 18 percent child support to a monetary amount. He said the reason the father was given the opportunity to provide additional information was because he had not filled out the financial declaration that had been filled out by the mother.
Continuing, Senator James queried where and when Ms. O’Keefe was informed the purpose of the hearing was to set the monetary amount of child support. Mr. Chally stated she would have been informed in the notice and process. Interjecting, Ms. O’Keefe asserted she did not wish to debate her case, remarking it was not within the purview of the committee. She said Mr. Chally had not been present during any of the proceedings. Ms. O’Keefe noted her concern regarded the process. She suggested, should the DA provide recommendations that go forward to a hearing master, a person be notified prior to the hearing what is contained in the recommendation.
In response, Mr. Chally indicated the record submitted to the federal district court included a notice, dated December 3, 1999, which was submitted to both the mother and the father, specifically stating it was a notice of hearing to establish the monetary amount of child support. Therefore, Ms. O’Keefe was served the normal notice to schedule a hearing. He clarified it was not notice by letter, as Ms. O’Keefe stated, but in a judicial format. When asked how much notice is provided, Mr. Chally answered the time frame is 41 days.
Mr. Chally referred to the fourth paragraph on page 1 of the Application for Child Support Services (Exhibit D) which states, “The CSE Program represents the State of Nevada when providing services,” and on the second page, in conformity with the actual legislation, language had been added above the signature line specifically stating the DA’s office does not represent parents; it represents the interest of the state.
Senator James requested Senator Wiener to study the issue as a subcommittee and decide how to deal with it, and Senator Wiener agreed to do so. Senator James informed Ms. O’Keefe the formation of a subcommittee would allow her more time to address the issue with a legislator.
Senator James closed the hearing on S.B. 285 and opened the hearing on Assembly Bill 62.
ASSEMBLY BILL 62: Makes various changes concerning garnishment. (BDR 3‑777)
John P. Sande III, Lobbyist, Nevada Banker’s Association, introduced Ted Wehking, Executive Director, Nevada Banker’s Association. Mr. Sande explained A.B. 62 had to do with garnishments upon financial institutions. Although the law seemed fairly clear to him, Mr. Sande indicated there had been litigation. He said section 4 of A.B. 62 addressed what would occur should a person not appropriately answer a writ of garnishment. He presented a scenario in which an individual had a judgment against a bank depositor, a writ of garnishment was served upon the bank, and the bank did not respond appropriately, and, as a result, the money was gone. Mr. Sande said existing law states the court should enter a judgment in favor of the defendant for the use of the plaintiff against the garnishee, which would be the bank, for the value of the property or the amount of money specified in the writ of garnishment.
Mr. Sande said apparently at least one lawyer had come up with the “novel theory” that, if the judgment is more than the amount in the bank account, the court should award the amount of the judgment rather than what is in the bank account. He said that is a rather harsh situation if the judgment is $5 million and the bank account contains $100, and the bank erred. He pointed out the question must be asked whether the bank should be liable for $5 million or $100. Mr. Sande said A.B. 62 is also contrary to subsection 3 of NRS 31.291, “A garnishment pursuant to this section creates a lien only upon the amounts in the account or the credit of the debtor at the time of service of the writ of garnishment.”
Further, Mr. Sande indicated an attempt had been being made to clarify the law to avoid ambiguity; therefore, sections 1 and 4, of A.B. 62, would add the language, “If the garnishment is pursuant to NRS 31.291, the amount of the lien created pursuant to that section would be the amount received.”
In addition, Mr. Sande said the only other proposed change was in section 1 of A.B. 62 which addresses how writs of garnishment are served and answered. Referring to page 1, lines 8 through 11, of A.B. 62, he said present law states the answers should be served and the person appear before the court in which the action is pending. However, in practice, the answers to the writ of garnishment and interrogatories are submitted to the sheriff. Therefore, Mr. Sande said, it would clarify common practice in Nevada that rather than going to court, the sheriff would be served with the answers.
Senator Care agreed with Mr. Sande’s comments on section 4 of A.B. 62, indicating it made no sense if there was $100 in the account and there was a $1,000 judgment. He pointed out he favored the remainder of the language in the statute because it creates an intimidation factor. The senator noted sometimes garnishees do not answer truthfully, or at all, and remarked it is easier to take them to court if they fail to answer an interrogatory truthfully.
In response, Mr. Sande said he shared Senator Care’s concern. He noted the existing language was not being changed in section 4 of A.B. 62, it only added a provision that said if the garnishment was pursuant to NRS 31.291, the amount in the bank account would be considered the amount of the lien. Mr. Sande indicated the law states that the amount of the lien is limited to what is in the account at the time of service of the garnishment. In regard to any other garnishee, the law does not change, Mr. Sande remarked.
Senator Care expressed understanding the language was not put into practice, but said it was there for a reason. He pointed out the difficulty of collecting on a judgment, and said sometimes operative language would have an effect.
With regard to financial institutions regulated by the state, Mr. Sande said if there was a pattern of nonresponse, Scott Walshaw, Commissioner of the Financial Institutions Division, Department of Business and Industry, would proclaim it a poor practice and correct it. He indicated banks take garnishee actions seriously and follow certain procedures. He said a problem only arises when somebody unintentionally errs within the organization. Mr. Sande indicated NRS 31.291 specifically mandates the lien, and pointed out A.B. 62 may pose a potential ambiguity with NRS 31.320. He said an attempt was being made to correct it.
Senator James closed the hearing on A.B. 62 and opened the work session. He referred to the work session document entitled, “Work Session-Senate Committee on Judiciary” (Exhibit E).
Senator James opened the work session on Senate Bill 15.
SENATE BILL 15: Prohibits attorney whose practice involves matters relating to personal injury from acting as arbitrator in action relating to personal injury. (BDR 3-34)
Senator James recalled that no one testified in favor of S.B. 15, other than the sponsor. He said Senator Porter had suggested increasing the salaries of the arbitrators. Senator James deemed the increase a good idea and reported he had discussed it with other members of the committee.
Senator Care disclosed, although he is not an arbitrator, he agreed the salary amount should be raised.
Senator Titus inquired the amount to which the salary would be raised. Senator James indicated an amount had not been determined and asked guidance from the committee. Senator Titus said she did not know what was reasonable and needed advice on the issue.
Senator Care suggested a range of $75 an hour, or $750 a day, an amount still under what arbitrators should receive.
Senator Titus expressed concern that should the salary be raised only a small amount and put in statute, at the next legislative session it would have to be raised again. She recommended raising the salary a meaningful amount in order not to be required to address it again for a while. Senator James suggested a range of $100 an hour, or $1000 a day, and Senator Care agreed. Senator James requested a motion.
Senator Wiener requested clarification whether the motion would be to pass S.B. 15 as presented by the sponsor with the amendment. Senator James explained the amendment would replace the bill.
SENATOR WIENER MOVED TO AMEND AND DO PASS S.B. 15 WITH A REVISION TO REMOVE EXISTING LANGUAGE AND RAISE ARBITRATOR’S SALARIES TO $100 AN HOUR, OR $1000 A DAY.
SENATOR TITUS SECONDED THE MOTION.
Senator McGinness asked who pays arbitration fees. Senator Care indicated the fee is split 50-50 between the parties, and in many cases, some of the money must be submitted prior to arbitration. Senator James added, in terms of what was involved, it was a diminutive amount.
It was Senator Porter’s understanding at times third parties helped pay the fees, and inquired about individuals who would have difficulty paying them. He asked whether or not people were ever denied the ability to use arbitration because of the fees. Senator James answered arbitration is a mandatory court-annexed program; therefore, should a person be unable to pay the minimal amount to an arbitrator, he/she is probably using legal aid to prosecute the case. He pointed out an attorney would cost much more than arbitrator’s fees. The senator stated no one is denied the right to go to arbitration.
THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY.
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Senator James opened the work session on Senate Bill 62.
SENATE BILL 62: Increases penalties for certain mistreatment of animals. (BDR 50-713)
Senator James pointed out Senator Titus and Senator Wiener had formed a subcommittee to discuss S.B. 62, and he asked them to present the amendments.
Senator Titus indicated S.B. 62 emanated from Senator O’Connell’s bill that came out of an incident in southern Nevada where the mascot of a football team was kidnapped and abused. She said a suggestion had been made that perhaps the penalties should be staggered, meaning that after the first occurrence, every subsequent occurrence of mistreatment would increase the penalty. Senator Titus indicated the subcommittee studied different kinds of animal mistreatment in an attempt to create staggered offenses, with more heinous crimes being the more serious offenses. She said in most cases the first offense was a gross misdemeanor, the second a Category E felony, and the third a Category D felony. There were some unusually serious exceptions, including overdriving, torturing, injuring, and abandoning, which would be Category C felonies; however, all the rest would be Category D and Category E felonies. The senator said a provision was also added to require a psychological evaluation for people convicted of offenses, particularly children, because evidence has demonstrated that children who mistreat animals often become more serious offenders later in life.
Senator James noted the committee had to choose between a mandatory psychological evaluation, or a discretionary psychological evaluation, with the court “psych review” proposed by John Morrow. He asked whether Senator Titus was proposing the discretionary psychological evaluation. Senator Titus asked whether the court would be required to decide whether or not a psychological evaluation was needed. Senator James indicated the court would provide for the psychological evaluation, but allow it to be recommended as a condition of being released, rather than making it mandatory. Senator Titus declared it reasonable.
SENATOR TITUS MOVED TO AMEND AND DO PASS S.B. 62.
Senator James clarified the amendment addressed subsection (b) of S.B. 62, rather than subsection (a) of S.B. 62, and all the outlined penalties.
SENATOR WIENER SECONDED THE MOTION.
Senator Titus said, additionally, the amendment prohibited releasing animals from a shelter for experimentation, and noted it was already policy in Clark County.
