MINUTES OF THE meeting
of the
ASSEMBLY Committee on Judiciary
Seventy-Second Session
February 7, 2003
The Committee on Judiciarywas called to order at 8:13 a.m., on Friday, February 7, 2003. Chairman Bernie Anderson presided in Room 3138 of the Legislative Building, Carson City, Nevada, and, via simultaneous videoconference, in Room 4401 of the Grant Sawyer State Office Building, Las Vegas, Nevada. Exhibit A is the Agenda. Exhibit B is the Guest List. All exhibits are available and on file at the Research Library of the Legislative Counsel Bureau.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
Mr. Bernie Anderson, Chairman
Mr. John Oceguera, Vice Chairman
Mrs. Sharron Angle
Mr. David Brown
Mr. Jerry D. Claborn
Mr. Marcus Conklin
Mr. Jason Geddes
Mr. Don Gustavson
Mr. William Horne
Mr. Garn Mabey
Mr. Harry Mortenson
Ms. Genie Ohrenschall
Mr. Rod Sherer
COMMITTEE MEMBERS ABSENT:
Ms. Barbara Buckley (excused)
Mr. John C. Carpenter (excused)
STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT:
Allison Combs, Committee Policy Analyst
Deborah Rengler, Committee Secretary
OTHERS PRESENT:
Paul V. Townsend, CPA, CIA, Legislative Auditor, Audit Division, Legislative Counsel Bureau, Carson City, Nevada
S. Douglas Peterson, CISA, Information Systems Audit Supervisor, Audit Division, Legislative Counsel Bureau, Carson City, Nevada
Richard Kirkland, Director, Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, Nevada
Daryl Riersgard, Criminal Information Services Manager, Central Repository for Nevada Records of Criminal History, Records and Identification Bureau, Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, Nevada
Jeff Artz, Program Manager, Fingerprint Work Section, Records and Identification Bureau, Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, Nevada
Allan Rogers, Data Processing Manager, Technology Division, Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, Nevada
David Kieckbusch, Deputy Director, Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, Nevada
Amy Wright, Chief, Division of Parole and Probation, Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, Nevada
Chairman Anderson made opening remarks and announced a quorum was present. He announced that public testimony would not be taken; the meeting provided informational preparation to comply with the oversight function of the Committee.
Paul V. Townsend, CPA, CIA, Legislative Auditor, Audit Division, Legislative Counsel Bureau (LCB), Carson City, announced that the Audit Division conducted a variety of audits under the “performance audit” category. He provided to the Committee copies of the Audit Report, State of Nevada, Security and Integrity of the State’s Criminal History Repository, 2002 (Exhibit C), which included a document entitled “Audit Highlights—Report #LA02-24.” This document was an example of an information systems audit, of increasing importance as more state entities began processing transactions, as well as storing and manipulating data electronically. Additional staff had been added to the Audit Division to ensure the security and accuracy of such data.
This Audit Report focused on the security and integrity of the criminal history records database, which was used primarily for background checks for employment purposes and gun purchases under the Brady Point-of-Sale Act, commonly called the Brady Bill. The audit covered the following topics:
Mr. Townsend reported that a number of serious issues were identified as a result of the audit, which included:
In closing, Mr. Townsend noted that a portion of the funding for the Central Repository for Nevada Records of Criminal History (CHR) came from administrative assessments. Additional funding came from fees and services provided by the CHR; it was a self-funded agency.
S. Douglas Peterson, CISA, Information Systems Audit Supervisor, Audit Division, LCB, Carson City, called attention to page 5 of Exhibit C as he began his testimony. He reported that the CHR had been created during the 1985 Legislative Session. The Repository collected and maintained statewide criminal history information relating to sexual offenses and other crimes. The day-to-day operations of the Repository were managed by the Records and Identification Services Bureau within the Nevada Highway Patrol (NHP), Nevada Department of Public Safety. The Bureau maintained relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and was a participant in the FBI’s Interstate Identification Index, which received and maintained criminal history information from all states. Mr. Peterson clarified that the criminal history records database was not the database that police officers routinely accessed when on the street.
Continuing, Mr. Peterson reported that the Bureau was divided into three primary sections:
Calling attention to page 8 (Exhibit C), Mr. Peterson began an overview of how information was received into the database and how it was used. The process for building the database began with local law enforcement agencies. Mr. Petersen explained how fingerprint data was entered into the database.
Continuing, Mr. Petersen commented on the civil applicant background check. Beginning in 1988, this program provided a background check on those seeking employment in certain occupations; a sample list of those occupations was provided on pages 8 and 9.
In 1993, under the Brady point-of-sale program, prior to selling a handgun or a long gun, a gun store owner was required to call the Bureau to provide information on the person attempting to purchase the gun. A background check was performed to determine if the purchaser had a criminal history that would disqualify him from obtaining the gun.
The Civil Name Check Program began in 1997, a service provided almost exclusively to the casino industry. A limited background check was run on prospective employees.
Mr. Petersen reported that in order to offset the costs of these programs, the Bureau charged a fee for each transaction.
Again referring to Exhibit C, Mr. Petersen summarized the findings of the audit.
1. Errors existed in the CHR database.
o Fingerprint cards—Two separate tests were conducted on the CHR database, resulting in a finding that 3 percent of the elements reviewed were in error.
o Errors in dispositions, the document issued after a person had been arrested and included guilty and not guilty pleas—The information was sent to the CHR to append an existing record. It was determined that 36 percent of the information was in error. A contributing factor to the errors was that the information was not rekeyed, entering the information twice.
o Missing records—Criminal histories for 47 individuals were not present in the database. The Bureau was unable to determine why the records were missing. Characteristics of the missing records were listed on page 30, Exhibit C, and totaled 200 misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, and felony charges.
2. Processing of criminal fingerprint cards was not timely.
o In March 2001, there were in excess of 70,000 criminal fingerprint cards not completely processed. The text portion of the cards had been entered into the CHR database and was available for searches. The fingerprint portion had not been processed yet.
o For those fingerprint cards that had the text portion entered into the database, 40 percent had not been rekeyed.
3. Allocation of resources—Specifically reviewed were the fees charged for state ($15 fee) and FBI ($24 fee) background searches. Prior to January 2001, the FBI had conducted its own searches and billed the Bureau for that service. After January 2001, the FBI asked the Bureau and other states to assume that responsibility. Consequently, the Bureau was conducting both background checks, but was returning the portion of the fee that applied to the FBI search. The audit recommended that the Bureau retain the fee. Based on a five‑month period of activity at that time, an additional $76,000 of revenue was estimated. A review of staffing allocations revealed that there were eight positions vacant due to shortfalls.
1. Password controls were lacking.
a. LEMS—Law Enforcement Message Switch, the system used by the user agencies throughout the state, such as sheriffs’ offices and federal agencies that had access to the system
b. USOFT—The coding language used to rewrite the new criminal history records system primarily used by the Bureau and others within the Department of Public Safety
2. Controls did not limit access.
3. Physical access was not adequately controlled.
4. Disaster recovery was not adequately addressed—The process of planning, testing of service disruption, and computer malfunction that would lead to loss of data was reviewed.
5. The Bureau did not always conduct audits of the 112 agencies that used its system in a timely manner.
Mr. Peterson noted that the Records and Identification Bureau had accepted all 14 recommendations from the audit.
Chairman Anderson asked for further clarification on the actual audit process and the $24 fee assessed but returned for the FBI identification check. Further, he asked if the $24 fee was returned because excess funds were not deposited into the General Fund. Mr. Peterson reported that the Bureau had expressed concern as to whether it could retain the $24 fee, but the Audit Division had determined that the Bureau had the authority to keep that fee. Chairman Anderson queried whether CHR funds were deposited into the General Fund and whether funds were withdrawn from the General Fund. Mr. Petersen replied there were no General Fund line items associated with the CHR; it was a self-funded agency.
Commenting on the 3 percent error rate, Chairman Anderson questioned if that was considered normal in terms of paper processing. Mr. Peterson said the 3 percent error rate was addressed due to the extremely sensitive nature of the information. A determination as to whether that was an appropriate error rate would require a periodic review of the database to analyze the existence of any variance.
Mr. Townsend interjected that rekeying data, an industry standard procedure, helped in the reduction of errors.
Mr. Peterson added that comparable information was available regarding the dispositions where there existed a higher error rate and the rekey function was not employed. Errors in dispositions could also be explained by the lack of standardization of the forms, which was addressed with recommendations to work with the court system to obtain a standard form.
Responding to Chairman Anderson, Mr. Peterson reported this was the first audit of the CHR. Mr. Townsend reported the current audit cycle ranged from four to seven years. However, he announced audit follow-up efforts were being expanded. In addition, he said the Audit Division would review the implementation of the recommendations and could revisit the CHR sooner than scheduled, if needed.
Chairman Anderson noted that the role of the CHR had expanded since its inception in 1985. Chairman Anderson queried whether the CHR was experiencing staffing problems as a result of the reporting requirements associated with Megan’s Law and the Brady Bill. Mr. Peterson replied it was difficult to find staff for this industry. He deferred to Allan Rogers, Data Processing Manager, Technology Division, Nevada Department of Public Safety, to answer that question. Mr. Peterson admitted he had noticed significant turnovers and vacancies within the Bureau during the audit.
Mr. Townsend explained that there were two separate divisions under discussion: the CHR within the NHP, and the Technology Division of the Nevada Department of Public Safety. These two separate divisions presented a challenge in implementing recommendations.
Assemblywoman Angle noted that the CHR kept records of sexual assaults against children, which directly affected the enforcement of Megan’s Law in the state. Referring to Exhibit C, page 30, she asked whether any of the missing information related to Megan’s Law cases. She also expressed concern that 25 percent of the missing records were drug-related. Mr. Peterson replied that the storage facility within the Bureau was divided into two sections: fingerprint cards and sexual offenders. The audit focused on fingerprint cards, not the sexual offenders or any specific charges.
Richard Kirkland, Director, Nevada Department of Public Safety (DPS), Carson City, reported that the CHR was one of 14 subunits that reported to the Nevada Highway Patrol.
Chairman Anderson said the Nevada Legislature and law enforcement had taken a strong position to implement firearms programs associated with the Brady Bill and notifications associated with Megan’s Law as it related to parole and probation; the CHR played a key role. While Nevadans, as well as residents of other hunting states, were not pleased with the concept of registering firearms, Nevada took an enlightened view to enable point-of-sale turnaround within hours. The reason Nevada was able to accomplish that task was because of the CHR. Nevada also networked with other western states that were simultaneously establishing their history repositories in an effort to reduce reliance on the FBI.
Chairman Anderson expressed his disappointment over the results of the audit. He said he was concerned to learn that procedures were not occurring as expected.
Mr. Kirkland said that despite the fact the DPS accepted the findings and recommendations of the audit, he did not consider the Audit Division presentation a fair and accurate representation. He said he would present the “other side of the story.” He emphasized that staffing was a major issue, as was the funding of the agency to accomplish its functions. Mr. Kirkland commented that confidential personnel rules and regulations of the state prohibited him from informing the Committee on the actions taken to correct previous problems within the DPS; the persons responsible no longer worked in the DPS.
Referring to Chairman Anderson’s question on the 3 percent error rate, Mr. Kirkland noted the FBI offices experienced a 12 percent error rate. The CHR personnel were hired from the FBI offices in Washington, D.C. In closing, Mr. Kirkland said he considered the past problem fixed and went on to introduce the new manger of the CHR, Daryl Riersgard, who provided a 12-minute presentation.
Having read the audit report as a result of serving on another committee, Chairman Anderson expressed his personal disappointment that what was being requested was not being accomplished. Mr. Kirkland said it was a disappointment to the Governor and himself, as well. He said the Bureau had set a new course and offered to meet with Chairman Anderson privately to discuss the details of the confidentiality issues.
Daryl Riersgard, Criminal Information Services Manager, Central Repository for Nevada Records of Criminal History, Records and Identification Bureau, Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, announced he had been in his current position for only five months. He had therefore brought with him two experts: Jeff Artz, Program Manager of the Fingerprint Work Section; and Tisha Johnson, Program Manager of the Fiscal Unit, who operated all other work sections except the Fingerprint Unit. Mr. Riersgard acknowledged the important role of the audit process and said he understood the seriousness of the presentation, which had brought to light a number of issues that required legislative policy perspectives.
Calling attention to Exhibit D, Mr. Riersgard encouraged questions during the PowerPoint presentation. He began his testimony by noting there existed a seven‑part assessment of the real problem. Simple in nature, the problem had a ripple effect that was quite serious. After four years of repository management experience, he stated that the budget architecture was flawed because the CHR relied on court assessment revenue, which was unreliable and inadequate. Since court assessments were reduced by 18 percent, the CHR was experiencing a $797,000 shortfall. This lack of funding had resulted in 11 vacancies remaining unfilled, and 40 percent of the mandated workload was not completed, resulting in large backlogs. Continuing, Mr. Riersgard commented that the growth rate of the CHR workload was greater than that of Nevada’s population growth over the past ten years. He said that on average, the CHR workload was increasing by 25 percent each year, while he was simultaneously dealing with serious staffing reductions. Consequently, the CHR record system was diminished.
Mr. Riersgard commented that he had recently returned from a national SEARCH [The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics] group meeting where he had the opportunity to survey other state representatives as to the health of their repository budgets. He did not find one other state repository that would describe their budget situation as serious. Mr. Riersgard opined that Nevada’s current budget situation was serious.
Continuing, Mr. Riersgard noted that at the January 29, 2003, meeting of the Legislative Commission’s Budget Subcommittee, Director Richard Kirkland informed the subcommittee that there were three key issues for the CHR:
Mr. Riersgard said he had little control over the line items in the budget. The CHR had no control over the amount of work. Finally, the CHR had little to no control over the revenues received from court assessments.
Mr. Riersgard went on to explain the functions of the CHR, referencing page 5 (Exhibit D), “The Criminal Justice Loop.” The street cop caught the crook, entering the criminal justice loop. The key tool for the officer was the state computer switch, an invisible tool that mysteriously provided important roadside information when the officer made a 1029 check to the local dispatch. In response to the officer’s input, which might be as little as name, date of birth, and social security number, key information would be returned within 30 seconds. That key information could include the following information regarding the person stopped:
In addition, Mr. Riersgard stated that if the information within the state computer switch was outdated, incomplete, or inaccurate, it could result in the wrong person being taken into custody, missing the opportunity to catch a crook, or allowing the officer to enter a dangerous situation without forewarning. The remainder of the criminal justice loop was self‑explanatory—local jails, pretrial process, efforts of the prosecuting attorneys, 92 courts, prison, and state supervision via Parole and Probation (P&P) officers.
Referring again to testimony given by Allan Rogers before the Legislative Commission’s Budget Subcommittee on January 29, 2003, Mr. Riersgard reported that the state computer switch received an average of 20 million hits. The CHR process and service was not limited to state users. The CHR also served the regional network called WIN that included the nine western states, the larger FBI system, and coordinated with other states that requested CHR information.
Mr. Riersgard then discussed the six basic functions of the CHR:
In respect to workload, Mr. Riersgard said he was not an expert on the topic. He deferred to Jeff Artz, whom he said was the most savvy fingerprint supervisor in the state, if not in the western United States.
Chairman Anderson queried how the system had originally been populated and whether priority had been set to handle the 40 percent backlog. Mr. Kirkland said that the Bureau had no choice but to prioritize what it considered most important. Considering growth rates, funding, and staffing, there was no way that current employees could reduce the present backlog. Mr. Kirkland reported that some grants had been obtained, but even with university student help, the backlog still existed.
Jeff Artz, Program Manager, Fingerprint Work Section, Records and Identification Bureau, Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, commented on the initial CHR process. A computer system to house the information had been built and brought on-line, creating the first state message switch system. Prior to that occurrence, inquiries to 17 counties had been required to determine if a person was wanted in Nevada. At that time, the funding had included a mix of General Funds, Highway Funds, and court assessments. From that point, the CHR had grown from six employees to the current staff of 61.
Referring to a previous presentation made by the Administrative Office of the Courts regarding the collection of court fees and assessments, Chairman Anderson asked Mr. Kirkland whether this problem could be resolved. He queried whether the Bureau was meeting the requirements of the Brady Bill and those of Megan’s Law; these checks should be a priority. Mr. Kirkland responded that the Bureau was performing well regarding the Brady Bill requirements, but due to staffing reductions, the Bureau was looking to the FBI to handle those inquiries. Unfortunately, the Bureau derived the major source of its secondary backup funding from that process.
Continuing, Mr. Kirkland noted that the average employee within the organization completed 64 “work widgets,” or processes, per day. It was actually a dual process whereby one person completed 64 work widgets and then a second person rekeyed those same 64 work widgets. He opined that the Bureau needed to increase and maintain staffing relative to the growth of those 64 procedures, or choices must be made as to which processes were the most important. Mr. Kirkland recalled the “Cameron incident” involving a fraudulent check‑writer, who would have been considered unimportant in the big picture, but who later killed a police officer. He concluded there was not an easy answer to the problem.
Chairman Anderson related details involving Officer Johnson of the City of Sparks, who was killed in the line of duty while attempting to apprehend the suspect. Mr. Kirkland admitted it had been a failure of the communication system. He said Mr. Cameron had been arrested previously, his parole should have been revoked, and the situation could have been avoided. Mr. Kirkland said the slightest element of the criminal system that might seem unimportant, unfortunately could become very important. He said in another situation, a serial sniper was listed as a “domestic violence” and should not have purchased or owned a gun. Mr. Kirkland acknowledged the systems had not communicated.
Further, Mr. Kirkland complained that the audit did not illustrate the linkage between “work widgets in” and “work widgets out.” He said he did not want the Committee members to be misled regarding the Bureau’s current position and any future situation. He noted that the Bureau would continue to have a 40 percent backlog in six months and could be 80 percent behind in a year, unless staffing could be maintained. Another staffing issue to be addressed was the salary differences between departments and agencies. Mr. Kirkland noted that staff within the Technology Division received higher salaries performing the same functions as those in the Bureau, and as a result, he regularly lost staff to that Division.
Assemblyman Mortenson asked what was involved in populating the CHR database. Mr. Riersgard responded that the question could be answered when he was allowed to return to the presentation.
Assemblyman Brown noted that the Bureau processed nearly 200,000 CHR checks within the fee-based system, yet the Bureau was experiencing an $800,000 shortfall. He said that simplistically, the fees could be increased to cover the shortfall. Further, he asked how the fee-based system was set up and whether all customers were chargeable or non-chargeable. Additionally, Mr. Brown queried whether the Legislature had control over setting those fees.
Mr. Kirkland responded that those had been the questions asked when the problems were initially identified. He noted that the Department of Public Safety had the authority to raise the fees. In fact, fees had been increased, effective February 1, 2003. Yet, when the fees were raised, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, the largest single user and income producer, had informed the Bureau that it would no longer utilize the CHR services due to the fee increase. Mr. Kirkland said this could result in not receiving the increased fees and a further reduction in expected revenues.
Mr. Riersgard explained that although CHR was receiving fees for Brady point‑of‑sale program checks, civil name checks, and civil applicant background checks, as a result of the reduction in court assessments, CHR was managing funds internally, as the state permitted, to keep the CHR afloat. He noted that the current fees were appropriate and the Bureau would not support any additional increases. Assemblyman Brown asked what the current fees were. Mr. Riersgard stated that the Brady gun check fee was $15 and the civil applicant background check fee was $21.
Mr. Artz outlined a number of CHR fees:
Mr. Brown queried what other agency the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department could use to perform the necessary checks. Mr. Kirkland replied that the new sheriff was willing to discuss options, although he said he was unclear as to what those other options might be. He said he understood there might be pending legislation and that the Gaming Division might perform its own background checks.
Chairman Anderson recalled for the Committee the provisions included in Assembly Bill 466 of the 71st Legislative Session, wherein the counties and the municipalities each conducted their own work card permits for employees of the casino industry. In order to lessen the economic burden for a person who might change employment between different counties, legislation was enacted so that a single work card was utilized statewide, to be renewed every five years. He noted that Clark County had a similar problem for those persons who changed employment between different casinos. Unfortunately, the enactment of that law had affected the revenue stream, the agencies, and the programs supported by that funding.
Mr. Artz explained the base function of the CHR, which was the processing of fingerprint cards. In order for the CHR to exist, criminal history records must be supported by fingerprints. Every program within the CHR—Brady gun checks, civil name checks, and civil applicant background checks programs—used the criminal history records. Referring to the graphs on page 9 (Exhibit D), Mr. Artz said that within the data entry and technical search areas of the fingerprint work program, each staff member was able to process eight units of work per hour on average. Thus, for the fiscal year, the current staff was able to process approximately 105,000 data entry units and 118,000 fingerprint searches against the existing files. He noted that it was anticipated that 183,000 fingerprint cards would be received.
Utilizing the “water bucket illustration” (page 10, Exhibit D), Mr. Artz said the water bucket ran over after an employee processed 13,200 fingerprint cards per year. Based on the current workload and the current number of employees, he reported he would have a new backlog of over 77,000 fingerprint cards within a year. Finally, referring to the graph on page 11 (Exhibit D), Mr. Artz called attention to the increasing workload since FY 1998-1999, the number of authorized staff, and the decreasing number of actual staff. He opined the backlog would continue to grow because the fingerprint receipts continued to increase and the staffing remained the same.
Chairman Anderson said it was an erroneous thought process that computers would reduce the number of personnel required to carry out any particular task. The exact opposite was true: more powerful computers performed work faster, but required additional skilled workers because more complicated questions were being asked.
Mr. Kirkland said it was a disservice not to illustrate how the workload would be handled without computers. Further discussion was needed regarding improved electronic communication between the courts, the police departments, and those who introduced the data. He reported federal grants were being sought to assist in a variety of methods. He emphasized that additional staff was not all that was required.
Mr. Riersgard discussed the Bureau’s response to the audit, an analysis of the situation as of March 2001:
Mr. Artz called attention to the 3 percent error rate on a fingerprint card that included 30 data fields. Chairman Anderson said he recognized that the spelling of an a.k.a. (“also known as”) alone could cause errors.
Chairman Anderson announced that the videoconference to the Grant Sawyer State Office Building in Las Vegas was being interrupted due to the evacuation of that building. The Assembly Committee on Judiciary took a 15-minute recess.
Chairman Anderson reconvened the meeting and asked Mr. Riersgard to continue his presentation.
Regarding the 36 percent error rate for court dispositions, Mr. Riersgard disclosed that there were data entry problems that required additional technology funding to improve the system. Because of the acute shortage of manpower, a decision was made three years ago to not enter court dispositions into the system, resulting in a backlog of 110,000 unfiled dispositions. He noted that it equated to ten man-years of work.
In conclusion, Mr. Riersgard noted that 7 of the 14 recommendations in the Audit Report (Exhibit C) were related to the Technology Division. He said efforts to save money due to the lack of current revenue had resulted in the reduction of computer programming by 1,200 hours. In order to accomplish the third recommendation of the Audit Report (Exhibit C), to work with local court jurisdictions to standardize the disposition form, the Bureau was working closely with Ron Titus, Director and State Court Administrator, Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), to coordinate efforts to resolve the problem.
Chairman Anderson recalled that Mr. Titus had reported numerous jurisdictions were experiencing the same problems with standardized forms as they prepared to initiate computerized systems.
Allan Rogers, Data Processing Manager, Technology Division, Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, reported the Division was working on several exciting projects with the AOC, which would automate case management, including recording of dispositions and other court activities. That data would be electronically transferred to the CHR directly from the courts, in essence eliminating the backlog of dispositions and any concerns regarding miskeyed information. The Division was currently receiving electronic warrants from Clark County. Mr. Rogers proposed that this system be implemented statewide and that all warrants come to the CHR electronically. Progress was slow because funding was still a problem; the courts relied on assessments and grants. He reported there was a grant called NCHIP (National Criminal History Improvement Program) for the national improvement of criminal history systems, which the Division had been sharing with the courts over the last four years.
Chairman Anderson commented that as additional responsibilities and greater amounts of data were added to the system, a larger system would be required. While funding issues were not within the jurisdiction of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Chairman Anderson asked whether the current computer equipment capacity would be sufficient to handle the demand placed upon it, even if the manpower was not available to enter the data.
Mr. Rogers replied that there were two problems: the Bureau manpower issues regarding actual data entry and programming staff performing the required activities to improve the systems. As indicated by Mr. Riersgard, the Bureau had eliminated two positions through the end of the current year, a 50 percent reduction in his staff. Many of the computer programs were efficiency-based programs to improve the process. The Technology Division had been working on a consistent plan to keep the computer system updated. The current capacity was projected to be sufficient for the next five years. The Division had appeared before a recent meeting of the Nevada Legislature’s Interim Finance Committee with a report outlining a new contract for equipment for a major upgrade to the processing and data storage capacities based on needs for the next five years. The Division was not asking for any funding increases for equipment; that was included in the Governor’s 2003-2005 Executive Budget. There was one enhancement included in the Governor’s Budget associated with the audit—a security officer for the computer systems had been requested. The Division had never had a security officer to perform security audits of the local agencies.
Chairman Anderson noted that the Audit Report (Exhibit C) identified security issues. He explained that as a classroom teacher, the school system required new passwords every few months during the school year. He expressed his surprise that the CHR did not employ such security measures, especially since that information involved constitutional rights that should not be readily available to just anyone. He said, ”Hackers are not our friends.” In addition, Chairman Anderson queried whether any funding would be available for homeland security issues.
Mr. Rogers reported that the Division had received a small amount of homeland security funding for firewall software and a server. He noted that the federal government grant process was in disarray, grants were in question, and the Byrne grant was being held up.
In response to Chairman Anderson, Mr. Artz explained that the Byrne grant was used for enhancements to local agencies, although the CHR received approximately $200,000 a year. In the past, the funding had been used for live scan fingerprint technology and basic computer enhancements.
Referring to the security issues raised, Mr. Rogers said many programs used were legacy programs developed in 1985 when just having a password was the security enabled. Most systems were local area networks that had password protection. The Bureau systems were primarily mainframe applications and not server type applications. He reported that since the audit, the Bureau had re‑engineered many programs.
Continuing, Mr. Rogers said the 71st Legislative Session had provided one-shot funds to obtain additional NCHIP grant money to upgrade the LEMS system, which was being replaced by a new switch called JusticeLink, a server-based program that had security built into it. Those agencies that had been moved from LEMS to JusticeLink had 90-day password retention, systemwide automatic log-off for inactivity, and security-sensitive passwords that required eight characters with capitalization and special symbols.
Mr. Rogers commented that the arrest program software, implemented during the audit, previously mentioned as having missing records, had also been completely rewritten. The new software provided improved methods to track, audit, and ensure data integrity.
Chairman Anderson offered his individual support to testify on behalf of the Bureau in its quest for funding when appearing before the Assembly Committee on Ways and Means. He noted that he was also willing to represent the views of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary if there was a consensus that it was important to the Committee.
Chairman Anderson called attention to copies of the death penalty study bulletin, a homework assignment for Committee members. He noted that on Monday, February 10, 2003, the Committee would begin hearing the death penalty cases related to DNA testing. The bulletin contained the final report on the study with recommendations, proposed legislation, and memoranda. He recommended that the Committee members read the first 17 pages of the report.
Chairman Anderson informed the Committee members that a tentative calendar was available for review. It was not a public document, so it was only distributed to the Committee members. He discussed the tentative agendas for the upcoming bill hearings.
David Kieckbusch, Deputy Director, Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, appeared solely to introduce Amy Wright, Chief for just over a month, who had replaced the honorably retired Warren Lutzow. He said he would remain to answer any questions of the Director’s office.
Amy Wright, Chief, Division of Parole and Probation (P&P), Nevada Department of Public Safety, Carson City, introduced Richard Varner, newly appointed Deputy Chief, who had been with the Division since Monday, February 3, 2003. She also introduced Kathy Thompson, Management Analyst, P&P, who had developed the presentation. It was her intention to provide an overview of the Division and its major programs. She reported the Division derived its authority through Chapters 176, 176A, 209, and 213 of the Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS). The Division was responsible for the community supervision of probationers, parolees, and special program inmates, which entailed both law enforcement and case management duties.
Referring to the PowerPoint presentation (Exhibit E), Ms. Wright outlined the duties of the Division, which included:
Continuing, Ms. Wright said the organization of the Division reflected the geographical characteristics of the state. There were 13 offices with the central administrative office located in Carson City. In response to the 3 percent budget reductions in FY 2003, the Division recently closed two offices, a court services office in Las Vegas and the Minden office. The Division operated four primary districts with headquarters in Carson City, Elko, Reno, and Las Vegas. The two urban offices, Reno and Las Vegas, accounted for 80 percent of the Division’s workload. The rural offices, while accounting for 20 percent of the workload, were responsible for more than 87,699 square miles.
Ms. Wright indicated that the average offender population within Nevada was 11,478, divided between the four districts as follows:
|
District – Office |
Offender Population |
|
1 — Carson City |
812 |
|
2 — Reno |
2,461 |
|
3 — Elko |
374 |
|
4 — Las Vegas |
7,831 |
|
|
11,478 |
Regarding staffing, Ms. Wright reported the Division was authorized to employ a total of 469 people, which included four positions that had been eliminated in response to the current budget crisis. Of those 469 employees, there were 268 sworn and 201 civilian support staff. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the Division would be eliminating 19 positions. The sworn personnel annual vacancy comparison indicated the sworn staff retention had improved since FY2001, showing a 60 percent improvement and holding steady at 15 vacancies per month. Pay grades for sworn personnel and state employee pay had been increased, implemented and approved by the 2001 Legislature.
However, due to the lack of state revenues that had forced a hiring freeze, Ms. Wright said the Division had experienced a 70 percent increase in civilian vacancies since FY2001.
Recognizing that Ms. Wright had only held her position for a month, Chairman Anderson commented on the state’s past practice of not filling a position for six months after it became vacant as an operational strategy to save money. He opined that this strategy appeared to have affected P&P more than other agencies because of the relatively large turnover of personnel. He questioned whether P&P was still experiencing a large turnover of those who began employment in P&P and then chose to transfer to other state agencies, and, as a result, if P&P was understaffed disproportionately compared to other state agencies.
Regarding the turnover, Ms. Wright indicated that turnover among the sworn officers had been considerably reduced and the Division had been able to maintain and lower the average vacancy rate. From July 2000 to June 2001, the average sworn officer vacancy held steady at 37 positions. Currently, the sworn officer vacancy was 15 positions. Ms. Wright said she did not have information available to make a comparison between P&P and other state agencies regarding vacancies. Chairman Anderson asked whether it would be possible to obtain that information. Ms. Wright said she would work with the Department of Personnel to obtain information, make the appropriate comparisons, and provide the information to the Committee. (See Exhibit F.)
Assemblyman Conklin asked for clarification as to the difference between sworn and civilian personnel. Ms. Wright said the sworn personnel were law enforcement officers and certified peace officers; civilian personnel provided support functions. Additionally, she noted the Division had reclassified court services positions, formerly manned by sworn officers, to be filled by civilian personnel since those positions were paperwork-intensive. This change allowed the sworn law enforcement officers to supervise offenders in the field.
Making reference to law enforcement training and the resulting category status, Chairman Anderson asked which category P&P officers would be placed in. Ms. Wright replied that legislatively the Division was authorized as Category II peace officers’ standards training. In the past, Category I peace officers’ standards training had been offered. Chairman Anderson said that Category I officers were those in NHP and on the streets, the highest level of training. Ms. Wright agreed those would be first responders. She continued that Category II was a step lower, and Category III was correctional officers for the prisons. Chairman Anderson noted that Category III officers did not receive emergency vehicle training.
Taking into consideration the inherent nature of the job as a P&P officer, Assemblyman Horne asked whether Ms. Wright anticipated a turnaround in sworn officer vacancies as they took on more tasks if the civilian personnel experienced a larger turnover. Ms. Wright said the high vacancy rate and the hiring freeze in the civilian support staff had caused the Division to perform more efficiently; some functions were completed late. While emphasis had been placed on those areas requiring sworn officers, civilian support staff were reorganized and utilized where their resources were most needed. Because P&P had moved to an electronic case management system, positions had been reallocated and moved to best utilize resources as officers entered and maintained data in real time and transferred information into reports. Ms. Wright noted that no officers were required to assume support staff responsibilities.
Chairman Anderson asked for information regarding the ratio of sworn officers to the number of cases. Further, he asked if the type of offender, primary crime committed, sentence, recidivism, and number of required P&P visits were considered. Ms. Wright indicated those questions would be answered in the remainder of the presentation.
Ms. Wright commented on the civilian reclassification of the sworn officer positions. In 1999, a pilot program began downgrading positions assigned to court services, where pre-sentencing investigations were prepared, from sworn officers to civilian positions. There were three positions in Reno and four positions in Las Vegas; that program worked well. The 2001 Legislature had authorized P&P to continue reclassification of those sworn positions to civilian positions. Currently, there were 27 positions that had been reclassified and occupied by civilians, 19 positions that had been reclassified but were still occupied by sworn officers, and 3 positions remained to be reclassified. Ms. Wright reported that the reclassification of these positions would result in a total annual savings of $345,365. This savings was associated with salaries only and did not include training equipment.
Chairman Anderson related his personal experience with P&P ride-alongs. He shared his concern that P&P officers were not supplied with the appropriate equipment to perform their duties. Ms. Wright informed the Committee that P&P had purchased hand-held radios for sworn staff, and the cars were equipped with radios equivalent to those of the NHP. Chairman Anderson asked whether the equipment was networked to the local sheriff or police dispatch system. Ms. Wright replied that P&P officers were dispatched through the NHP, and if a call for an assist was generated, P&P officers as well as local law enforcement responded. Chairman Anderson said the process “used to have to call the guy on his snowplow to relay to the state central radio system in order to get backup.” Ms. Wright assured him that was no longer the case.
Continuing, Chairman Anderson said it was a matter of personal safety for those officers, since everyone P&P dealt with had been found guilty; those were all “bad guys.” Ms. Wright agreed it was an officer safety issue that had been a concern of the Division and it had been addressed. She indicated that P&P was appreciative of the funding to provide hand-held radios for the sworn staff and for car radios as well. Chairman Anderson questioned whether the weapons were still falling out of the holsters. Ms. Wright said the weapon issued to officers was a Smith and Wesson, along with the holsters and all appropriate gear issued as mandatory equipment for sworn law enforcement staff.
Ms. Wright reported that the Division administration and management had been monitoring overtime and operations closely. As a result, P&P had projected a 31 percent reduction in overtime costs this year compared to last year.
Ms. Wright outlined the major programs handled by Parole and Probation:
Chairman Anderson announced he was required at another meeting and Vice Chairman Oceguera would finish conducting the meeting.
Ms. Wright explained that work units were a value given to the various activities and functions performed by line staff and were utilized to project staffing needs. She said that, given the continued relatively flat overall growth, the Division was not seeking any additional positions for the upcoming biennium. Ms. Wright called attention to the average caseload and staffing ratios for all the major programs as of December 1, 2002. She said that management closely monitored officer and caseload activities monthly and adjusted as necessary to ensure that resources were utilized as effectively and efficiently as possible. When caseload activity levels were over the authorized officer-to-offender ratio, officers would be moved to ensure that programs would meet authorized staffing levels.
In reference to pre-sentence investigations, Ms. Wright noted that the NRS mandated that such reports were conducted and completed for the court on felony and gross misdemeanor cases. The report included a complete criminal history of the offender, the offense of which he had been convicted, victim information and restitution information, social history of the offender, and a recommendation to the court for an appropriate sentence. The investigation was used as a tool for the Department of Corrections to assist in classification, by outside law enforcement, and as a case management tool for P&P officers.
Ms. Wright pointed out that court service work units included the following activities:
Referring to the “Court Services Caseload” chart within her presentation (Exhibit E), Ms. Wright said the caseload had increased over the past year, with an overall increase of 10 percent since FY2001. Supplemental and amended pre‑sentence investigations and boot camp reports, previously not included in court services work units, were added in FY2001. This was the result of a recommendation following an audit conducted by the Department of Administration in 1999-2000.
Ms. Wright reported that supervision officers performed a variety of work activities:
Calling attention to the “Regular Supervision Caseloads Work Unit Growth Comparison” chart (Exhibit E), she indicated a 5 percent increase since FY2001. Regular supervision caseloads included three levels of supervision: maximum, medium, and minimum. The medium supervision level constituted the majority of the caseloads. Each supervision caseload assigned to regular supervision had different contact guidelines based on the offender’s risk to the community. Ms. Wright reported that the intensive supervision and house arrest caseloads had declined over the past four years for a variety of reasons. Sex offenders who were supervised under the intensive supervision level were now placed into specialized sex offender caseloads. In the past, mandatory release parolees were supervised under the intensive supervision level regardless of their scored risk throughout the parole period. Currently, the NRS required that all mandatory release parolees be supervised at an enhanced level, and the Division continued to supervise them at an enhanced level. For the first 90 days, these parolees were supervised at the intensive supervision level regardless of the risk. Upon completion of those 90 days, the parolees were reassessed and were supervised at one level higher than their scored risk. If an offender scored a minimum or medium risk, as a mandatory parolee he would be moved out of the intensive supervision unit onto a regular caseload to be supervised at a maximum level. Additionally, the house arrest caseload was declining due to the high cost charged by vendors.
Ms. Wright said the population of sexual offenders in Reno and Las Vegas had increased 33 percent since the program started. Originally, the Division was authorized ten officers, six in Las Vegas and four in Reno. Since then, the number of officers had been increased to 16 to accommodate the caseload sizes. Currently there were 83 sex offenders who were subject to lifetime supervision. Another 156 sex offenders were currently in prison and would be subject to lifetime supervision upon their release. The number of lifetime supervision sex offenders would continue to rise, given that there was little recourse to be removed from the program.
Referring to the “Central Office Programs” chart, Ms. Wright said there were three central office programs staffed by 25 civilians due to their paperwork-intensive natures. Interstate Compacts caseloads had declined, while pre-release caseloads had remained static. Reallocation of staff from the Interstate Compact Unit to the Pre-release Unit had been completed to cover two vacancies in that unit. The Warrant Unit caseloads were also static, and that unit remained fully staffed.
Approximately 2,000 Nevada offenders were supervised in other states via the Interstate Compact, Ms. Wright reported. She said Nevada imported half the number of offenders from other states than was exported or transferred out of Nevada. Currently, there were 900 offenders from other states being supervised in Nevada.
Assemblyman Horne questioned whether the transfers from other states were required to sign an agreement in Nevada regarding any differences in supervision levels. Ms. Wright replied that Nevada supervised those transfers under the laws and conditions of the states where they were originally sentenced. The NRS applied lifetime supervision to convicted sex offenders whose crimes were committed in Nevada; it was not applied to offenders convicted in other states.
Since the overall work unit growth for all major programs had only increased 2 percent, Ms. Wright indicated that the Division was not seeking additional positions in the FY2004-2005 budget.
Referring to a series of charts on successful exits over the last five years (Exhibit E), Ms. Wright made the following brief statements:
Calling attention to the last three charts within her presentation (Exhibit E), Ms. Wright emphasized that P&P had placed a high priority on collections. As indicated, P&P had been collecting higher-than-projected amounts of restitution funds over the past three years. By the end of the current fiscal year, it was anticipated that P&P would collect $3.7 million on behalf of victims of crimes in Nevada. The Division also collected revenue from offenders who were able to pay $30 per month to defray the costs of supervision. The Division was projecting a 6 percent shortfall in meeting the projected revenue for this fiscal year. Overall, each officer collected an average of over $39,000 in restitution and supervision fees per year, a 32 percent increase compared to FY 1999.
Kathy Thompson, Management Analyst, P&P, also submitted for the record an e‑mail printout (Exhibit G) outlining additional budget cuts needed.
Vice Chairman Oceguera adjourned the meeting at 11:02 a.m.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
Deborah Rengler
Committee Secretary
APPROVED BY:
Assemblyman Bernie Anderson, Chairman
DATE: