Senate Bill No. 375–Committee on Judiciary

 

(On Behalf of District Attorneys Association)

 

March 16, 2001

____________

 

Referred to Committee on Judiciary

 

SUMMARY—Clarifies statutes concerning murder. (BDR 15‑465)

 

FISCAL NOTE:            Effect on Local Government: No.

                                    Effect on the State: Yes.

 

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EXPLANATION – Matter in bolded italics is new; matter between brackets [omitted material] is material to be omitted.

 

AN ACT relating to crimes; clarifying certain provisions relating to murder of the first degree, murder of the second degree and manslaughter; and providing other matters properly relating thereto.

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, REPRESENTED IN

SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

 

1-1    Section 1. NRS 200.020 is hereby amended to read as follows:

1-2    200.020  1.  Express malice is that [deliberate] intention unlawfully to

1-3  take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external

1-4  circumstances capable of proof.

1-5    2.  Malice [shall] may be implied when no considerable provocation

1-6  appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned

1-7  and malignant heart.

1-8    Sec. 2.  NRS 200.030 is hereby amended to read as follows:

1-9    200.030  1.  Murder of the first degree is murder which is:

1-10    (a) Perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait or torture, or by any

1-11  other kind of willful[, deliberate] and premeditated killing;

1-12    (b) Committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of sexual

1-13  assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary, invasion of the home, sexual

1-14  abuse of a child, sexual molestation of a child under the age of 14 years or

1-15  child abuse;

1-16    (c) Committed to avoid or prevent the lawful arrest of any person by a

1-17  peace officer or to effect the escape of any person from legal custody; or

1-18    (d) Committed on the property of a public or private school, at an

1-19  activity sponsored by a public or private school or on a school bus while

1-20  the bus was engaged in its official duties by a person who intended to

1-21  create a great risk of death or substantial bodily harm to more than one

2-1  person by means of a weapon, device or course of action that would

2-2  normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.

2-3    2.  Murder of the second degree is [all other kinds of murder.] murder

2-4  that is not murder of the first degree that:

2-5    (a) Occurs in the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its

2-6  consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being; or

2-7    (b) Is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent.

2-8    3.  The jury before whom any person indicted for murder is tried shall,

2-9  if they find him guilty thereof, designate by their verdict whether he is

2-10  guilty of murder of the first or second degree.

2-11    4.  A person convicted of murder of the first degree is guilty of a

2-12  category A felony and shall be punished:

2-13    (a) By death, only if one or more aggravating circumstances are found

2-14  and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances which are found do not

2-15  outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances; or

2-16    (b) By imprisonment in the state prison:

2-17      (1) For life without the possibility of parole;

2-18      (2) For life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole

2-19  beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served; or

2-20      (3) For a definite term of 50 years, with eligibility for parole

2-21  beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been
served.

2-22  A determination of whether aggravating circumstances exist is not

2-23  necessary to fix the penalty at imprisonment for life with or without the

2-24  possibility of parole.

2-25    5.  A person convicted of murder of the second degree is guilty of a

2-26  category A felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state

2-27  prison:

2-28    (a) For life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole

2-29  beginning when a minimum of 10 years has been served; or

2-30    (b) For a definite term of 25 years, with eligibility for parole beginning

2-31  when a minimum of 10 years has been served.

2-32    6.  As used in this section:

2-33    (a) “Child abuse” means physical injury of a nonaccidental nature to a

2-34  child under the age of 18 years;

2-35    (b) “Premeditated” means an intent to kill that is formed in the mind

2-36  of the perpetrator after a period of reflection and judgment, of any

2-37  duration, at any time before or at the time of the killing;

2-38    (c) “School bus” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 483.160;

2-39    [(c)] (d) “Sexual abuse of a child” means any of the acts described in

2-40  NRS 432B.100; and

2-41    [(d)] (e) “Sexual molestation” means any willful and lewd or lascivious

2-42  act, other than acts constituting the crime of sexual assault, upon or with

2-43  the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of 14

2-44  years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust,

2-45  passions or sexual desires of the perpetrator or of the child.

2-46    Sec. 3.  NRS 200.040 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2-47    200.040  1.  Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being,

2-48  without malice express or implied, and without [any mixture of

3-1  deliberation.] premeditation. As used in this subsection, “premeditation”

3-2  means an intent to kill that is formed in the mind of the perpetrator after

3-3  a period of reflection and judgment, of any duration, at any time before

3-4  or at the time of the killing.

3-5    2.  Manslaughter must be voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion,

3-6  caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion

3-7  irresistible, or involuntary, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a

3-8  lawful act without due caution or circumspection.

3-9    Sec. 4.  NRS 200.060 is hereby amended to read as follows:

3-10    200.060  The killing must be the result of that sudden, violent impulse

3-11  of passion supposed to be irresistible; for, if there should appear to have

3-12  been an interval between the assault or provocation given and the killing,

3-13  sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing shall

3-14  be [attributed to deliberate revenge and] punished as murder.

3-15    Sec. 5.  The amendatory provisions of this act do not apply to offenses

3-16  committed before October 1, 2001.

 

3-17  H