Senator McGinness queried whether or not the amendment would prohibit animals from being used for research. Although he did not support animal cruelty in any way, the senator said research on animals can substantially benefit the human race and requested further explanation regarding the reason for the prohibition.
Senator Porter indicated he received a request from a group in southern Nevada who proposed legislation during the last legislative session. He pointed out there were fewer regulations on animals used for research and experimentation that come from animal shelters. Senator Porter declared the regulations “willy-nilly” and pointed out the animals were not used by reputable research and experimentation firms. He said there were ways to experiment and perform research that were more superior than others, and stated this legislation would put the regulations in line with the rest of Clark County’s ordinances.
Senator Washington inquired about the affect upon rural communities when attempting to find a cure for infected and/or infested animals. Senator McGinness indicated he hesitated to vote for S.B. 62 because the University of Nevada, Reno (UNR), had done research on livestock animals. He said he did not wish the regulation to be all-inclusive and, consequently, stop an ongoing program.
Senator Titus said she would support the amendment because she did not recall a protest from UNR against it. She noted many times animal shelters were viewed as free places to obtain creatures on which to experiment. Although she was aware of the controversy, Senator Titus still supported S.B. 62.
Senator James inquired whether another bill existed that would address Senator McGinness’ concerns. Senator Titus proclaimed the rest of the bill meritorious and did not wish to see it stopped because of one provision. She suggested seeking another vehicle and adopting S.B. 62 with the other amendments. Senator James clarified Senator Titus would amend her motion to remove subsection 2 of S.B. 62.
THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY.
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Senator James asked Senator Titus to handle S.B. 15 and S.B. 62 on the floor, and requested Senator Care answer any questions that would relate to A.B. 62.
Senator James opened the work session on Senate Bill 204.
SENATE BILL 204: Revises definition of “manufacture” of substance. (BDR 40‑470)
Senator James explained that S.B. 204 would merely take out the personal use exemption and add “pharmacist” to the list. He pointed out there had been discussion and concern in the committee. Senator James was inundated with calls from law enforcement and prosecutors proclaiming the issue was not just an isolated case and was viewed as an impediment to breaking up home-grown “meth labs” (methamphetamine laboratories). Senator James asked whether the committee had an appetite to process S.B. 204.
Senator McGinness said he was confident no one would prosecute an individual for grinding up rose leaves in their backyard and smoking them. Senator James stated he did not want to go backward, speculating that should people be prosecuted for doing something in their home, the issue would have to be revisited. People creating “meth labs,” putting others at risk, and risking explosions was another issue, Senator James remarked.
Senator James clarified the exemption for pharmacists would be added to the list of doctors, and others who handle controlled substances would be part of the motion.
SENATOR MCGINNESS MOVED TO AMEND AND DO PASS S.B. 204.
SENATOR TITUS SECONDED THE MOTION.
THE MOTION CARRIED. (SENATOR PORTER ABSTAINED FROM THE VOTE.)
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Senator James opened the work session on Senate Bill 214.
SENATE BILL 214: Creates rebuttable presumption of negligence when driver of motor vehicle or pedestrian uses mobile telephone at time of motor vehicle accident. (BDR 3-635)
Senator Care pointed out that S.B. 214 now had “dentures as opposed to teeth,” but he would move to amend and do pass. Senator James inquired whether legislation already existed in the law. Senator Care declared there was a bill in the Senate Committee on Transportation, sponsored by Senator McGinness, dealing with a slow-moving vehicle on a two-lane highway that would incorporate the language into driving a vehicle at a dangerously slow speed, but he was uncertain how it would interact with S.B. 214.
Interjecting, Mr. Wilkinson indicated, after perusing the issue, he had not found a statute that contained the same elements. He noted there were statutes pertaining to operating a vehicle at an unsafe speed, but he did not find a statute that specifically conflicted or overlapped with S.B. 214.
Senator McGinness pointed out slow speed was a secondary issue. He said there was a reckless driving statute, but the highway patrol and the justices of the peace were seeking something less, such as careless driving, which would fit with operating a telephone, eating, reading the paper, or putting on makeup.
SENATOR CARE MOVED TO AMEND AND DO PASS S.B. 214.
SENATOR WIENER SECONDED THE MOTION.
THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY.
Senator James opened the work session on Senate Bill 336.
SENATE BILL 336: Adopts revised Uniform Arbitration Act. (BDR 3-1343)
Senator James indicated there was controversy regarding the addition of punitive damages. He said it would be a revolutionary law which would allow arbitrators to award punitive damages, and pointed out the proposed amendment would omit it.
SENATOR MCGINNESS MOVED TO AMEND AND DO PASS S.B. 336.
SENATOR CARE SECONDED THE MOTION.
THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY.
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Senator James requested Senator Care to handle S.B. 214 on the floor.
There being no further business to come before the committee, Senator James adjourned the hearing at 10:49 a.m.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
Barbara Moss,
Committee Secretary
APPROVED BY:
Senator Mark A. James, Chairman
DATE: